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
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Prof. F. W. Taussig.

20 June, 1898.









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# THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNMENT

A TREATISE ON THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS  
OF MAN AS EXHIBITED IN HIS RELATIONS TO  
THE STATE, AND THE ULTIMATE FORM  
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT CERTAIN  
TO RESULT THEREFROM

BY

GEORGE W. WALTHER

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To

IRVING M. SCOTT

ONE OF THE BUILDERS OF THE WHITE NAVY AND FOREMOST  
CITIZEN OF CALIFORNIA IN PROMOTING HER TRUE ADVANCE-  
MENT, TO WHOSE GENEROUS ASSISTANCE THE  
PUBLICATION OF THIS WORK IS DUE.





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# THE PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNMENT.

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## INTRODUCTION.

**T**WO mighty movements can be traced throughout the whole of the period of time covered by the records of history, a period brief as compared with the full age of the world. Heretofore, these movements have proceeded along lines of human energy which appeared to be entirely different from each other and intended to remain totally distinct. Now, however, for the first time, it is possible to perceive that this separation was in appearance only, and not in reality; that the two movements are about to come together, and that their combination will constitute a positive advance in the development of man.

These are the movements which comprise the thought, the experience, and the discoveries of mankind in the separate domains of philosophy and of civil government.

Each of these domains is the opposite and yet the complement of the other. The one belongs to the

realm of mind, the other to that of matter; the one expresses spiritual, the other physical force; the one is internal, the other external; the one deals with the individual, the other with the nation. Philosophy is akin to religion, and seeks to discover the final relation between man and God; therefore it is spiritual, introspective, inductive. Government is akin to the sciences, and seeks the practical and immediate relation of man to man; therefore it is empirical, experimental, deductive. These two forces, the one of human thought, the other of human experience, have been slowly developing (for how long a time we know not) without mankind perceiving any connection between them, and it has remained for the nineteenth century to disclose the fact that they have been converging towards each other, and that their coming together is for the great good of man. The time has now arrived in the progress of their development when we can examine these departments of thought and of experience, each by the light of the other; from their juxtaposition we can now draw conclusions not possible before. It is the plan of this inquiry to follow such a line of investigation.

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In the development of the art of government the experience of mankind has demonstrated that there are but two systems which in any sense can be said to be finalities or to accomplish successfully the purpose for which governments are designed. These are the federal system of the United States of America and the responsible system of Great Britain.

Each of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, in its own way, in the course of the nineteenth century, has brought to something like perfection one half of the art of government. The federal and the responsible systems go hand in hand. Together they are applicable to all parts of the earth. There is no area too large for them; there is none too small. There can be no race of men too enlightened not to be the better for their gentle restraints, and one must go far down the scale before a people is reached which is too ignorant to live successfully under their sway.

The federal and the responsible systems are not antagonistic. They do not refer to the same aspect of government. They are the two halves of a whole. That they appear antagonistic is due to a misconception of what they are. They have not been clearly defined. In their practical application they have been mixed with other and extraneous things, and the common observation of mankind has not clearly distinguished them, delimited them, set them apart to be separately examined. The responsible system has been confounded with the institution of hereditary monarchy, and the federal system has been tacked to a plan of government which, when sought to be reduced to the classification of genera, is seen to be neither fish, flesh, nor fowl. Separate these systems from the rubbish that encumbers them, and they will be seen to be not two but one, as a man and his wife are one—each the necessary complement of the other. The federal system relates to territory alone; the responsible system deals only with men.

As both men and territory are necessary to make a proper nation, so the federal and the responsible systems need to be united to constitute a proper government.

The federal system of government is a practical application of the discovery that the relations of the citizen to the state are capable of division into separate and distinct parts, and that these divisions correspond to natural divisions of territory. The essential feature of the federal system, therefore, is the division and the subdivision of the territory governed: there is the nation, the state, the county, the township, each within the other.

The development of the federal system in America during the past one hundred years has been almost entirely a development of the lines of demarcation between the jurisdiction of the nation and that of the state. This development has about reached its utmost limit. The questions have been pretty thoroughly discussed and rather conclusively decided. The lines of demarcation have been pretty sharply drawn. There remains now room for but little confusion. We may consider that the controversy practically is at rest. It is true there remains still a further development to take place in the federal system in relation to the government of cities, but that is a separate topic, and will be treated in a chapter by itself.

The artificial division of the powers of government into Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, which was achieved by our forefathers when they constructed the American Constitution, is no part of the federal

system. It is a part of the government of the United States of America; but it is not a part of what is known to the scientific and the philosophical as the "federal system"—that is, a certain wise and successful division of the territory to be governed. The division of the powers of government into legislative, executive, and judicial, as attempted by the American Constitution, is not only not a part of the federal system, but also, it might be said at this point, that it is neither scientific nor philosophical. It is contrary to the experience of mankind. Our forefathers, having a hatred of tyranny, and living in an age when tyranny was represented to be in the person of the single prince, sought to escape tyranny by dividing the tyrant. They created three separate branches of the government, each apparently independent of the other, and all three as far from the influence of the people as possible. It may be said in passing that our forefathers seemed to have been as much afraid of the people as they were of a king.

The scheme of government was simply an attempt to set up three sovereigns instead of one. The result of such an attempt is not difficult to foresee. In time, one of the three powers will dominate the other two, or rather, I should say, will absorb the other two, and the three will become one, in fact, if not in form. The growth of a nation is slow. The United States of America has been up to the present, so far as its constitutional development is concerned, absorbed in the States'-rights controversy; but that question now being practically out of the way, the next fifty years undoubtedly will show the

inevitable tendency of the nation's future growth. That tendency will be towards constitutional unification.

It will be observed that I have said that one of the three powers of government will absorb the other two. I do not mean to say that the judiciary will or could disappear; but simply that that power now exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States, which, under certain circumstances, makes it in point of fact a legislative power, will be taken from it. So, also, will similar powers now exercised by the supreme courts of the various states. I allude to the power to declare a law to be null and void.

This tremendous but anomalous power given to the supreme courts of this republic would never have existed had it not been for a peculiar, but perhaps, under the circumstances, excusable error into which our forefathers fell when they designed the Constitution. In the first place, they seemed to believe that it was possible to prevent bad or foolish men in office from doing harm by placing limitations upon their powers. They seemed to have a profound and ineradicable distrust of men. They appeared to realize the truth that it was impossible to avoid placing the supreme and unrestricted power somewhere; but when it became necessary actually to place that power they sought to avoid giving it to men, and, instead, to place it in a written instrument which they called a Constitution. They placed this Constitution over and above all the departments of government, and it contained provisions expressly

and minutely limiting each. It followed immediately, of course, that some branch of the government must have the power of construing that instrument; this important function was bestowed upon the judiciary.

Under the circumstances attending the founding of the United States of America a written Constitution was, of course, to some extent, expedient. A number of (theoretically) sovereign states met together in convention and decided to yield up certain powers from themselves as individual states and to vest these powers in a central government. It immediately became expedient, of course, to define what powers were surrendered by the states and reposed in the nation. It also became expedient to outline the form of the new national government. These things were expedient as a starting-point, and it was expedient to incorporate the agreement of the convention in a written instrument, otherwise it would have been difficult to prove what the agreement actually was. Had the Constitution makers stopped at that, with a suitable provision for readily altering the written agreement in the future, they would have shown the highest wisdom. But they were not content to stop at that point. Alas! like many another body of men, before and since their time, they were filled with the conceit that their wisdom was greater than the wisdom of the Creator of the world. They fondly thought that the Great Design could be given shape by their feeble hands and moulded into future form. Not satisfied with the performance of the work they came to perform,

which (theoretically) was to transfer certain powers from the state to the nation, they sought to take altogether from future generations the power to do many things which, at that particular time, they considered wrong.

This was the error of our forefathers. They attempted to legislate for futurity and to make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for later generations to repeal their laws. They did not perceive that every generation is and should be a law unto itself; that every generation has its own needs, its own aspirations, and its own development. They sought to take from future generations that sovereignty which belongs to them, and to vest it in that inanimate king of their own creation which they called the Constitution.

This error once started in the first written Constitution of the nation has been carried to extravagant lengths in the constitutions of the various states which have since been adopted. It would almost seem as though the state constitution makers had set themselves at the problem of creating a government, and then of rendering that government powerless to do anything but to suppress mobs and to pay salaries. It is forgotten that constitutional restrictions never did keep bad men from being corrupt, but always and ever serve as obstructions to good men, in seeking to do good.

The first mischief which necessarily results from this fondness of our constitution makers to legislate for all time is that of vesting the judiciary with the power of absolute veto. There is no appeal from

the decision of the Supreme Court. There is none to say that the decision itself may not be a violation of the very constitution in the name of which it is rendered. Thus the power of veto is exercised by two branches of the government. But not only may the Supreme Court veto a law; it may make one as well. The decision of the court is often practically a decree of a new law—and one, too, from which there is no appeal except by a long, roundabout, and difficult process. It is in all respects truly a legislative power and inevitably will be stripped from the judiciary in the course of the constitutional development of the nation.

The constitution makers further divided the powers of government by dividing one of the three sovereigns. The legislature was made to consist of two chambers—a Senate and a House of Representatives, each altogether independent of the control of the other, and each of equal powers. But although one house cannot compel the other, either can effectually obstruct. Nothing can be done by one without the consent of the other. Neither house is wholly responsible for the passage of any law. Our forefathers, however, may well be excused for creating two houses of the legislature. The bi-cameral idea of legislation was the only one at that time generally entertained. The same view held absolute sway among English-speaking peoples up to a recent period, and, even as late as 1853, the Australasian colonies, when they adopted their constitution, seemed to have no idea that the bi-cameral form of the legislature could be improved

upon. Of late years there has been a strong reaction—but more of that anon.

The framers of the Constitution designed another division of powers when they created the Electoral College. This was after the plan of the Venetian constitution for the election of the Doge. In Venice, however, the idea had been carried to such extravagant lengths that it would seem as though our constitution makers could not have failed to see its absurdity. Fortunately, the people of the United States were wise enough to sweep it aside practically almost immediately by the simple device of nominating presidential candidates for whom the nominees for the Electoral College, in the event of their election, were in honor bound to vote.

Thus the Constitution of the United States of America was put together, and the God-conceived and God-grown plan of division of territory was fastened to the man-conceived and man-made plan of division of responsibility.

Division of responsibility is the great American folly. It is admirably calculated to bring about the very calamities it was intended to prevent. It is a promoter of corruption and a preventive of reforms. It encourages rascals and disheartens patriots. It is the creator of the "boss," the "gang," and the "push." It is because of it that great corporations are enabled to obtain the influence they do in American politics. In the present, it is the chief cause of all the evils of American political life, and, in the future, it is destined to make us objects of commiseration to succeeding generations.

That the institution has not worked greater evils than it has, even to the extent of destroying the American republic altogether, is due to two great facts. The first of these is that the institution itself was rendered nugatory, to a great extent at least, by the early introduction into American political life of a feature which is the very foundation of the responsible system, to wit, government by party. The voters of the country, and the office-holders as well, early divided themselves into two opposing factions called political parties, each of which based its existence upon a principle. Responsibility was thus, to a certain extent, shifted from the individual office-holder to the party. This was to a certain extent only, but still enough to create a united responsibility which subjected office-holders to a partisan watchfulness and a partisan control by partisan leaders. The divided responsibility was thus united again.

It is due to this fact that national politics are so much purer than the politics of the different states, and that state politics are so much less corrupt than the politics of our cities. The party lines are drawn upon issues which are purely national, and hence the party responsibility is greatest in national politics. This responsibility is lessened and weakened in state politics, and disappears altogether when we reach the politics of our cities. On the other hand, in our city charters, the principle of division of responsibility is extended to inordinate lengths. Our cities are governed by a bewildering multitude of independent boards, commissions, and departments,

some of which are appointed by the governor of the state, some (few) appointed by the mayor of the city, and some elected by popular vote. Nowhere is there the least indication of a perception of the truth that a city is a unit, with one people having a common development and looking towards a common future, and that therefore the form of government should express the same unity. Everywhere is irresponsibility, waste, corruption, degrading politics, confusion, and despair of reform. In one of the New York illustrated papers at the time of the Tweed exposures, a cartoon appeared which depicted a number of public officials standing in a circle, each pointing to the man at his right, and each exclaiming: "He did it." The honest voter in our cities is perpetually beholding such a scene when he seeks to "put the rascals out."

The other fact which has aided to save the nation from the extreme dire effects of the pernicious doctrine of division of responsibility is the inherent vigor of the units composing the nation. The American people are essentially a people capable of self-government. They are naturally conservative, self-reliant, patriotic, lovers of law and order, and haters of public dishonesty in any form. Again and again, have they risen in their might and broken through all the meshes of the complicated web of divided responsibility to declare in unmistakable tones for purity and for honor. Even in the cities have their herculean efforts again and again cleaned out the Augean stables, only to have the filth creep back again; but the repeated cleansing has prevented the

utter choking of the public life. How much better would it be, however, were these tremendous and exhausting upheavals unnecessary, and the energy thus consumed directed, instead, towards orderly and peaceful development!

The doctrine of division of responsibility, however, is not altogether without its foundation in philosophy. The makers of the Constitution were not wholly without an excuse for its creation. They had grasped a great fundamental fact in the art of government, and they endeavored to make the Constitution harmonize with that fact. The mistake they fell into was the choice of method.

The great fundamental fact in question is the truth that the people cannot be trusted to pass correct judgment upon details of administration. They cannot be trusted even to watch such details. It is indeed altogether true that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty; but the people, in whom alone in a republic reposes the power of correction and of final judgment, never did and never could exercise that vigilance. For the vigilance necessary is not only eternal, that is to say, unremitting, but it is also minute, and every man in a nation is chiefly concerned about his own private matters. He has not the time, even if he had the inclination and the capacity, to give to public affairs that exhaustive study and constant attention necessary to a comprehension of the details of administration. Even if a few men in private life gave such attention, their report to their fellow-citizens would be unofficial, they would be characterized as meddlers, and would

be little heeded and not at all believed. Furthermore, it would be impossible for the people to distinguish in such reports between public spirit and private malice, between the highest wisdom and the callow, carping criticism of immature, meddling minds. The makers of the Constitution understood these truths and perceived the necessity for creating an official body of men whose business it was to watch the course of government and to prevent or impede any action opposed to the public weal.

As a solution of the problem they devised the system of checks. It is in this respect that our form of government is positively unique in the world. The same idea has prevailed, of course, in the constitutions of other countries; but it has never been carried to the same degree of refinement. The American plan was the creation of a number of wholly independent branches of the government, each to be of equal power, and the co-operation of all to be necessary to the validity of any important act. It was hoped that each department would thus be a perfect check upon the other. The idea was not carried out to its last analysis; that was found to be impossible—the president, for instance, was given considerable independent power—but it was carried to an extent sufficient to raise up that monstrous folly, division of responsibility.

And yet our forefathers were, philosophically, upon the right track. They saw well the main-springs that move mankind. Their mistake lay in the means adopted to carry out their philosophical conclusion. Had they been able to look about

them with wholly unprejudiced and slightly keener eyes they would have seen the Great Design at work, slowly, as it always works, in its own good time and through the suffering and the effort of mankind, developing the system of the perfect check. Over across the ocean, in the land from which they had only just cut themselves asunder, a mighty struggle was going on, out of which even then was appearing the shadow of the true form—the form of the responsible system.

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The responsible system of government in its present state of development is the product of five hundred years of almost continuous struggle, and many mighty battles still remain to be fought before it will have reached its perfect form. It is not possible within the limits of this work to attempt any history of this struggle. Such an account would necessarily be a detailed history of Great Britain from the time of Edward I. to the present day. It is, however, possible and might be of use to point out certain turning-points, or rather periods, in which it can clearly be seen that the growth of the responsible system made a decided and distinguishable advance from which it did not again recede. For this advancement was not by any means a continued march along the pathway of progress. As in all other genuine advancements of the human family, there appeared to be almost as much falling back as there was going forward. It requires the retrospect of centuries to perceive that the movement was al-

ways, in the long run, an advance. It was much like the snail in the well, which climbed up three feet every day and fell back two feet every night.

The first of these periods was remarkable for that historic action of Edward I., by which the House of Commons was created. Prior to his time all the powers of government were vested in the king and the hereditary council of nobles; the common people had no voice whatever. That ambitious but sagacious monarch needed money to carry on his wars, but he found that the towns, or "boroughs," as they were called, where the bulk of the wealth of the country was held, paid the taxes with great reluctance and much grumbling. Accordingly he hit upon the device of permitting them to tax themselves. He issued writs to the various "boroughs," directing them each to send two representatives to the capital empowered to "consent to what the king proposed." The king, finding that in this way money came easier and in larger quantities, continued the practice. And thus was originated the House of Commons, which gradually attached as conditions to the voting of supplies, the making of some new laws or the amending of some old one, and so grew to full legislative power. But the administration of government was still retained by the king and the hereditary council of nobles.

The second period was that in which occurred the action of the Tudors in investing their secretaries with the actual work of administration, instead of leaving it as before with the hereditary council of nobles. These secretaries were selected from the

body of the people, and for their fitness only. The most noted was William Cecil, the secretary of Elizabeth. This period accomplished the overthrow of the hereditary principle in respect to the actual working force of the administration, which thenceforth was selected from the body of the people with little or no reference to birth.

The third great period was filled by the long struggle between the parliament and the Stuarts, which ebbed and flowed, now the king and now the parliament becoming master. This conflict, in the end, demonstrated that the parliament had become the more powerful arm of the state, and that the king could not govern without its co-operation and consent. During this period was shown the necessity for having the secretaries of the king obtain seats in parliament so that they might influence the course of legislation.

The fourth great period or turning-point occurred under William and Mary, when the custom was first adopted of selecting all the secretaries or ministers of the king from one party (the dominant party in parliament). Prior to this, it was the custom to select them about equally from the two great parties, Whig and Tory. In this period the first faint indication of the office of "premier" appeared in the person of the gifted Montague.

The next evolution, and the most important of all, appeared in the reigns of the Georges, when the great institutions of the "government" and the "opposition" came into being. Sir Robert Walpole and Henry Poulteney were the first statesmen

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to occupy positions analogous to our modern "premier" and "leader of the opposition."

The next step consisted in the establishment of the principle that the members of the ministry or "cabinet" must stand or fall together. Although this principle is merely a logical (and necessary) concomitant of the plan of a responsible ministry, it required a long time to become incorporated into the British constitution, and it is not yet fully recognized in the governments of Italy and of France.

The last great development began with the Reform Bill of 1832, by which was started that irresistible movement towards the democratization of the House of Commons, which has steadily progressed ever since, and which is slowly but surely transferring the sovereign power from the privileged classes to the great body of the people.\*

The system in Great Britain has not yet attained the perfection of unity and simplicity. It is, however, tending towards that end. The two greatest obstacles in the way are the House of Lords and the Crown. The House of Lords undoubtedly will disappear long before the Crown. The titular sovereign of the empire is truly such in name only, and the whole power of government is, in point of fact, wielded by the premier alone. The House of Lords,

\* This synopsis does not, of course, take into account the spread over Europe of the various modifications of the responsible system during the course of the nineteenth century; a movement which may be said to have been begun by that remarkable convention of the Spanish Cortez at Cadiz in 1812, which adopted a constitution providing for a single legislative chamber, popular representation, and a responsible ministry.

on the other hand, is never anything but an obstruction, and some day the people will remove it. But, before the institution of hereditary monarchy shall disappear from the British constitution, it probably will be necessary to have the throne filled by a very stubborn king who will insist upon actually exercising the powers theoretically vested in the Crown. That day, however, may be a long time hence, and the responsible system may, meanwhile, attain its perfection first in the United States of America.

It is not my intention to enter into a description of the system as it now exists in Great Britain. I refer the reader to the numerous works upon the constitutional development of that country. To understand the details of the mixed and complicated system prevailing there, it is necessary first to make a close study of the history of that nation. Our concern is rather with the perfect form towards which all progressive nations inevitably are tending. That perfect form may roughly be set forth under four heads as follows:

A. All the powers of government are reposed in a parliament (or congress) which meets and legislates as one body in a single chamber. The members are numerous, and are elected at frequent intervals by popular vote from the body of the people. A member need not necessarily be a resident of the district he represents.

B. The parliament (or congress) turns over to one of its own members, who is called the premier (president or king), the function of administering the government and of initiating legislation, with

the proviso, however, that he must submit his acts to the parliament (or congress) for its approval, and that the moment he fails to obtain that approval (expressed by a majority vote) he immediately must vacate his office.

C. The premier (president or king) selects from among the members of the parliament (or congress) certain prominent men, each of whom he places at the head of one of the various departments of the government, to remain there at his pleasure or during his continuance in office. The premier (president or king) and the men thus appointed form a council called a cabinet. The premier (president or king) is responsible for the acts of each member of the cabinet precisely as though they were his own.

D. The parliament (or congress) grants certain privileges to a small body of men called Leaders of the Opposition, who, in the main, are men who have been in former cabinets. The man whom this small body recognizes as its chief, usually, by the custom of parliament (or congress), succeeds to the office of premier (president or king), whenever it becomes vacant by reason of the overthrow or resignation of its incumbent.

The cardinal features of this system can be seen, at a glance, to be as follows:

1st. All the powers of government are vested in a large body of men elected by popular vote and sitting in a single chamber.

2d. The powers of government are actually wielded by a small group of men called a cabinet.

3d. A second small group of men is continually seeking to turn the first small group of men out of office for the sake of getting into office; thus the first group or cabinet is continually watched by experts who have a vital interest to stimulate their vigilance.

4th. At the head of each of the two small groups of men is a leader who, in point of fact, unites in his single person all the real power of each group.

Here, then, is the essence of that wonderful scheme of government known as the responsible (or parliamentary) system. All the members of parliament (or congress) inevitably range themselves under the banner of one of the two leaders (either of the "government" or of the "opposition"), and the people of the whole land instinctively marshal themselves in the same manner, so that, in point of fact, the whole nation is divided into two great opposing camps or factions, each represented by some central or principal idea. According as one faction or the other becomes the more numerous, the idea or principle represented by that faction prevails in the government of the country. When all this is taken into account, we begin to see that this system does indeed combine to perfection the three great essentials of government. These essentials are:

1st. The sovereign power (actually, and not merely theoretically) is retained in the hands of the people.


2d. All the powers of the administration of government are concentrated in the hands of a single man, who, necessarily, is one of the two leaders of

parliament (or congress), and one of the ablest statesmen in the nation.

3d. An absolute and perfect check is obtained upon those in power.

The first time these propositions are considered, there immediately arises in the mind a host of questions and of objections. Before attempting to answer, or even to state, any of these, it will be advisable to conduct an inquiry into those fundamental causes affecting the progress of mankind, the results of which appear as nations and as the governments thereof.





## CHAPTER I.

### THE LAW OF THE DOUBLE ASPECT OF THE PEOPLE.

**T**HE very first question which confronts one who attempts a philosophical examination into the fundamental laws underlying the art of government is: What is the law of life itself? Government, scientifically considered, is merely the art of adjusting the relations of a man to his neighbors in such manner that the greater the number of individuals brought together under one government, the greater the liberty, opportunity, and leisure each will have to pursue the purpose of his own life. It follows, therefore, that, in order to determine whether individuals of a nation are, on the whole, better able to pursue that purpose under one form of government than another, it is necessary, in the first place, to know what the main purpose of the life of each individual is. Furthermore, it is necessary to ascertain if this main purpose, when discovered in one individual, be the same in others. In other words, is the fact of physical life traceable, on the whole, to some deep necessity of the soul, common to all

humanity alike, and for the sake of feeding which humanity continues physically to live? Is there, in short, any main purpose in life?

We can obtain an answer to this question, with more or less distinctness, from three sources, which I here group in the order of their importance: (1) By ascertaining what the wise men of the world have said about it; (2) By an examination of history; and (3) By a study on the part of each individual of his own inner consciousness.

From the first of these three sources we obtain the testimony (which is practically unanimous) that the law of life is growth. "Man lives," say the wise men, "that he may grow." All the seers of all the ages unite in proclaiming this truth. It is only when we come to inquire as to the manner and form of the growth that we find a divergence among them. Just in what this growth consists and exactly how it manifests itself, are questions they do not all answer alike. Some say a growth in spiritual insight and spiritual power is the object and meaning of life. Others say a growth in knowledge, character, and wisdom. A third group says that there is, in point of fact, no real difference between the two first schools, because before a soul is really ready to acquire spiritual experience it must first exhaust temporal experience. A fourth class (happily very small and little deferred to) says that the growth desired is a widening of the ability and the opportunity to enjoy the pleasures of the senses, or, in other words, the pursuit of happiness in its narrowest and most materialistic sense. But it is not necessary to

enter into these distinctions. It is enough for our present purpose to know that all the wise men whom the world has known unite in saying that the object of life is growth of some sort or other.

An examination of history seems to present irresistibly the same conclusion. What are all the wars of conquest but a blind yielding to the instinct of expansion? He would be but a shallow observer who would suppose that they were due solely to the personal ambition of this prince or of that general. Neither king nor warrior is ever able to lead a people in a direction opposite to the national impulse. Before the ponderous machinery necessary to a war of conquest could be set in motion, the mysterious, perhaps silent but nevertheless irresistible, opposition of the united wills of all the people of the nation would beat down and divert the purpose of the most despotic and ambitious ruler that ever trod the earth. As in the wars of conquest, so in the colonizing energies of nations does the instinct of expansion express itself. Here the energy is expended upon a conquest of nature instead of upon a conquest of peoples.

But certainly in more than their outward expansion does the constitutional history of every people exhibit this irresistible impulse to grow. The internal struggles of nations are simply mighty efforts of the people to obtain greater liberty and opportunity to grow. This is so plainly apparent that it is not necessary to enter into a discussion of the matter. It may be pointed out, however, that this instinct for growth is (within certain limitations, which will

be referred to in a subsequent chapter) incessantly active in all progressive peoples. The moment the internal development ceases, the energy immediately seeks expression in foreign war, while, on the other hand, the moment peace with foreign powers is proclaimed, the activity at once occupies itself with internal change and reform. This fact has long been recognized by rulers and statesmen. It is the main reason why despots are usually so ready to embark in a foreign war, and it is the secret of the vigorous foreign policy of the Conservative party of Great Britain.

The third source of information respecting the main purpose of life, as before stated, comes from an examination by each individual of his own inner consciousness. It is no less explicit than are the first two; only, in this case, while the evidence is conclusive enough to each individual, it is not of a nature which can be made conclusive to others. John knows the desires and impulses of his own soul, but how can he demonstrate them to James? He can relate what they are, but James is compelled to rely upon John's unsupported word. This evidence is not of that tangible nature which, for instance, would be held conclusive in a court of law. What can be done, however, is to set forth those aspects of the human soul which bear out this theory, and to permit each reader to judge for himself if they agree with his own aspirations and experience.

I shall lay down the broad principle, then, that the desire for growth is the ruling principle in the life of every individual. It is sometimes difficult to

determine the direction in which the desire leads, that is to say, what kind of growth is longed for; but it is always unmistakably growth. This is proven by the never-ending discontent in the breast of every man. Discontent sits, a grim sentinel, at the doorway of every heart, and strikes with his poisoned javelin whatever enters there. No human being is content with what he owns, with what he knows, or with the extent of his experience. There is always present with every man a desire for something more. The thing which he has is never enough to keep him from wishing for the thing which he has not; to wish for it is to strive for it, and to strive for it is to grow. Discontent is, in this respect, in very truth, the mother of progress.

Taking it as demonstrated, then, that the main purpose of life is growth, we pass on to inquire what relation this fact bears to the form of a government. And here, immediately, we are confronted by a proposition which we must settle before going further. The proposition is, simply, that the growth of the whole of the people of a nation and not of a portion merely must be provided for, if the nation is to progress. The whole course of history teaches that a nation which excludes the common people from a voice in the conduct of affairs cannot long sustain a high degree of civilization. A nation may, indeed must, so to speak, begin that way and progress up to a certain point before its common people are or can be advanced much beyond the condition of serfs. A rude barbaric people are oftentimes best suited to a despotism, and are sometimes not capable of self-

government. But, in proportion as that nation becomes refined and advances in civilization, it must extend down to its common people a greater and still greater measure of freedom and of power. So long as the general tendency is, on the whole, in this direction, the nation will go on prospering and will increase in vigor. England, during the past one thousand years, is an excellent example of this law. Russia is now exhibiting the same phenomenon. But once let the tendency start in the opposite direction—let the masses be deprived of privileges once possessed, or let there be an absolute and permanent halt in the growth of these privileges, so that they do not keep pace, on the whole and in the long run, with the advancement of the upper classes, and the nation will presently lose its vigor and go downhill.

The most unyielding law of nature is the law of unity, and that nation which fails to perceive that each class of its citizens is of equal importance in determining the growth of the state is affected with a fatal blindness. The common people are ever the larger portion of all communities. They are always the most numerous class in every state. It is altogether illogical to suppose that the Great Design is carrying out Its mighty program for the development of a small portion of Its children only. It is only reasonable to conclude that the greater number (which needs development more, and needs assistance more) is as much Its concern as is the smaller, abler class. Lincoln, who, more than any other American, possessed an insight into the soul of the

world, expressed this idea when he exclaimed : " The common people, whom God must love because He has made so many of them."

The common people are the broad foundation upon which every state must rest. No matter how magnificent the superstructure, how great the Prince, how able the Senate, how compact the Great Council, how resolute the Ten, all these rest upon and depend upon the great body of the common people underneath ; once the virtue of the common people goes out, the state is lost. The people fill the army and man the navy, they build the buildings and make the roads, they toil, they invent ; they are the source whence continually springs new and vigorous blood.

A careful examination of history discloses a significant fact : whenever a nation excludes the common people from a voice in its government, in which the people have had a voice before, it pronounces upon that people the doom of deterioration. It is always noted that, in the course of a few generations, they have become distinctly inferior. In fact, they invariably have deteriorated to such a degree that they are no longer capable of self-government, and it then appears highly dangerous, if not impossible, to admit them again to any rights as citizens. It is not merely that they have had less training and, therefore, have less understanding of public affairs, but, also, that they have become distinctly an inferior race. The Italians of the eighteenth century were as distinctly different from the Italians of the Renaissance as Russians are different from Germans, or Poles from Englishmen. This fact is always accompanied by another one. In

just the same proportion and rapidity that the common people deteriorate, so do the classes above them—although at a later period. The eternal law of unity here does its deadliest work. It decrees that the governors and the governed form but a single nation which, if decayed in part, must decay in all. The secret of the downfall of every nation which has ever fallen may be looked for in the fact that the common people were excluded from the rights of citizens. It would seem as though the Great Design, balked of the opportunity of growth for all Its children alike, decrees the uprooting of the erroneous civilization and begins again in a new land and with a new people.

But, it may be asked, if the law of all humanity is growth, how can a nation deteriorate? A nation deteriorates and slips back toward barbarism simply because each new generation born into that nation is inferior to the generation which preceded it, inferior in capacity, inferior in desires—inferior men and women in every way. Thus the state of civilization which the new generation already finds in the nation is more than enough for it because it is more than it can assimilate. Its capacity for growth is more than filled. Its desire for growth is more than satisfied. Each generation, therefore, successively permits a lowering of the standard of civilization until, in the course of a few centuries, what was once the civilization of Socrates and of Plato, of Æschylus and of Sophocles, of Phidias and of Praxiteles, becomes the barbarism of mediæval, captive Greece, content to take its color from the Turk.

So far, all is quite simple and plain, but when we attempt to inquire how and why one generation can be so much inferior to another which immediately preceded it, we enter into a realm of philosophy which presents many difficulties. We smooth away some of these difficulties, however, by recognizing that, in the first place, there is a difference in individual men immeasurably greater than can be accounted for upon any hypotheses of environment, opportunity, or education. Note the distance between Gladstone and the average London laborer, or, to present a greater extreme, between Shakespeare and an Australian savage. The savage cannot in the least comprehend such a man as Shakespeare, but Shakespeare, on the other hand, has shown that he understands, not only the savage, but all the innumerable gradations of men between the savage and himself, and that, too, with such a delicacy of perception and such a particularity of detail as to make us wonder if, indeed, he had not lived all these lives in his own person, thought their thoughts, and felt their emotions. And savages are still being born, but there never since has been another Shakespeare. There have, however, been myriads of men in all the innumerable degrees of development from the savage almost up to the gigantic measure of the bard of Avon. Humanity has always exhibited this infinite variety and, it is reasonable to conclude, will continue to exhibit it while the world lasts.

Taking it for granted, then, that every man has merely a limited capacity for growth within a single lifetime, and that the capacity of every man is dif-

ferent from every other man, it immediately is seen that the measure of the capacity for growth of the children born into a nation is the gauge of that nation's progress. What, then, determines the character of the children born into a nation? What law of nature brings children of superior capacity into England and children of inferior capacity into Spain? Nature, in this as in all else, simply works in obedience to the law of supply and demand. It needs men of good capacity to sustain the free institutions of England, under which, also, on the other hand, there is scope for the growth of the greatest capacity. But in Spain, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, there has been small opportunity for growth and small need for advanced citizens. In other words, the character of the government materially affects the capacity of the children born into a nation.

Perhaps the most striking example of this theory which the world furnishes is that of the Italian Renaissance. After the declining Roman power had been totally overthrown by the repeated invasion of the northern barbarians, the lamp of Italian civilization, which had long been flickering, went out. Italy dwelt in absolute mental darkness. Suddenly through the gloom appeared a feeble light, which, however, quickly grew stronger until, presently, it burst into a glorious blaze that lighted all the world and dazzled the eyes thereof; but, just as the world was beginning to accustom itself to the glare, the light began to fade. It died down, went out, and was seen no more. Philosophers have been much puzzled to explain the phenomena presented by this

period. The amazing intellectual activity of the Renaissance burst forth so suddenly from a period of such apparent intellectual dearth and so quickly vanished again that it put at naught most of the cherished theories of physical heredity and of education. The intellectual activity of that time is still a matter for wonder. It might almost be said to have been feverish. It ransacked every corner of Europe, Asia, and Africa for manuscripts of ancient writers, plunged into every department of thought, and sought to sound all depths. In letters, in philosophy, in science, in architecture, in music, in art, the most bewildering number of masters appeared. It seemed as though all the intellectual power of the world had been bottled up during the dark ages only to be uncorked all at one time and in one place. Why all this tremendous intellectual force should so suddenly disappear, is a problem which has sorely fretted the philosophers. And yet the explanation is plainly written in the history of Italy itself. The key to that explanation lies in an understanding of the law of unity as applied to political affairs. For a brief period in Italy this law was partially satisfied and the result was the splendid Renaissance, which did not last because, almost immediately, the law of unity was broken again—in fact, completely overthrown. An outline of the principal events will illustrate.

After the repeated incursions of the northern barbarians had stopped, Italy was left in a state of almost practical anarchy. The people of the different communities were compelled to govern themselves as best they could. After a time, out of the confu-

sion, there emerged a number of small independent states, each of which, for the most part, consisted of a single city, with, perhaps, a small outlying territory. The most noteworthy were Venice and Florence. The significant fact about these early communes was that, in almost every instance, the rude form of government was wholly democratic; that is to say, the common people were the governing power. In early Venice, for instance, the government consisted, practically, of a sort of town meeting of the inhabitants of the lagoon in which every one had an equal voice. These democracies gave to the common people of Italy the vigor and character necessary to the foundation of a successful civilization; but, before the superstructure could be reared, another element was required—that of a discriminating intelligence. It was in the process of supplying this latter element that the Italians planted the seed of their own destruction. Every development, crystallization, or improvement in the forms of government became a means of depriving the common people of some of their political rights, until at last, at about the period of the Renaissance, in all Italy the common people were excluded from any voice in the management of affairs. In some states, a prince or petty tyrant had absorbed all the powers; in others, a close oligarchy prevailed. The Great Council of Venice never exceeded 1200 persons; in Florence 3200 was the greatest number reached.

It will be seen, then, that there existed in Italy, though not exactly contemporaneous in time, the two elements necessary to a high degree of civiliza-

tion, to wit : a unity of the people—that is to say, equal political rights for all,—and an intelligent, discriminating government. The one, however, merged into and overlapped the other. Just at or, rather, a little past this merging point, the genius of Italy blossomed into the glorious Renaissance. The vigor imparted by the early democracy remained in the middle classes for a century or two after the common people were no longer vigorous and then it gave out. The process of deterioration set in and the glorious period was over.

The favorite doctrine of the writers that the civilization of Italy, as indeed of all other countries which have risen and gone down again, was overthrown and lost because of the invasion of outside barbarians, is but a shallow theory evolved out of a superficial observation. No civilized nation, whose common people were free citizens having a voice in the government, was ever thus overthrown. There was a period in the history of Rome when the possibility of the successful and permanent invasion of barbarians was no more apparent than the chance of the sea invading the land and swallowing up the eternal city. The Romans were secure in their own strength. The barbarians would have been flung back as waves are tossed from a rock. It was after her common people for centuries had lost all semblance to political rights that the free barbarians of the North overran Rome. The process of deterioration had long before set in, and had progressed with fell effect. The same causes procured the successful invasion of Italy after the Renaissance. Italy had no free common people

with which to defend herself, and the less cultured but more vigorous Gaul and Spaniard easily made Italy their prey.

It can be laid down as a political maxim having a scientific accuracy, that the defensive power of a nation may be measured by the degree of liberty and of political rights which its common people enjoy. Not guns or forts or ships, but people form the bulwark of a nation's defense. The number of the people or the military training which they have had is not of so much importance as is the degree to which each individual actually enters into and forms an integral part of the government of his own country. When two peoples meet in death-grapple the factors which will decide the ultimate victory are, first, the liberty and political rights of the common people, and, second, the degree of advancement of the nation. A free, barbaric people will inevitably overcome a civilized despotism, but a people equally as free as the barbarian but more highly civilized will as certainly triumph as that in the springtime heat will triumph over cold. It is part of the law of nature.

An excellent illustration of this law has occurred in our own land. The Spaniards, spreading out from Mexico, invaded, conquered, and settled the territory now covered by Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. They virtually enslaved the inhabitants, and brought with them other laborers, mostly of mixed Indian blood, all of whom were kept in a condition known as "peonage." This peon labor became in time, by reason of the profuse mixture of blood and other causes, the common people of the

country. They were the Mexican common people. To the north dwelt the Indian tribes of the Apache, the Navajo, and the Comanche. They were savages ; but they were a free people who elected their own leaders and made their own laws. After a time the Indians began to make raids into the Mexican settlements. These raids, invariably successful, in time drifted into a well-defined plan, or rather process, of invasion and subjugation. The savages became rich upon the spoils thus acquired, increased in numbers, and improved in discipline and in military tactics. The Mexican settlements were one by one abandoned, the Mexican civilization was driven back, and, had the two peoples been left to themselves, the whole vast territory would have been restored to its original wildness. How far the savages would have penetrated into Mexico proper must be a matter of mere conjecture ; but I am of the opinion that they might have overrun all Mexico and have subjugated it. They were not left to themselves, however. On the north and east appeared the Anglo-Saxon, equally free but more highly civilized, and the savage tribes were soon subdued. An especially significant feature of this incident is the fact that while the conquered Mexican used every military art to keep out the savages and had a regular army on the border with extensive fortifications and ample military stores, the conquering Anglo-Saxon was, for the most part, merely the unorganized settler, with only such knowledge of military art as stern necessity and deadly peril taught him, and with such arms as he could individually procure.

This doctrine, however, is subject to one important limitation. In estimating the fighting power of a nation, the length of time its people have enjoyed the blessings of free government must be taken into consideration. It requires more than a single generation to infuse into a people which has lived under a despotism, the qualities necessary to make it a conquering one. The only instance in history in which this has been done is that of the Israelitish exodus; but in that case the conditions were so peculiar that it may be said to be the exception which proves the rule. In general, it may be laid down, that it requires the development of many generations to produce an unconquerable people. And that this is true will be plain when it is considered what particular quality it is that renders a people invincible. This is not the quality of valor, but is none other than the quality of self-control. A self-governing people which has been long used to self-government possesses pre-eminently the quality of self-control. The rank and file of such a people (and especially if it be a very intelligent people) go into battle with a full knowledge of all that the contest means. They go, not to obtain glory nor the rewards of paradise, but with the sole idea of winning the fight. They fight to win. They take in all the chances. They act together and yield prompt obedience to orders, but each man is, as it were, also his own general. They understand what is done, and what it is done for, and they appreciate the importance of each man doing his share. Such men do not lose their heads, or become panic-stricken, or give

way at the wrong time, or become easily disheartened; but, with a grim, steady determination, they do the work they are there to do. And when such men know their general and have full confidence in him and are certain he is making no mistake, they will fight with a steady coolness that nothing can overthrow. Such a class of men were Cromwell's Ironsides. A people may be merely valiant, however, without knowing anything of self-government. Its valor may be the result of forces other than the inspiration of liberty. It may be produced by religion, for instance, as in the case of the Turks, who believe that the highest heaven is the immediate reward of a death in battle. And it is a well-proven fact that the Turks are still valiant in battle, notwithstanding that they have long lived under a despotism. But none but a self-governing people possesses self-control, and, in battle, valor is to self-control what the bow and arrow is to firearms. Consider the Turks opposed to Cromwell's Ironsides!

But, after all, it is not altogether safe to attempt to reduce this phenomenon of fighting humanity too narrowly to particulars. Many exceptions immediately claim the attention. The most that can be said with certainty is that there is some peculiar virtue in a free people which renders it able to preserve its national life from destruction by war. And, indeed, this is all that is necessary for the purposes of this inquiry.

A people, then, progresses or decays accordingly as in the government of that people the law of unity is satisfied or denied. And at this point it

becomes necessary to inquire into that law of unity ; to understand what manner of thing it is, and why it is so important. We are here treading upon extremely difficult ground. The problem is not merely psychological ; it is occult as well. The statement, however, may safely be advanced that every grouping of men becomes at once a unity with a soul or intelligence of its own. This is not at all the sum of the souls or intelligence of the individuals composing the group, and yet partakes of them and is colored by them. It is, so to speak, a common soul—a communal soul. Observe an audience in a theatre at the representation by capable, well-drilled actors of a properly constructed play. As the play progresses, the individuals of the audience become welded into a homogeneous whole which thinks and feels as one. Dominating each individual is a common emotion, a common thought, a common intelligence—in fact, a common soul. Let one who doubts this make the experiment of withdrawing his eyes and his thoughts from the stage in the midst of a highly interesting scene in a successful play in which the audience is absorbed, and of giving his whole attention to the audience. The experimenter will at once become conscious of a nervous shock to himself followed by a sense of isolation, and will perceive a ripple of irritation pass over the audience. The unity of the audience has been disturbed. Were a dozen people to follow his example, the whole effect of the play would be destroyed.

The same phenomenon holds in larger bodies. A city has a consciousness of its own, so a state, and so

a nation. There is, in very truth, a national soul which partakes of and is colored by the souls of all the individuals composing the nation, but which is yet not merely the sum of those souls. It is, so to speak, an entity, a thing by itself, and has its own necessities, its own desires, it is progressing along the line of its own development and is shaping its own life and seeking its own proper growth. Herein lies the vital essence of the law of unity. A nation as a nation has necessities and aspirations for growth which are different from the necessities and aspirations of any individual in the nation or of any group of individuals or of any number of groups; it is seeking after a distinct national life which is designed to be, and is, the expression of the Great Design with reference to that people. But to make that expression perfect it must be complete; that is to say, the national soul will not be a true national soul if any considerable portion of the common people be excluded from a voice in the government. It will, in such case, be merely a partial and distorted expression of the national impulse, need, desire, destiny, intelligence, soul—call it by what name you may.

The scientific, the great—nay, the sole—consideration in adopting a form of government is to provide a proper vehicle for the perfect expression of the unified national soul. This is, in very truth, the whole of the problem. For, if a form of government can be devised which will at all times give a full, free, adequate, and perfect expression to the national life, that government will always do precisely and absolutely the thing needed to be done at the particular

time for doing it for the correct development of that nation.

To provide that vehicle has been the despair of all the lawgivers of ancient times. Every plan of government heretofore offered to the world has contained some fatal error, which, though hidden and apparently undiscoverable, always inevitably and with terrible precision, operated, in time, to bring destruction upon the nation and upon the civilization to which it belonged. Philosophers have theorized with wisdom profound and statesmen have planned with infinite pains, but to no avail: the nations and the civilizations have continued to crumble and to disappear. So inevitably have deterioration and death followed upon the heels of advancement and power that philosophers have been led to advance a theory that this is the law of nature from which no nation can escape; that every civilization, our own of the nineteenth century included, must inevitably live its brief hour and pass away; even the pathetic picture drawn by Macaulay of the New Zealander of the future moralizing over the ruins of London has been held to be not overdrawn. I do not agree with these gloomy forebodings. It seems to me clear that the Great Design has lifted the veil which has blinded the eyes of former peoples and shown to us of the nineteenth century the secret of Its own eternal plan.

The great and fatal error into which all the lawgivers and constitution-makers have fallen has been the failure to distinguish between those things which the common people can do and those which they cannot. In passing upon broad principles or upon

general results, the people are unfailingly right ; in deciding upon particulars of legislation or upon details of administration, the people are invariably wrong. Another fact correlated with the first and equally important, and, too, which apparently is as little understood, is that the people acting as individuals are wholly different from the same people acting in masses. The same man who, considered as an individual, will lie, cheat, steal, debauch himself, sell his manhood, barter his vote, betray his neighbor, shirk his responsibilities, and be in all respects apparently beyond the reach of grace, will, in a mass of him, when rubbing elbows with his fellows and called upon to face with them some great broad issue, become at once a stickler for national honesty and national honor, an upholder of public virtue, an earnest patriot, a defender of his country (with his life if necessary), and, in fact, be absolutely and wholly transformed. Also, considered from another standpoint, the same individual who, privately viewed, appears hopelessly stupid, ignorant, incapable, and limited, will, when acting merely as one factor in the great national whole, support, with marvellous instinct, that side of a great question which is precisely the side the light of subsequent events discloses to have been the correct one for that nation at that time to take—and this, too, notwithstanding that the leading minds of the nation may have taken the opposite view. Again and again have the common people of a nation overruled their leaders when all sorts of disaster were predicted as bound to come from their action—only to have subsequent events

show that the people were right and that the statesmen were wrong. As to the philosophy of this we shall presently inquire, but, for the moment, let us content ourselves with stating that the people in masses are exalted. They represent the National Soul. They are inspired by the Great Design. The voice of the people speaking upon a broad national issue is, literally and in very truth, the voice of God.

But very different are the common people when required to pass upon particulars. Here their utter incapacity is quickly shown. This is the fatal stumbling-block over which all the sages have tripped when attempting to construct the ideal republic. It was an obstacle none could surmount. Statesmen and rulers from the earliest times have seen, and seen clearly, the incapacity of the people for the administration of government. A distrust of the people has pervaded the whole history of the nations. It is this fact and this alone which has caused the exclusion of the common people from a voice in so many governments. It has not been because men are inordinately selfish. It has not been the lust for power. It has not been because rulers were cruel or rapacious or warlike or haughty or addicted to any vice or evil under the sun; but it has been simply and solely because intelligent men, one and all—the leading men in every nation—have clearly seen the incapacity of the people for the administration of government. “To speak of the people,” wrote Guicciardini, the Florentine statesman and historian, who, by reason of his representative qualities, was called the Man of the Renaissance,—“to speak of

the people is to speak of madmen, for the people is a monster, full of confusion and error, and its vain beliefs are as far from truth as is Spain from India." Nor has this distrust been ill-founded. The ruined nations, the wrecked cities, and the lost civilizations which fill up the record of all the long history of the human race are terrible object-lessons of the incapacity of the people for the administration of government. The public, in matters of detail, is a terrible blunderer, whose interminable mistakes bring ruin, death, and desolation. It cannot protect its own liberties. It is worse than a little child in passing upon laws. It is utterly incapable of selecting its own leaders. It is forever setting up rascals and crucifying Christs.

This was the terrible alternative that was presented to the nations for decision: if they excluded the common people from a voice in the government, they would surely decay until they became too weak to resist foreign invasion; and if, on the other hand, the common people were admitted to a share in the government, their incapacity would breed error, confusion, corruption, and, finally, anarchy, and so around again to despotism and to decay. Either alternative gave nothing but ultimate destruction. How, then, could the lives of the nations be saved? How could the civilizations be preserved? How could the two alternatives be blended? How could the apparently irreconcilable be reconciled? This was indeed the very riddle of the Sphinx which every nation had to solve or be destroyed. And how many failed? India, Babylon, Assyria, Egypt, Tyre,

Greece, Carthage, Rome, Italy of the Renaissance, the Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella—all have been devoured.

It seems never to have been clearly seen by any thinker that the people have two aspects, and that in one they are as children and in the other they are as gods. There was a man once—a Florentine, named Niccolo Machiavelli, who possessed to a remarkable degree the faculty of seeing things as they actually were. He had little regard for the superstitions, the pretences, the traditions, and the shams of the world, and he gave free play to his faculty of correct seeing and his power of keenly describing what he saw. He formulated and put forth doctrines so full of truth as to be strange to the world, which is at all times full of shams. Since nearly the whole of mankind is wedded to some error, if not in one form, then in another, all men recoiled from Machiavelli's doctrines and heaped upon their author such abuse that he has become the man in all history who is the least understood and the most vilified, to the extent, even, that, as told in the words of Macaulay, "Out of his surname they have coined an epithet for a knave and out of his Christian name a synonyme for the devil." At the very time when the Great Design in another, but almost barbaric country, was just beginning the work of evolving the true form of government, this man, by a mighty effort of the mind, lifted himself high above mankind, so that he was totally unaffected by their confusing emotions and desires, and he thus approached so close to the Great Intelligence that, in his inmost soul, he felt the great law of the

double aspect of the people. And I use the word "felt" advisedly, for although this law underlies the whole of Machiavelli's writings and gives them relevancy and connection, purpose and unity, yet he nowhere distinctly states it, or shows, even, that he clearly saw it and defined it in his own mind. But, nevertheless, this great law of the double aspect of the people makes all his writings intelligible and explains all the apparent contradictions therein. It crops up in them in innumerable places and under many forms and disguises, and dominates the trend of all his thought.

It is quite plain that Machiavelli felt the great law of the double aspect of the people and, in fact, founded his science of politics upon it, without ever stating the law or even formulating it in his own mind, and this, too, notwithstanding the 47th Chapter of the first book of the *Discourses*, in which he plainly states what, at first view, appears to be the very opposite of that law. In that chapter he says: "In examining whence this difference arises, I believe that it comes from this, that men are apt to deceive themselves upon general matters, but not so much so when they come to particulars." And he then goes on to give numerous instances in history to support his statement. But an examination of his illustrations discloses that he means to say that the people cannot grasp all the particulars of a general proposition, though when a single one of these particulars is detached and presented to them for decision, the matter is brought within the compass of their minds and they are able to decide, sometimes

wisely, but, at any rate, to decide. And, to illustrate by one of Machiavelli's own illustrations, let us take that one upon which he chiefly relies and which, indeed, is identical in motive with the others. That the matter may be better understood, I quote Machiavelli's words entire :

“In corroboration of this example we may adduce another notable one which occurred in Capua, after Hannibal had defeated the Romans at Cannæ. Whilst all Italy rose up in consequence of this defeat, Capua still remained in a state of insubordination because of the hatred that existed between the people and the Senate. Pacovius Calanus being at that time one of the supreme magistrates, and foreseeing the dangers that would result from the disorders in that city, resolved by means of the authority of his office to try and reconcile the people and the Senate ; with this purpose he caused the Senate to be assembled, and stated to them the animosity which the people felt towards them, and the danger to which they were exposed of being massacred by them if the city were given up to Hannibal in consequence of the defeat of the Romans. He then added, that if they would leave it to him to manage the matter, he would find means of restoring harmony between the two orders ; but that, for this purpose, he would shut them up in their palace, and by seemingly putting them into the power of the people he would save them. The Senators yielded to his suggestion ; whereupon Pacovius shut the Senate up in their palace, and then assembled the people and said to them the time had arrived when they might subdue the pride of the nobles and revenge themselves for the injuries received at their hands, and that he held the Senate shut up in their palace for this purpose. But believing that

they would be unwilling to allow the city to be without a government, it would be necessary, before killing the old Senators, to choose new ones ; and that therefore he had put the names of all the Senators into an urn, and would proceed to draw them in their presence, and that one after another those who were drawn should die, after their successors had been elected. And when the first was drawn and his name proclaimed the people raised a great noise, calling him proud, arrogant, and cruel ; but when Pacovius asked them to choose another in his place, the whole assembly became quiet, and after a little time one was named by the people ; but at the mention of his name some began to whistle, some to laugh, some to speak ill of him in one way, and some in another ; and thus, one after another, those that were named were pronounced by them unworthy of the senatorial dignity, so that Pacovius took occasion to speak to them as follows : ‘ Since you are of the opinion that the city would fare ill without a Senate, and as you cannot agree upon the successors of the old Senators, it seems to me it would be as well for you to become reconciled with the present Senate, for the fear to which they have been subjected has in a great measure humbled them, and you will now find in them that humanity which you in vain look for elsewhere.’ This suggestion prevailed, and a reconciliation between the two orders followed, and the people, when they came to act upon particulars, discovered the error into which they had fallen in looking at the subject in general.”

Now it seems to me clear that this illustration plainly shows the infallibility of the people upon a broad general issue and their utter incapacity in particulars. The thing in which the people were right was their hostility to the encroachments upon their

liberties which the Senate represented. When it came to providing a remedy for that evil, that is, when the people were compelled to particularize, they were totally at sea and could think of nothing better than to kill all the Senators. When Calanus singled out the first Senator to be killed and asked the people to elect a successor before killing him, it was simply brought home as an object-lesson to the people that they could not invent a remedy for the evil which oppressed them. So they abandoned the whole struggle. The other illustrations show identically the same result. The mistake which Machiavelli makes in this chapter, or, I should say, the wrong inference which a reader might draw from this chapter, is that the general is confused with the particular, for, be it observed, particularization in this sense does not mean the selection of a single particular out of many; it does mean the reduction of a general issue to its particulars, or to its parts; in other words, the understanding of a subject in all its details. It is, of course, easier for the people, as it is for a savage or a child, to understand a single detail, when presented apart, than to understand the true meaning and relevancy of all the details of a subject at once; but that is not the mental process which takes place when a topic is particularized and reduced to its details. And, further, when it is said that the people are infallible in deciding upon a broad general issue, the kind of issue that is meant is one which presents but a single alternative, as, for instance, whether a nation shall be warlike or peaceful, whether it shall expand its territories or remain

stationary, whether progressive innovations shall be continued or the nation shall rest awhile, and the like. But the moment it becomes necessary to decide in what manner a war shall be conducted or how the territories shall be extended or what innovations shall be made, the people are helpless and full of error.

The astonishing mass of criticism and abuse which has been heaped upon Machiavelli has been due to the fact that not one of his critics has been able to see the problem from the same exalted point of view as that from which he saw it himself. He who now takes up the *Discourses* and the *Prince*, having a prior understanding and a full appreciation of the law of the double aspect of the people, will have no difficulty in recognizing the keen insight of Machiavelli's mind; but to all the innumerable critics who have discussed his works without that prior knowledge, Machiavelli necessarily remained an enigma of varying aspects according to the point of view. It is easy to perceive, however, that the reason why Machiavelli did not clearly define this law in plain terms was simply because he did not clearly see it in all its fulness and importance. In attempting to make a practical application of his science he fell into two errors, one of which was basic and necessarily fatal, and the other one of degree merely and not of kind. The latter was simply the length to which he carried the doctrine that there was one standard of morals for the statesman and another for the private citizen—a proposition which we shall discuss in another chapter,—but the fundamental

error lay in his plan to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the double aspect of the people. His plan was that a great man, a "prince," should found the state, give it its constitution and its laws, and then hand it over to the people for preservation. He seemed himself instinctively to feel the weakness of this plan, for he continually insists upon the necessity for the people "returning to first principles," that is to say, to the constitution and laws laid down by the original founder. By never permitting any change in the laws or government, he hoped to avoid the evils arising from the incapacity of the people for details of administration. This, of course, is radically opposed to the fundamental law of the universe, which is that of growth—a law, by the way, to which Machiavelli did not appear to attach much importance. Indeed, it is more than probable that the intensely materialistic character of Machiavelli's mind not only led him into the mistake of ignoring the law of growth (which is a spiritual law), but also, as well, into the failure to grasp adequately the great law of the double aspect of the people—which is also a spiritual law. Had Machiavelli heeded the law of growth, he might have been prevented from falling into his error. And it was an error of the most radical sort. The people cannot preserve a government any more than they can found one. Their incapacity for details is as fatal in the one case as in the other. In the daily administration of any government, no matter how fixed the laws, there are innumerable details which are altogether beyond the capacity of the common people.

Inevitably, abuses will creep in, and, inevitably, the government will drift either towards a despotism or towards an anarchy which, in its turn, breeds a despotism again. Machiavelli avoided the rock only to be drawn into the whirlpool.

And yet, when viewed from another standpoint, Machiavelli's plan was not an error, for the reason that it was not so much a plan of government as a prophecy. The method which he outlined as a plan of procedure has been precisely the course followed by the world in its slow gropings towards the perfect government. If the history of England alone is considered, the prophetic nature of his work is not so striking; but, when the whole of Europe is taken into account, the accuracy of the prophecy is startling. Europe, from the time of Machiavelli, in her progress towards the true form of government, first concerned herself in building up nations. The national idea was the idea first fostered. To obtain true development, it was necessary first to build up a number of strong, individualized, distinct, centralized nations. In the course of this development, Machiavelli's plan was strictly followed; that is to say, a number of strong "princes" appeared, from time to time, upon the stage of Europe and built up and cemented nations. Furthermore, strangest of all, these princes, in carrying out their work, one and all followed, with absolute fidelity, the maxims laid down by Machiavelli. Many of them, as, for instance, Frederick the Great, who wrote *L'Antimachiavel*, abused him vociferously in words, while, in deeds, all the time strictly adhering to his doctrines.

After the various nations had been formed, they were "turned over to the people for preservation." That is to say, the people began to assert themselves and to demand greater and greater concessions until, to-day, all Europe is well on the road towards the true form of government—even heretofore decaying Spain taking a new lease of life and displaying a new activity.

There is a beautiful theory advanced by some of the philosophers that everything which happens in this world is first projected in the imagination of some great seer or leader of men. It would seem as though the Great Design, about to begin Its mighty work of developing the true form of government, permitted the foreshadowing of all that was to come to appear in the mind of Machiavelli. From thence it was to be given out to an unregenerate world which reviled and scoffed, but, nevertheless, obeyed. And yet Machiavelli was not permitted to see clearly the great law that gave coherence and finality to his science, and, since he did not see, neither did any who came after him. This truth has come to the world, as all great truths respecting the government of man have come, by the slow working out of the purposes of the Great Design, until, one day, lo! all men see, and then all wonder that it was not seen before. Thus only does the human family advance. The road to progress is no more royal than is the road to learning, if by royal we mean exemption from otherwise universal law. Man is what he is by experience only, and the experience is long and bitter. The law of the universe is growth; but, when

we come to measure by our finite standard, the growth is terrible because so slow. Mankind never has advanced and never will advance more than a single step at a time, and no step is taken until the ground immediately beneath the feet is thoroughly explored and trodden solidly into place. The footing must be kept firm beneath the masses. It would seem as though the moment a rapid forward movement were attempted, the wrong direction invariably is taken. Mistakes have been many and costly. Nature appears to show man what should be by letting him first attempt everything which he should not, and the lessons thus learned are bitter and full of suffering. But this is the method of the Great Design, and since it is, it is right.

We have thus seen that the law of the universe is growth; that the growth of a nation can be made continuous only by a form of government which gives perfect expression to the unified National Soul, and that the unity of the National Soul can be preserved only by giving to all the people alike a voice in the government, and that while the body of the people acting together is infallible in deciding upon general results, it is certain to err in particularization. It follows, then, as a matter of course, that the problem which the nations had to solve, but failed to solve, was to provide a form of government which would enable the National Soul, that is to say, the whole nation, including the common people, always and easily to render the final decision upon all generalities, and, at the same time, altogether exclude the common people from meddling with particulars. That

the Great Design has been working out this problem during the past five hundred years and that It has, in the responsible system, presented mankind with its solution is a proposition the pages of this work are designed to demonstrate. To render this demonstration convincing, however, it is necessary to furnish satisfactory if not conclusive evidence that the basic doctrine upon which the proposition rests, to wit, the doctrine of the great law of the double aspect of the people, is a correct one and is founded upon universal law. Such evidence can be obtained only by an examination into the essential nature and constituent elements of the souls of the people themselves. And herein lies the pith of the whole matter. We have reached, so to speak, a solemn moment in the progress of our inquiry. For if it be shown upon investigation that the minds of the people are so constituted as to be suited to the responsible system of government and to none other, our whole case is won. We shall, therefore, now follow in the footsteps of the philosophers and, turning our thoughts inward, seek to know the nature of man itself.

In conducting the investigation which is to end this chapter we cannot do better than to adopt the method pursued in the inquiry which began it, that is to say, to consider first and to attach the chief importance to what the wise men of the world have said about the subject. And in this matter we find that the philosophers naturally arrange themselves into three main groups or schools: the Brahman, which is the oldest; the Greek, which is a little later;

and the modern school, which, because completed by the Germans, is called the German school. As to the merits of these schools, they may be ranked as follows: First, and by far the most important, the Brahman; second, the modern; and, third, and much less important than either of the other two, the Greek. The Brahman school is placed in the first rank, not merely because it is the oldest, but also because it is the most complete. Everything in the domain of philosophy that has been given to the world during the past three thousand years by western nations had already been given, and better given in a more complete and particularized form, by the Brahman philosophers. The Greeks were but a faint echo of the Brahmans, and the modern school (given its body by the Englishman, Darwin, and its crown by the German, Hegel) has merely arrived at the same result as the Brahmans, but by a different road and with less clearness in some respects and, perhaps, a little greater clearness in others. But the rise and progress of the Brahman school of philosophy is so signal an illustration of how a whole people will sometimes exhaust themselves to obtain a single result, that a short account of it will not be out of place here.

In that great movement in which the Aryan race emerged from its Asiatic home, the stream of people split into two channels. One turned westward and became the progenitors of Greece, of Rome, and of western civilization; but the other turned eastward, broke through the passes of the Himalayas, and, emerging by way of the Punjaub, took its conquer-

ing course down over the great river plains of India. In time it conquered the whole peninsula and became the ruling power. This branch of the Aryan race already possessed a considerable knowledge of philosophy before its entry into India, from whence obtained none knew, though many have theories. After the conquest of the peninsula, it appeared as though the spirit of philosophy took possession of the whole people, and its institutions were shaped (or, more likely, slowly shaped themselves) with the sole object of developing philosophy to its highest limit. A large portion of the race was set apart as the priesthood. They were called the Brahman caste. They were accorded peculiar privileges and were exalted above all the rest of the nation. A Brahman ranked higher than a king and demanded ceremonial respect from warriors and statesmen. The caste, itself, imposed an iron discipline and a rigid mode of life upon its own members from the cradle to the grave. At seven years of age the young Brahman was invested with the sacred thread; he was then placed under the tutelage of a sage and was instructed in all the knowledge of the caste. He lived under this training until manhood, when he married, raised a family, and mixed in the affairs of the world. At the prime of manhood, when his intellect was at its greatest power and his youthful passions and desires had spent their force, he was required to leave his home and family and retire to the sacred groves or monasteries. There, with others of his kind, he spent his life in the study and the discussion of philosophy. In his old age, he

took his staff and his beggar's bowl and went about the world spreading his knowledge.

Thus, the whole vitality of India was given over to the exaltation and support of the Brahman caste, and the whole vitality of the Brahman caste was given over to the development of philosophy. And, during the period which is estimated as from 1500 to 500 B.C., this system bore its splendid fruit in that comprehensive philosophy which was given its ethical finish by Gautama Buddha (500 B.C.). The Brahman schools of philosophy were six in number. It is not within our limits to treat of them here; it is enough to say that they cover every phase of modern philosophical thought. But this caste system of the Brahmans, after having developed philosophy, had accomplished the purpose for which it was designed, and was of no further use to the world. Nevertheless it was so firmly implanted in the very life of the people that it could not be overthrown, and it has remained a dead weight upon that people ever since. For two thousand years nothing good has come out of India.

The basis of all the systems of completed philosophy is the doctrine of the universal consciousness, or mind, which in thinking manifests itself in form as the created world. Form is the phenomenon; the reality is the thought back of it. Each form in the world, whether of mineral, of vegetable, of animal, of man, or of what not, is merely the present expression of a section, so to speak, of the universal mind, or, to put it in another way, of a centre of consciousness, or, to give it another turn of expres-

sion, a particularization of the universal mind. Now, all these sections or centres or particularizations of the universal mind are in a course of constant progression. They are undergoing a process which Hegel calls a process of "becoming," which, being interpreted into popular language, means a sort of spiritual evolution. That is to say (if I may be permitted to put the thought in very simple language, which, necessarily on that account, becomes not very accurate and somewhat misleading): a centre of consciousness starting from the universal mind, as it were, passes through all the forms and experiences of creation, and finally, in the course of countless ages, returns again to the bosom of the universal mind freighted and filled with all the experience and all the wisdom of the material universe. This process of "becoming" is continually going on. So far as our finite minds can grasp the thought, there never has been a time when it began and there never will be a time when it shall stop. The Brahman philosophers, who were proficient in classification, put forth a theory that there is a period of time, occupying countless millions of years and which they called a "manvantara," during which this process of "becoming" is going on, and that there is another period of equal length called a "pralaya," during which it ceases, or, as it were, the universal mind sleeps; but even the Brahmans asserted that manvantara succeeds pralaya, and pralaya, manvantara, in endless succession forever. Not only is this process of "becoming" always going on, but, also, it is always in all stages of develop-

ment; that is to say, there are always centres of consciousness just beginning the long journey, and there are other centres of consciousness at all points along the road. Towards the end of this long journey the centres of consciousness or particularizations of the universal mind manifest themselves as Man.

Up to this point all the philosophers demonstrate, with much hard reasoning, that their conclusions must be true, but, when we seek to know by what identical method this process of "becoming" proceeds, both the Greek and the German philosophers discreetly refrain from attempting to explain. The Brahmans, however, with their characteristic boldness in matters of detail, put forth the beautiful theory of reincarnation. This theory, with its attendant law of Karma, I, for my part, gratefully and cheerfully accept as offering a rational and satisfactory explanation of the mystery of life. I comfort myself with the reflection that, if it be not true, it is, at least, so far as I can perceive, in harmony with such facts in the world as I have been able to examine and to understand.

But now we shall step down out of the most rarefied atmosphere of speculative philosophy and come into regions inhabited by the ordinary practical, thinking mind, not permitting ourselves, however, meanwhile, to forget the process of evolutionary progression or "becoming," as Hegel puts it, which is continually going on in the universe; we shall take up and examine those qualities and attributes of the human mind which, in their orderly development, create the essential difference between one man and

another, between the people and the leaders of the people, between those who do not think and those who do. And in this matter it is well thoroughly to explore the subject, for it is upon these essential distinctions between man and man that the whole of the philosophy of the responsible system of government rests. To show that that form of government has its origin, so to speak, in the very scheme of the universe itself, and that, therefore, it is the system devised by the Great Design for the government of mankind and the only one destined to endure, it is necessary, first of all, to show that the universe in the process of evolution or "becoming" creates essential differences in the mental capacities of men, which, by an orderly progression starting from close to the animal, ascends an infinitely diversified scale up to the colossal intellect of overtowering genius. Furthermore, it is necessary to show that along this progression there are well-defined stages or conditions, and that minds in one stage or condition are unable to perform functions which are well and easily performed by minds in another stage or condition. In other words, it is necessary to show that the difference between the minds of the people and the minds of statesmen are of such a kind and degree as to make it apparent that the responsible system of government, which is the only system based fundamentally upon this difference, is the system designed by nature for the government of the world.

The minds of men, then, as we know them, are all included within three classes: those which are ruled by emotion, those which are ruled by reason, and

those which possess that extraordinary and divine power of the highest genius, called by Hegel "direct knowing." Those persons who are in the first category, that is to say, whose minds are ruled by emotion, comprise the vast majority of the human race. The whole of the common people of every nation, and a very large proportion indeed of those people who do not class themselves as "common," have minds which are under the control of the emotions. A small minority of mankind—the leaders of men, the statesmen, the thinkers—belong to the second category—that is to say, their minds are ruled wholly by reason; while, at rare intervals, now and then in the course of the centuries, appears a man in the world who possesses, in its fulness, the sublime mental power of "direct knowing." But, while these three mental states are clearly distinct, each from the other, and while minds in one state perform their work in a manner radically different from minds in another state, yet there are no sharply defined lines of demarkation between the people who inhabit them. That is to say, while there are some people whose minds are wholly in the emotional region, and there are other people who have entirely graduated, so to speak, from that condition and live altogether upon the plane of pure reason, yet there are great numbers—indeed, by far the greater number—whose minds alternately functionate in both these conditions. In some, emotionalism controls most of the time, and in others reason has the greater sway; but between the mental condition of all emotion and the mental state of pure reason

there are infinite gradations and millions upon millions of men. So, too, minds which have attained the degree of pure reason already have premonitory symptoms of illumination, as it were, in which they momentarily exercise something of the tremendous mental power of "direct knowing." Now, it is advanced by the philosophers that the human mind or soul is undergoing the evolutionary process of progression which Hegel calls "becoming" in common with the rest of the universe, and that, therefore, those minds which are now at the lowest depths of savage emotionalism are destined, in the due course of countless ages, to evolve or develop up to the sublime state of "direct knowing"; that the process is going on now, as always, and that this accounts for the infinite diversity in the minds of men. And, necessarily resulting from this postulation, is the conclusion that in the lowest savage there is already the embryo of the divinest genius, just as in the acorn there is already the stately oak, only that, before one becomes the genius or the other becomes the oak, a long process of unfolding, or growth, has to be undergone. In just what manner this long process of unfolding or growth is brought about, most of the philosophers, as before stated, refrain from explaining, but, be that as it may, the essential fact for us to bear in mind is that the divine power of "direct knowing" already lies latent in the common people.

Thus, it will be seen that although the minds of men are infinite in their diversity, and merge almost imperceptibly from the lowest to the highest, they

can, nevertheless, be arranged broadly in three well-recognized general groups or classes. It is in order now for us to examine each of these three classes in detail; and herein the Brahman philosophers, with their superior audacity in classification, aid us materially. They had a beautiful theory, or perhaps it might better be called imagery, which, while it may not be accurate, serves better than anything else to enable the mind to grasp the distinctions between the three mental states which we are seeking to understand. The Brahmans described man as composed of seven distinct parts. There is, in the first place, the Atma, or pure spirit—which may stand, roughly speaking, for the centre of consciousness, or particularization, of the universal mind which we discussed in a previous paragraph. Round about this pure spirit are wrapped, so to speak, six envelopes, or bodies, beginning with the Buddha (which corresponds to Hegel's "direct knowing"), and ending with the physical body of gross matter which we see and touch. Through these successive envelopes, or bodies, the pure spirit is, as one might say, struggling to shine; but, until the baser envelopes become refined, and, as it were, fall away, it cannot succeed. As Shakespeare puts it, in the mouth of the young Lorenzo, in that which is the most poetical of all writings in the world—the fifth act of the *Merchant of Venice* :

"Such harmony is in immortal souls ;  
But whilst this muddy vesture of decay  
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it."

It is not necessary, however, for us to examine in its entirety the Brahman theory of the seven-fold nature of man. Of these seven we are concerned with only the three which correspond to our mental states of direct knowing, pure reason, and emotionalism. This last the Brahmans designated by a name which signifies "the body of desire." No more apt expression could have been coined.

To appreciate the aptness of this expression,— "the body of desire,"—and why minds which are in that condition are inferior to those emancipated therefrom, it is necessary to understand something of the method of the mind itself when in the act of thinking. In this connection, the doctrines laid down by a certain Brahman philosopher named Patanjali are of the greatest value. No satisfactory account of the life of Patanjali, or of the exact time in which he lived, is obtainable, except that his period could not have been later than 500 B.C. The only records of his life extant in Sanscrit literature are plainly mere fables, and nothing is available of his teachings (or, at least, nothing that has come under my notice) save a few fragments in the form of aphorisms. These maxims, fragmentary as they are, give a truer insight into the operations of the human mind than the works of all the other metaphysicians put together, ancient or modern. Patanjali pointed out that the difference in mental power between one mind and another consisted simply in the length of time which the mind could be held upon one subject or, rather, to a single thought. Mental power is exactly synonymous and correlative with mental

concentration. The greatest musician is he who can concentrate his mind upon music for the greatest length of time; the greatest painter, upon art; the greatest statesman, upon statecraft; the greatest general, upon war; and so on through all the list of things which men do. Patanjali defined concentration as "hindering the modifications of the thinking principle"; or, to put it in simpler language, that it did not consist in putting thoughts into the mind, but that it did consist in excluding thoughts from the mind. This is the greatest truth that has ever been put forth by mortal man respecting the operations of the human mind—the truth that the measure of the power of the mind is the measure of the ability to exclude thoughts from it. It seems a simple enough truth when once it is stated; but it is tremendous in its consequences and in the flood of light it throws upon the otherwise unsatisfactory science of metaphysics. It is forbidden by the limits set down for this work to enter into an extended discussion of this topic of mental concentration; such a course would lead us far afield and into many by-paths. Therefore, although it is full of instruction, and most fascinating, we shall say as little about it as the necessities of this inquiry will permit. It is well, however, to point out, in passing, the intimate relation, but, nevertheless, distinct difference between application and concentration. One might apply himself to a certain topic for several hours together, but to concentrate the mind upon a single thought for the period, say, of sixty consecutive seconds is a task totally beyond the power of nearly the whole

of humanity. On the other hand, to acquire the power of concentration, even in the minutest degree, it is necessary first to obtain a training in the art of application, for, unless one can apply the mind, it is certainly impossible to concentrate it. Concentration, in this sense, is the total and uninterrupted exclusion from the mind of all but a single thought. The tremendous power of this process almost staggers belief. To fully appreciate how great a power it is, one must dip deeply into a philosophy so profound as to be, in truth, entitled to be designated by that much-abused word, occultism.

But, to return to the main thread of our inquiry, the highest mental power is concentration ; next to this and as a necessary beginning thereto, is the power of application. To possess the latter to any useful extent and to possess the former even in the minutest degree, it is necessary to bring the mind up to a point where it is, so to speak, independent of outside influences. If the mind be distracted and continually turned aside from its work, application is extremely difficult and concentration is wholly impossible. To perform even the lesser of these functions it is necessary for the mind to become, to a greater or less degree, self-contained, obedient to its own will, capable of being self-directed and self-controlled—in fine, to be, to some extent at least, master of itself. This is precisely that which is impossible to minds in the first category, that is to say, minds under the control of the emotions. Such minds are indeed wrapped completely within and imprisoned by the “ body of desire.” The essential

and distinctive characteristic of such minds is that they are totally incapable of independent action and that, with a single notable exception which we shall presently discuss, no thought ever takes place in them except it be suggested from without by something presented to one or more of the five senses—something seen or smelled or tasted, felt or heard. Furthermore, coincident with this fact and equally important in its bearings upon the subject of our inquiry, is the fact that whenever such a mind is stimulated to anything like activity, it is always because the something taken notice of by the senses has aroused either an emotion or a desire, and these, in turn, so color and warp the mind that a correct judgment is seldom formed upon any subject whatever. In fact, people whose minds are in this category act correctly only in matters in which they have been repeatedly and thoroughly instructed, either in the hard school of experience or by some superior mind, or, as is generally the case, by both.

The immense inferiority of such minds to minds controlled by reason is, when viewed by the light of the great truths promulgated by Patanjali, readily seen and appreciated. At the mercy of every passing distraction and continually disturbed by the echoes of countless emotions and desires, they cannot follow out any line of thought; they are altogether incapable of consecutive application; they no sooner strike upon a thought than straightway they are hurried to another and a different one and thence to another and still another in endless transition, like those humming-birds which flit from flower to

flower but rest upon none. These transitions occur with such rapidity that thoughts mix with and entangle one another and so breed endless confusion. Slaves to the emotions and the desires, such minds perceive all things only as these emotions and desires prompt them to perceive, and thus they perceive nothing rightly and can never distinguish truth from error. That minds thus restricted and impeded by such handicaps are utterly incapable of the slightest approach towards the exalted power of concentration will at once be perceived when we recall the definition of Patanjali that concentration is the "hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle." The very thing which such minds cannot do is to hinder their modifications, that is to say, to exclude thoughts from themselves. Indeed, they cannot even choose the thoughts which shall "modify the thinking principle," but must perforce entertain any and all which are presented from without. They are therefore not only incapable of concentration, but, to a great degree, of application as well. This is true to a degree only, however, because all minds are, to some extent, capable of application; but the degree to which they are so capable is measured by the progress they have made from the condition of absolute emotionalism (as prevails in savage races) towards the state of pure reason. The diversity of mankind in this respect is very great.

It is this which renders the mass of the people incapable of particularization. Their minds, being all more or less within the limits of the first category—that is, the state of emotionalism,—and, when acting

together, being wholly so, they, in the first place, cannot hold them upon any question presenting difficult details long enough to consider those details consecutively and to digest them, or to perceive their full relevancy one to another. In the second place, being wrapped about by the "body of desire," their opinions, if they form any, are certain to be warped and colored by their own prejudices and their own wishes, and, therefore, certain to be full of error. This is the case with any detail in the administration of a government, no matter how minor or relatively how unimportant, because it necessarily involves the consideration of other details with it so that it may be seen in its true relation to the general course and administration of that government. It follows that it is utterly impossible to present a single detail to the people for decision without involving all the other details of the main question with it; for the people must be called upon to particularize, that is, to follow consecutively, detail by detail, all the various phases of the subject, and to consider them all in their bearing upon each other and upon the particular detail upon which a decision is desired. Such an effort of the mind is totally beyond the capacity of the people; and, if their action be based upon a partial view of the question merely, it must be erroneous; but, in any case, even if an attempt be made to take in all the details, their emotions and their desires and the instability of their minds would involve them in hopeless confusion and error.

But very different are those minds which have emancipated themselves from the condition of emo-

tionalism and have approached the state of pure reason. This mental state is that which is the crown and the conclusion of the philosophy of Emmanuel Kant and called by him "Individual Self-Consciousness"; that is to say, the mind has now come to recognize itself as being separate and apart from the rest of the universe. Such a mind has become conscious of its own independent powers and obtains pleasure from their exercise. It resents modification by external influences. It perceives the distinction between thought and emotion, and it prevents emotion from controlling thought. It now for the first time perceives that it is in truth a creator only less in degree than the Creator of the world, and that that which creates is Thought, and that thought is directed by Will. Hence, the effort of such minds is to remove thought altogether from the influence of emotion, which springs from things external, and to hold it under the domination of the will, which is wholly internal and independent of all else but itself. And when this is complete—when the mind is entirely emancipated from emotion and made wholly subservient to the will,—the state of pure reason is reached. Minds so advanced are self-contained, self-controlled, self-directed, unmoved by externals, uncolored by desires, firm, stable, calm, consecutive in application. They reason from cause to effect, from premises to conclusion. Above all, it will be seen, they have approached so much the nearer to the sublime power of mental concentration, because, being now emancipated from the control of the emotions and the desires, they are able the better to

"hinder their modifications," that is, they are now able, at least, to choose what thoughts shall come into the mind and, to a large extent, to exclude thoughts from it. It will at once be seen that such minds are especially adapted to the work of particularization—that is to say, of examining the details of any given subject, of reasoning consecutively thereon, and of reaching a conclusion in which all the facts are taken into account, and of acting accordingly. Such, therefore, should be the minds of statesmen.

But how now shall I describe the divine power of Direct Knowing? In seeking to do this I shall, as it were, be talking in an unknown tongue with which I am not myself familiar. For, indisputably, all of us have minds which are either now in the first category—that is, under the rule of emotionalism—or, at some time, have been in that state, and thus understand it. It is further undeniably the case that if our minds are not continually in the second category—that is, in the state of pure reason,—they yet have occasional periods when they approach that mental condition, and are thus able to know it and to appreciate its functions. On the other hand, it is altogether certain that very few and, perhaps, none of us now living have ever reached that elevated mental state in which is possessed the divine power of perfect concentration and of "direct knowing." Thus it becomes extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, for one to describe, and for another to understand, that of which neither has, after all, any actual knowledge. The only thing that can be done,

under the circumstances, is to put into more popular language what the wise men have said about the subject. In this respect, I know of but two philosophers in the whole world who have laid down in intelligible shape what they knew about this mental power. One of these was the Brahman, Patanjali, who called the thing "Concentration," and the other was the German, Hegel, who called it "Direct Knowing." Be it observed, the process by which this power is called into being is concentration, and the result which is obtained is direct knowing. Thus the earliest and the latest of the great philosophers were the only ones who reached a clear conception of this exalted state. But I shall have nothing more to say about concentration, because, as before stated, any further discussion of this mental process would lead us so far afield into the theories of vibrations and thought-forms, and what not, that it is forbidden by the bounds of this work. I shall, therefore, confine myself to the ideas put forth by Hegel. With this warning, then, that it is often easy to state in words that which seldom can be known in deeds, I shall attempt a verbal description of this divine power.

Conceive then, if you please, the idea of the universal mind which is the creator of everything—which, in fact, is everything. Consider now the idea of the particularization of the universal mind in the process of "becoming," as Hegel calls it, and which we have before described. A centre of consciousness (which now has become, so to speak, a human mind) has almost completed the process of

"becoming," and has been evolved through the whole of the experience of matter, and is about to return again, as it were, to the bosom of the universal mind, bearing its acquired knowledge. All that the material universe contains, therefore, has been experienced by it and is known to it. The veil of matter has fallen from its eyes. The world contains nothing which remains a mystery. All has been experienced; all is known. In the state of pure reason the mind recognized itself as apart from the rest of the universe, or, as Kant puts it, had attained individual self-consciousness, and rejoiced in its independence and its own strength. Now the mind has progressed still another step and recognizes itself as not apart from the universe at all, as erroneously apprehended by the lower mental state, but as at one with it, as being, in fact, It itself; or, as Hegel puts it, as having attained universal self-consciousness. It is, as it were, the universe itself. It no longer arrives at truth by the slow, laborious, and painful process of reasoning from premises to conclusions, but seizes upon the truth itself. In point of fact and in fine, it has ceased to be a human being and has become a God. Now, of course, it is more than likely that no such minds ever occupy human forms—unless, indeed, it may have been the forms of Gautama Buddha and of Jesus Christ,—but it is certain that flashes, as it were, of this exalted power of direct knowing do come into the minds of highly developed men, and, by the power of mental concentration, may be brought there at will. How vast, then, is the distance between minds

possessing even the rudiments of this exalted power and the minds of the people, which are under the dominion of the emotions and the desires and are unable to perceive anything clearly and the truth not at all!

There is, however, as before hinted, a single notable exception, when the minds of the people act from within and not from without, and when they seize upon that which is truth itself. This exceptional faculty has its foundation in the fact, to which we have heretofore called attention, that the divine power of direct knowing already lies latent in the common people. Whenever, by the force of some great common interest, the minds of all the people are directed at the same time towards a single great question or general issue, there comes into being that strange entity which we have named the National Soul. It then suggests to and puts into the minds of the people the emotion, the desire, the thought, which prompts them to do what they ought to do to promote the true development of that community or that nation at that particular time. And if the proper machinery be at hand, to give unequivocal expression to the will of the people and to carry out that will in detail when expressed, the community or the nation is bound to follow in the line of the development intended for it by the Great Design. And herein lies the deep significance of the great law of the double aspect of the people, for, note it well, this National Soul will not come into being with the strength and precision needed to dominate the minds of the people so that their thought is its thought, unless all the

minds be directed at the same time to the same subject, and that subject be presented for acceptance or rejection with but a single alternative. The minds of all the people must be thoroughly aroused and made to vibrate upon a single note. Thus is brought about a result which corresponds to the results of the tremendous power of mental concentration. The latent divine power of "direct knowing" awakes for a brief moment in the minds of all the people at once and thus becomes the National Soul. It flashes forth the Truth, and burns and stamps it into their hearts so that their desires and their emotions are all to follow It and to do Its bidding. So the voice of the people becomes the voice of God. But, if the people be forced to decide upon any of the details of a question, or upon a number of questions, one man will think one thing and another man another, and the unison of thought will be broken and confusion ensue. The communal soul will not exist under such conditions, but the people will immediately fall back into their normal slavery to the desires and the emotions, and will become that thing described by Guicciardini: "A monster, full of confusion and error, with its vain beliefs as far from truth as Spain from India."

Thus, when united into one body and under certain peculiar conditions, the people, to a limited extent and for a single purpose only, possess the same power that is possessed by the great seers and teachers of men, such as Jesus of Nazareth and Gautama Buddha,—that is, the power to perceive and to grasp absolute truth. And in this respect they are above

all the kings and statesmen and rulers of the world. These usually—nay, almost universally—live on the plane of pure reason, which is that stage in the development of the mind that best suits it to the understanding of details and to action upon them ; but which renders it altogether incapable of grasping a truth that cannot be arrived at by a process of reasoning from cause to effect, from premises to conclusion. Therefore, it is the business of the people to decide upon the course which the national life shall take ; it is the business of statesmen to arrange the details of that course and to guide the nation safely therein. And this is the essential arrangement of the responsible system of government, which preserves all power in the hands of the people, while placing the administration of that power in the hands of a single individual. The functions and peculiarities of this individual we shall now proceed to discuss.





## CHAPTER II.

### THE LAW OF POLITICAL SELECTION.

**L**ANGUAGE has its limitations, and it is often inconvenient to coin a new word. According to Carlyle, the word "king" means "strong man." He says that in primitive times a body of men, finding themselves without a leader or a directing head to make their united force effective, either in attack or defence, usually chose the tallest and strongest among themselves and called him "king," that is to say, "the strong man." Be the origin of the word what it may, the word itself has come by the usage of the world to mean a distinct thing, to wit, the head of the nation. For that reason, we should employ the word in this connection in preference to the word "premier," were it not that the word "king" has also become associated in the popular mind with the idea of hereditary succession, and, to some extent at least, with the idea of irresponsible power. For this reason, and for the reason that the word "premier" has been associated mainly with the idea of responsible government, we shall use the

latter to designate the individual whose functions and powers are the theme of this chapter. But here we are forced to adopt a compromise ; for the word "premier" is not wholly satisfactory either. This is mainly because the office which the word heretofore has represented has been the second post of honor in the nation, and not the first, since always there has been another functionary, such as the King now is in England, or the President in France, who has been the constitutional fountain of honor and power. Neither do any of the other terms used for the head of the state, such as president, doge, gonfalonier, prince, sultan, czar, emperor, or the like, prove satisfactory, for each of these has been associated with ideas which would tend to confuse the conception of the functionary we wish to depict. This individual is, as it were, not only the very head and front of the state, as is the case with kings, but also as well he is, like the premier, the channel of communication with the people and the active instrument of executive power. Hence it would be impossible to use any term now in use to express exactly what we mean, unless we were to use two of them, as premier-president or premier-king. But as this would be cumbersome, and on that account, probably, soon would be rejected by the world at large, we are fain to fall back upon the simple designation "premier," trusting that in time it will be accepted to mean what we here wish it to mean, to wit, the person in whom is concentrated all the powers of the state.

Herein is the very pith and marrow of the true form of government ; all the powers thereof are

placed in the hands of a single man, who, necessarily, is a wise and a strong man. He holds his power under such peculiar conditions that he can use it for the public good only, and never for the public harm, or to gratify any unworthy desire or ambition of his own. This always has been the result most desired by the theorists and by the practical lawgivers as well. All the political writers of repute from Machiavelli down unite in saying that the most effective form of government that can be devised is one in which all the powers thereof are placed in the hands of a single man (as in an absolute monarchy), provided that that man be the right man. All, however, equally unite in saying that in practice it is utterly impossible to guarantee the selection of the right man. Since, when absolute power is placed in the hands of a weak, vicious, or foolish man, the worst of all possible governments is the result, political writers all abandon the idea of such concentration immediately after stating it. Instead, they generally advocate forms of mixed governments in which the power of the state is distributed among several functionaries, but they would confine, nevertheless, the executive power in the hands of a single individual who is always regarded as the head of the state.

It is in the matter of the selection of this individual who is the head of the state that the machinery of government has unfailingly fallen short. The ingenuity of statesmen has exhausted itself in seeking to devise a method of selection that would be infallible; but such a method has never been found.

Every system yet devised has exhibited weak points, and has failed of its purpose to a greater or less degree. In general, all the systems may be classed under three heads: first, where the selection is left to God (or nature); second, where the selection is made directly by the body of the people; third, where an intermediate body of some sort is employed.

Of the first of these, of course, the chief and, practically, the only example is that of an hereditary monarchy. Americans are accustomed to regard the idea of hereditary monarchy as being essentially a bad and a foolish idea with nothing to recommend it; but, indeed, such is by no means the case. If we once admit (and we must admit if we are careful and candid observers) that the doctrine of heredity does not account for all the peculiarities of birth, we are forced to admit a good foundation for the doctrine of the divine right of kings. In the breeding of horses and of dogs, one can count with reasonable certainty upon the product of such and such a sire with such and such a dam; but in the breeding of men, all calculations are set at naught. Peculiarities of form and features do result, but nothing is more uncertain than the moral and mental natures which shall appear in the children of this or that man. It is only the physical peculiarities of birth which can be explained upon any theory of heredity; the mental and moral peculiarities of each man belong to that man alone. If, then, it be granted that the mental and moral equipment of a child bear but a slight relation, if any, to the moral and mental equipment of his parents, it must follow, as a matter of



course, that the kind of child in this respect which shall be born—its degree of intelligence, will power, moral fibre, etc.—is determined by some other and higher power than the law of physical heredity. And it must be a spiritual power, because it controls spiritual things. Why would it not be natural, then, and even reasonable, to attribute that spiritual control directly to God, and why would it not be wise for a nation to pick out a certain family and say: "The children born into that family shall rule us, and we shall leave it to God that men fit for their exalted station shall be born therein"? Certainly, such a family, seeing that the interests of the state were indistinguishably bound up with their own, would have no temptation to advance aught other than the public good; and, if God presides over the destinies of nations, why cannot the selection of the ruler of a nation thus be left to God, who, by causing the proper soul to be born into the proper family, would always provide the nation with the wisest man in it for its ruler? Indeed, in point of fact, this very thing does occur in every nation and at every time when it is the timely thing needed for the proper development of the nation. Who that looks back over the record of the great kings of the earth can fail to see a design in the fact that those kings were in power, each in his time and place?

God does preside over the destinies of nations; but He does not keep them always in leading-strings. As soon as a people graduates, as it were, from the kindergarten stage of development, the Great Design immediately begins more and more to force that

people to learn how to govern itself; and the very first sign of this is the degeneration of the royal line. Weak kings, vicious kings, and foolish kings follow each other in succession until the people learn to rely not upon kings at all. From all of which, and from many other facts not necessary to be stated here, I should argue that the institution of hereditary monarchy is intended for nations in the early stages of development, but that it is totally unsuited to nations which have made much progress and evince a tendency to advance farther.

The second method of choosing the head of the state, that of selection directly by the people, is, theoretically, and upon a surface view, the one which appears to be the most in harmony with reason and with ethics. And, indeed, such would be the case in reality as well as in superficial appearance were it not for certain stubborn, irremovable facts which the experience of mankind has shown to exist. The first of these is that, except in very small communities where all the people can meet at one time and in one place within sound of one another's voices, direct selection by the people, pure and simple, is, in point of fact, impossible of practical accomplishment. The moment the community is enlarged, an intermediate machinery is necessary to segregate candidates and to present them for the choice of the people. In the United States of America, this intermediate machinery takes the form of the party conventions, with their complicated paraphernalia of primaries, delegates, committees, and the rest of it, together with a side complication in the system of

petitions for a place on the ticket. And it is in the manipulation of this intermediate machinery that powerful interests and unscrupulous men take advantage of the people. This never has been and never can be avoided. The evil has its firm foundation in the great law of the double aspect of the people. The incapacity of the people for particularization prevents them from following the devious ways of politicians with sufficient clearness ever to defeat their schemes. In the United States, powerful corporations no longer concern themselves with the result of election; they simply provide for the control of the conventions (or of the candidates by petition) of the principal parties, and, by controlling all the candidates, they control the policy of the country. This is especially apparent in the government of cities and is observable even in the selection of presidents. Prior to one presidential election, the head of a syndicate formed for that purpose organized a vast and successful campaign having for its object the presidential nomination, and his work was so complete that the hand of the master was plainly revealed in the end to all observers. And of another candidate it was said that he was likewise the pre-arranged nominee of certain corporations. In fact, Americans have come to regard "management" of their politics quite as a matter of course. It is unnecessary here to enlarge upon all the evils that flow from such a state of affairs. The truth that concerns us in this connection is that this method seldom results in the selection of the man in the nation who by his proven ability and reputation is

looked upon as the leading American. I have but to mention the names of Webster and of Clay, of Sumner and of Blaine, to illustrate my meaning.

The third system of choosing the head of the state places the power of selection in some intermediate body, generally, but not always, created especially for that purpose. The simplest example of such a special body is the Electoral College of the United States. The most complex was the method employed to elect the doge of Venice. Of the Electoral College of the United States, the best that can be said is that the people had no difficulty whatever in promptly rendering it of no account, and that, while by the letter of the Constitution it remains in existence, it is perfectly dead and does no harm, and nobody cares to take the trouble to bury it. This cannot be said of the Electoral College of Venice. That remained ever and always the essential machinery for the election of the head of the state. As an example of the fine spinning of the Italian intellect it was unique. In addition to being unique it was also ludicrous. But to appreciate the thing let us glance briefly at its growth. In the early life of the state, the dwellers in the Lagoon of Venice met on one of the islands and elected, by popular vote, a doge, in whom were reposed all the powers of the state. This worked very well until the doges began to exhibit a desire to elevate themselves into hereditary princes. The Venetians adopted means to put a stop to this, and it is precisely in the development of these curbs upon the power of the doge (and, also, in the gradual exclu-

sion of the common people from any voice in the government) that the growth of the Venetian constitution consisted. The Venetians observed that every doge who sought to obtain unlawful power first allied himself with some faction or party (as was quite natural), and, through the aid of that faction, attempted to strengthen his position. They appeared to believe that the thing which corrupted the doges was party spirit, and that if the doges could be removed from the influence of faction they would be independent of it and have the good of the state only in their hearts. They, therefore, set about devising a plan of electing the doge in which party manipulation could have no place. Gradually, and in course of time, the Venetian Electoral College came into being. It is impossible to understand this system without the aid of a table, and, so, here it is:

The Great Council chose by

lot . . . . . 30 electors.

The 30, by lot, reduced their

number to . . . . . 9.

The 9 voted for . . . . . 40 electors, at least  
7 votes being  
necessary to elect  
each.

The 40, by lot, reduced their

number to . . . . . 12.

The 12 voted for . . . . . 25 electors, at least  
9 votes being  
necessary to elect  
each.

The 25, by lot, reduced their

number to . . . . . 9.

The 9 voted for . . . . . 45 electors, at least  
7 votes being  
necessary to elect  
each.

The 45, by lot, reduced their

number to . . . . . 11.

The 11 voted for . . . . . 41 electors, at least  
9 votes being  
necessary to elect  
each.

The 41 elect (25 votes being necessary to a choice)  
THE DOGE.

The Venetians seem to have overlooked the fact that, after all the ramifications of the nines and the forty-fives and the elevens and the rest of it had been gone through with, the forty-one electors at the end were men, having all the passions of men and swayed by selfish interests precisely the same as the thirty electors at the beginning. The only difference was that the forty-one had lost all semblance of responsibility to anybody, and could follow out their own selfish interests in the election of a doge without let or hindrance; whereas the thirty at the beginning did have the appearance, at least, of direct responsibility to the Great Council which selected them. Of course, the elaborate system did not work any better than did the simple one, first adopted, of choosing the doge by the shouts of the populace. The Venetians, therefore, devised means to curtail the power of the doges, which resulted, in

the end, in the real executive power being transferred to a body of men called the Ten. In point of fact, they were seventeen in number, including the doge and his counsellors. This body remotely resembled a modern "cabinet."

But, to pursue this matter no further, let us say at once that all the systems which have been devised by the ingenuity of men for the selection of the head of the state have been failures. This statement is sweeping, and bears no exception, unless, perhaps, it may be the first—that is, the plan of leaving the selection to God. This plan, in the institution of hereditary monarchy, does appear to work successfully with people who are in a certain stage of development, and, therefore, to that extent, it may be said to be an exception. It might well be denied, however, that this system is really the product of human ingenuity. We might perhaps affirm with truth that it is the natural product of time and, therefore, not a genuine exception after all. But human ingenuity, strictly speaking, has not yet devised a system for selecting the head of a progressive nation which exhibits the least evidence of being a solution of the difficulty—that is to say, by which always, infallibly, precisely, the right man will be selected. There is, however, a system which is infallible in this respect. It is one which has not been invented by the ingenuity of man, but is the product of centuries of growth, or, in other words, it is the invention of the Great Design. And the fundamental feature of the system is that it permits the Man to select himself.

After all, now that we come to think it over, how utterly absurd it is to suppose that any man or body of men or nation of men, by observation or by taking thought, can penetrate into the depth of a human soul and read all that is written there! Who but Cromwell knew that the giant Cromwell lived until he had grasped the sceptre that only he could wield? Who, Caesar? Who, Napoleon? These mighty ones of earth, results of mighty convulsions, knew themselves from the first and pushed puny mankind to the right and to the left and stepped with ease and of right to their thrones. But there has been many a man not so great as these, but still mighty, who lived in times of quiet, and not of convulsion, who was entitled, by right of being the ablest in the nation, to be the head and the leader thereof, but who never reached his rightful place. And such men must always exist in ordinary times under any form of government which does not permit the Man to select himself.

This is precisely what the responsible system of government does. It permits the premier to select himself. The leader of his party is leader solely by reason of his own might. There is no more certain "trying-out" process in the world than that which must be undergone by those members of the British Parliament who aspire to leadership. In the arena of the parliamentary struggle the weaklings inevitably are pushed to the rear; the strong forge to the front. So in a little time, out of the heat and the smoke of the fierce fight, emerges the form of Him—the leader, he who alone is best able to

marshal and to lead the forces and to bear the brunt of the attack; and his lieutenants range themselves behind him in the order of their strength. No amount of influence, prestige, intrigue, or wealth will avail to hold a man in the front rank if he possess not the qualities of intellect and of will which entitle him to that place. He may be held up by his companions for a little time, but, inevitably, sooner or later, he will receive blows which will force him backward, and a stronger man will slip into his place. The premier becomes premier simply because he has shown that he is the king, the strong man—the greatest fighter in his nation.

And this is as it should be. The whole world loves a good fight, for the whole world recognizes that by fighting alone can man advance. By no other course than by fighting can the will be developed, and the will is master of the mind, and in the mind lies the whole life of man. The law of the universe is growth, and growth comes by struggle only. Man is doomed to a never-ending contest with nature, with his fellows, and, above all, with himself, and every victory gained adds strength to the will, and every defeat takes some strength away; but whether he be gaining or whether he be losing he must ever keep fighting on. For nature will not permit him to evade the combat, but forces him, under penalty of destruction, to make continuous effort, even though he be very much disinclined that way, and fain would take his ease. But, more often, men take a keen pleasure in the struggle, and, certainly, the whole world loves to watch a

good fight. It is a representation on a grand scale of what each spectator is daily encountering on a small one, and it puts heart into every man to meet his own foes.

It has been a matter of much comment that the greatest interest is taken by the British public in the debates in the British Parliament; while, as to the debates in the Congress of the United States or the various State legislatures, but a languid interest, at best, is exhibited by Americans, and, usually, complete indifference is shown. The reason is obvious. In the debates in the British Parliament, there is an element of personal combat totally lacking in the legislative bodies of the United States. The public knows that the whole matter is a mighty struggle on the part of Sir William Vernon Harcourt, for instance, to get into power, and on the part of Lord Salisbury to keep him out. The debates are the visible movements of the opposing forces—the smoke and the glare of battle which disclose how the fight is going. And when the leaders in the strife are redoubtable champions, such as Gladstone and Disraeli, public interest becomes intense. Every word of the debates is eagerly read. Not for the subject matter of them, be it understood, not from an intellectual standpoint and to acquire the knowledge which they may impart, not with the laudable purpose of keeping informed as to the needs of the nation, but solely to hang with bated breath upon the progress of a good fight. But, nevertheless, the result is that the British public is kept thoroughly and constantly informed upon all public affairs. In

this respect the British are immensely superior to the Swiss with their Referendum, or to Americans with their universal suffrage, or, indeed, to the people of any other nation upon earth. Such is the attraction of combat.

And it is in this great tournament, open to all comers, and with the world for spectator and a nation for umpire, that the Man must show himself champion and win the crown of victory. Only the strongest arm will grasp the prize. And herein comes the question : What sort of strength must be possessed, what kind of ability is required ? What manner of man is he who is entitled to the premier-ship by right of being the strongest and the ablest in the nation ? Must he be the greatest philosopher, or scientist, or soldier, or lawyer, or orator, or poet ? The answer is that he must be all of these, yet not the greatest in any. He must be philosopher enough to understand the meaning of the national life, scientist enough to keep pace with the development of progressive thought, soldier enough to perceive the strategical necessities of his nation, lawyer enough to be versed in the laws of the land, orator enough to hold his own in debate, and poet enough instinctively to feel the purpose of the Great Design, as foreshadowed in the minds of the people ; but to be any of these completely, is to be one of them exclusively, and to be such would be fatal to his power. However, if I were to affirm that he should have any one of these qualities more than another, I should say that he ought, most of all, to be a poet.

And this brings us to a consideration of those

doctrines of Machiavelli, respecting the difference between public and private morality which, for nearly four centuries, have remained peculiarly his own, and associated solely with his name. These doctrines have been assailed by more adverse criticism than, perhaps, any doctrines put forth to the world since the time of Mahomet, and, inasmuch as an excessive amount of extravagant abuse never fails to raise up defenders, Machiavelli has had many apologists. Some of them, and especially Villari, whose exhaustive and monumental work upon the life and times of Machiavelli is of superlative value, have displayed much ingenuity in trying to soften the great Florentine's doctrines or to excuse them by comparison with the morals of the time in which he lived. They are all unsatisfactory in this, that none of them attempt to justify the doctrines themselves by showing that they were founded upon universal law. But, indeed, his apologists can scarcely be blamed, since this was the trouble with Machiavelli himself, and is the fertile source of all the misconception of the meaning of his writings. Machiavelli possessed a marvellous power of perceiving truth on the surface—practical truth, physical truth, isolated truth; but he seemed never even to seek for the great underlying, universal, spiritual laws which bind facts together and give them coherence and reason for existence. His deficiency in this respect was, I am persuaded, wholly due to the materialistic character of the time in which he lived. There has, perhaps, been no age of the world, of even approximate intellectual vigor, so densely materialistic as

was that of the Italian Renaissance. Machiavelli was, of course, as all men must be, profoundly affected by the character of his time. This result in him was further heightened from the fact that he appears to have written his immortal works chiefly (perhaps solely) with a view to pointing out to the Italy of his own day how again to become united and great. Hence, he did not appear to give due attention to the thought (if, indeed, it occurred to him at all) that he might be promulgating a science of politics which should remain a science for all time, because founded upon universal law. And this is precisely the fact. Machiavelli's doctrines are founded upon universal law, and they are eternally true. It is, indeed, a truth that there is one standard of morals for the private citizen and another for the "prince." But, to bring the matter within the scope of our own inquiry, let us substitute for "prince" the word "premier." In this case, we can affirm, with absolute truth, that a line of conduct which, in Mr. Cecil, the private citizen, would be regarded with universal horror, and might result in placing him in the hands of the public hangman, would, in Lord Salisbury, the premier, be an exhibition of the highest moral courage in that he would be pursuing a course contrary to the accepted standard of mankind, but strictly in obedience to the express command of God. Let me repeat; the premier of a nation, in his acts as a premier, should be governed by a moral standard wholly and radically different from the moral standard by which he or any other man must be gov-

erned in his private life. A private citizen to be a good citizen should be liberal, humane, frank, full of pity, plain-dealing, charitable, and careful of the rights of others; while a premier, to be a good premier, should be extremely penurious, crafty, secretive, cold, unfeeling, unmoved by compassion, oblivious to human misery, and regardless of human life.

But in this matter, to avoid a misunderstanding, we must be careful to observe certain nice distinctions. A premier should not, simply because he is a premier, exhibit these obnoxious qualities in his conduct as a man, nor, indeed, must he always exhibit them in his official conduct, for there may be (and undoubtedly are) times when the exigencies of the public service require the application of the moral standard of private life. But when all the powers of government are placed in the hands of a single man, that man then becomes different from all other men in that now he is, so to speak, the personification of the nation; his concern is no longer with the development of himself, but solely and absolutely with the development of his nation. And it is one of the plain lessons of history that the development of a nation is governed by a wholly different standard of ethics from the development of an individual. The development of an individual is the work of that individual, but the development of a nation is the concern of God. It is part of the plan of the Great Design. It is difficult to discover any evidence of divine direction in the life of a single individual; but in the lives of nations the finger of Providence

is distinctly seen. There is an overruling destiny plainly manifest in the history of every race and of every people. But one of the things which confronts and appals the student of history, is the slight account taken of the individual in the working out of the destiny of the nation. Indeed, there appears to be no account of him taken at all. War, pestilence, famine, invasion, rapine, massacre, and captivity—these are some of the terrible means most often employed by Providence in working out the destiny of peoples. And it does not mitigate the horror to perceive that these things do lead ultimately to the proper development of nations. The student asks himself: Why these horrors at all? Why cannot an all-powerful and a just God bring about His results without inflicting such frightful misery upon so many millions of innocent people? The doubts which sweep over the mind upon the first contemplation of this apparent ghastly cruelty are suggested by the words wrung out of the soul of England's poet:

“Are God and nature then at strife,  
That nature lends such evil dreams?  
So careful of the type she seems,  
So careless of the single life.”

As there no longer appears to me to be either cruelty or injustice in the method of the Great Design, but only a beautiful harmony and a beneficent wisdom, I do not think it necessary, and it would seem to be presumptuous, to attempt to enter upon its defence. Our concern only is to discover what is the

law ; it has already been decided by God whether it be wise or just. We must accept it as a self-evident truth that, in the lives of nations, whatever is, is right—even the impulse to change what is. Otherwise we should deny design, and deny God, and the universe without God is an absurdity. But, apart from all this, to enter into a discussion as to the justice of inflicting misery upon individuals, in order that the race may be benefited, would necessitate an inquiry into the whole scheme of life, and an exploration of the whole realm of philosophy. Such a digression would be wholly out of place in this work, and we must content ourselves with the statement that these things are, and therefore they are right. If, then, it be taken as granted that the Great Design in working out the destiny of nations is, on the face of things, altogether regardless of the lives and happiness of individuals, and that this seeming indifference is part and parcel of the great plan of the universe, and therefore just, the foundation for Machiavelli's doctrines becomes at once apparent. The "prince" or (in our case) the premier is simply the representative of the Great Design and the human instrument through which Its purposes are carried out. The only question, then, which a premier should ask himself is : What does the development of his nation demand ? If that development necessitates, for instance, the slaughter of innocent people, he cannot hold back upon the ground that such an act would be repugnant to his sense of mercy and justice. For, if he does, not only will he pay the penalty of a loss of power, but, what

is of more consequence, he will arrest the growth of his nation. He must, therefore, govern his official and his private life by wholly different standards.

Perhaps the best illustration of this doctrine which history affords is the career of Moses. It is my opinion that Moses was the greatest leader of men the world has ever seen. The work he accomplished was greater than that accomplished by any other man of which we have any account, and the difficulties in the way were altogether unparalleled. Out of a multitude of slaves without a country, without a government, practically without law, destitute of military knowledge, devoid of spirit, steeped in ignorance, and sunk in degradation, he created a nation, proud, progressive, conquering, law-abiding, vigorous, inventive, homogeneous, and destined to stamp upon posterity its thought, its institutions, and its religion. He performed this gigantic labor despite the opposition of the Israelites themselves, of Egypt, which was then the greatest power in the world, and of the armed hostility of the fierce warrior peoples among whom he led his subjects. Moses accomplished these stupendous results simply by a strict adherence to what afterwards became Machiavelli's doctrines. An examination of a single feature of his policy will be sufficient to illustrate all. Moses planned to perpetuate a nation, the foundation of whose national life should be the worship of the one God and the observance of the law laid down by him (Moses), uncontaminated by the idolatrous rites and luxurious or lascivious customs of the surrounding nations. He clearly saw

that his people would become corrupted by mere personal contact. The forty years' sojourn in the wilderness sufficed to develop a race of warriors from the young men growing up under such conditions ; but it was not sufficient to raise the whole people to such a standard of self-control that they would be proof against the seductive habits of the nations he wished to conquer. He clearly saw that there was but one thing to do : to conduct a war of utter extermination. He did not hesitate to follow out the full consequence of his policy. Listen to some of the injunctions he laid upon the Israelites with all the authority of direct revelation from God :

“ And they warred against the Midianites, as the Lord commanded Moses ; and they slew all the males.

“ And the children of Israel took all the women of Midian captives, and their little ones, and took the spoil of all their cattle, and all their flocks, and all their goods.

“ And Moses was wroth with the officers of the host, with the captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds, which came from the battle.

“ And Moses said unto them, Have ye saved all the women alive ?

“ Now therefore kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him.

“ But all the women children, that have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves ” (Numbers, chapter xxxi., v. 3, 9, 14, 15, 17, 18).

“ Then ye shall drive out all the inhabitants of the land from before you, and destroy all their pictures, and

destroy all their molten images, and quite pluck down all their high places.

"But if ye will not drive out the inhabitants of the land from before you ; then it shall come to pass, that those which ye let remain of them shall be pricks in your eyes, and thorns in your sides, and shall vex you in the land wherein ye dwell.

"Moreover it shall come to pass, that I shall do unto you, as I thought to do unto them " (Numbers, chapter xxxiii., v. 52, 55, 56).

"And when the Lord thy God shall deliver them before thee ; thou shalt smite them, and utterly destroy them ; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them.

"Neither shalt thou make marriages with them ; thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son.

"But thus shall ye deal with them ; ye shall destroy their altars, and break down their images, and cut down their groves, and burn their graven images with fire.

"And thou shalt consume all the people which the Lord thy God shall deliver thee ; thine eye shall have no pity upon them ; neither shalt thou serve their gods ; for that will be a snare unto thee.

"Moreover the Lord thy God will send the hornet among them, until they that are left, and hide themselves from thee, be destroyed.

"And the Lord thy God will put out those nations before thee " (Deuteronomy, chapter vii., v. 2, 3, 5, 16, 20, 22).

As to the thorough manner in which the injunctions of Moses were carried out, a single example—that of the fate of the city of Jericho—will suffice :

“ And they utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword ” (Joshua, chapter vi., v. 21).

The victims doomed to this terrible fate were an innocent people whose only crime was that they were in peaceful possession of the land which Moses desired for the habitation of his own race, and to the possession of whose territory he had not the faintest color of right. When we measure the course of Moses by the ordinary standards of individual morality, its absolute heartlessness comes out in all its naked severity. In comparison, the policy of Mahomet was benignity itself, for his followers spared and protected such of the people they conquered as were willing to embrace the faith, and they respected the innocence of childhood. Even the Goths and the Vandals were angels of mercy as compared with the Israelites under Moses. And yet Moses was altogether right. Into his hands were intrusted the destiny of his people, and there was no other way than the way he took in which that destiny could be fulfilled. He had but two possible courses to follow: one was to leave the Israelites in Egypt without disturbing them at all, in which case they would sink peacefully into the condition of permanent slavery; the other was the course he followed. It will be observed that he did not commit the common folly of mankind against which Machiavelli so vehemently protests—that of following a middle course. For had Moses permitted any of the inhabitants of the countries the Israelites conquered to remain alive

(except female children whose habits were not fixed and who were easily moulded to new conditions), his whole labor would have been lost. The survivors would have introduced the enervating customs of their nations, and the Israelites, not yet developed by generations of training to a high standard of self-control, would speedily have sunk to the level of the former occupants of the land. We who now look back over the course of history, and consider what the establishment of Judaism meant to the advancement of the world, can clearly perceive the purpose of the Great Design in raising up such a man as Moses for the work he had to do. Moses made no mistakes. And as it was with Moses, so it is with the leader of every nation. Whatever the destiny of his people demands, that must he do. His public and his private conscience must be kept apart.

But woe to the leader who inflicts misery upon humanity when it is not demanded by the development of his nation and is not intended by the Great Design; and woe to the people who are unfortunate enough to have such a blunderer at their head! For the inexorable law of cause and effect will exact retribution to the last item, and inflict destruction for destruction. Such a blunderer was Dandola, the Doge of Venice, when he attacked the Christian city of Constantinople; for by his act he shook the foundations of the Byzantine Empire and broke down the one barrier that kept the Turk pent up in Asia and away from the possessions of Venice. Such blunderers, however, have not been as numerous in history as one, at first glance, would suppose.

The errors have been more often on the side of mercy. The crimes of history, in the majority of cases, have been committed in a small way and to gratify personal hate or personal ambition. It seems like a paradox, but, nevertheless, it is true, that to adopt, in cold blood and without the stimulus of personal feeling, a policy of great cruelty (like the one adopted by Moses), requires the loftiest kind of moral courage. As this quality is the rarest among men, it is not often that such a course is taken. It is still more seldom that it is pursued when it is a mistake. It must be noted, in this connection, that such impelling motives as religious fanaticism and the like are classed under the head of personal feeling. It frequently happens, however, that by slow degrees there grows up in a nation a system of cruel oppression of the common people. Usually, in countries where this occurs, at least one ruler (king or otherwise) has the opportunity to turn the tendency of the government in the opposite direction and towards relieving the burdens of the people. Sometimes this opportunity extends itself to several rulers in succession. If the opportunity be seized, the nation advances; but if the nation is allowed to drift, or if greater severities be adopted to suppress the discontent of the people, one of two things will happen: either the nation will deteriorate and, ultimately, become the spoil of a foreign invader, or the common people will rise in revolt and overthrow the established order. The first of these alternatives happened to the Roman Empire; the second happened to France. But on the whole, however, it may

with certainty be said that the great preponderance of errors in this respect made by rulers is made on the side of seeming mercy. A recent example of an error of this latter sort is Mr. Gladstone's course in "scuttling out of Africa." Considered from a standpoint of ethics, the Boers had the first claim to the country, and the British had no right whatever to dispossess them; in fact, it would appear to be a great national crime to conduct a war of conquest. Mr. Gladstone took that view of it and withdrew his troops. It was a capital mistake. It is the manifest destiny of the British in South Africa to absorb the country of the Boers. In spite of this, the policy of Mr. Gladstone has enabled the Boers so to entrench themselves, by forming an alliance with Germany and by other preparations, that an occupation, which then would have cost comparatively few lives and little treasure, is likely, when the inevitable comes, to cost thousands of lives and millions of money; if, indeed, it does not precipitate a general European war. Meanwhile, the independent Boer republics in the heart of the British possessions are the sources of endless trouble, expense, disturbance, and danger. Mr. Gladstone's tenderness of conscience, in this case, will turn out to be a very serious matter for the British nation.

But whether it be the greater error, to be cruel when he should be gentle, or to be gentle when he should be cruel, it is apparent that, in any case, and at all events, the ruler of a nation is weighted with enormous responsibilities. The greatest crime which he can commit is to make a mistake, for an

erroneous decision launches the whole nation in a wrong direction, and irreparable mischief may be done before it can be righted again. And the seriousness of a decision is not at all confined to matters in which a question of ethics is concerned, such as we have just discussed, but may attach to matters of mere domestic policy. So that, indeed, the ruler of a nation is under the weight of a great responsibility. How, then, can he always decide aright? How avoid the terrible consequences of an error?

This is the question which has been asked by every ruler of every nation, from the earliest times down to the present day. How to decide aright? Most rulers have distrusted their own judgment and have sought instruction from heaven. The persistency with which, in all ages, they have sought to obtain divine guidance is one of the significant facts of history. Especially is it significant when considered in the light of the accompanying fact that there has always existed a deep and a universal conviction that such divine guidance was to be had. No belief of humanity has been more universally held than the belief that there is an overruling power which guides the destinies of nations, and that it is in some way possible to communicate with that power and to obtain inspiration from it. The means employed to obtain divine guidance have varied, but the belief that such guidance was to be obtained has always remained the same. One people consulted a fetish; another obtained instruction from the stars; a third depended upon inspired seers or holy men; a fourth trusted the dictum of the priesthood; a fifth ob-

tained oracles from the gods, and so on through all the list. Nor have these things been confined to barbarous nations. Greece consulted the oracle of Delphi ; Rome watched the flight of birds ; Europe has adhered to the doctrine of the divine right of kings, and there is still a wide-spread and an abiding faith that God will grant a revelation by inspiration in answer to earnest prayer. It is begging the question to say that these beliefs have been fostered by rulers for the mere sake of controlling or of animating the people. It is quite true that oracles have often been invoked for this very purpose. Indeed, this constitutes the whole efficacy of oracles, that, when believed in, they dispel doubts, fix the determination, and strengthen the will. A man who distrusts the wisdom of his own decision is generally vacillating, feeble, and dilatory, while the very same man with all doubts removed may be prompt, vigorous, and decided. It is often not of so much consequence which of two possible lines of policy a ruler shall adopt, as that he shall vigorously carry out one without troubling himself about the other.

And as it is with a ruler, so it is with his people ; when a crisis is to be met, it is highly important that they should be filled with confidence in the righteousness of their cause, and thus be inspired to take decided and vigorous action. So that, therefore, we must admit, rulers have often designedly made use of augurs for this purpose. But, nevertheless, nothing is plainer than that the belief in the divine guidance of nations has been genuine,

that it has been deep and wide-spread, and that it has been held by some of the greatest leaders of men whom the world has known.

A belief in the divine guidance of nations has been universal, but wise men have always perceived that the means for obtaining that guidance have been lacking. In time, this perception has extended from the few to the many and, among modern civilized peoples, the increasing tendency has been to rely less upon heaven, and more upon human judgment. So far has this tendency developed that, at this day among statesmen, all thought of obtaining divine guidance has been practically abandoned. And yet the world has never been so near to the discovery of an infallible means for ascertaining the will of God in the movements of nations. Only now, for the first time in the progress of the world, has the institution of government approached that perfection which will permit the purposes of the Great Design to be made manifest to the understanding of rulers. Under the responsible system, when brought to its full perfection, the premier may, and, indeed, must perceive the immediate course which has been laid out for his nation to follow. The importance of this fact (if it be a fact) becomes at once apparent, and it adds a deeper interest to the question: How, then, can a ruler always decide aright?

To answer this question we must revert to what has been said in a former chapter respecting the National Soul, the national life, and the great law of the double aspect of the people. It will be remembered how we concluded that each nation was pro-

ceeding towards a certain national development which the Great Design had marked out for it. It was also concluded that this national life was shaped and controlled by a mysterious, unified intelligence which we denominated the National Soul, and that this National Soul was awakened and brought into active being only when the whole people were aroused and made to think in unison upon some common topic. We decided, furthermore, that the chief, nay, the sole, proper function of any government was to give a full, free, and perfect expression to the national life. It was seen that the career which the Great Design intended for a nation was the only career possible for that nation; that, no matter what any person (or number of persons) might think should be the course a nation ought to follow, there was but one course it could follow, because destruction as a nation was ultimately certain to be the result of a departure therefrom; that that course was already clearly outlined in the mind, so to speak, of the Great Design and was given voice and expression through the National Soul, sometimes with great distinctness and unmistakably, and sometimes obscurely and difficult to understand.

When these considerations are brought freshly to mind, it will be seen at once that the only safety of a ruler (whether he be king, premier, or what not) is to interpret correctly the voice of the National Soul. This, and this alone, is the oracle of Delphi from whence he may obtain divine guidance. If it be understood and the course of the government be guided accordingly, the nation will prosper uninter-

ruptedly. On the other hand, a departure from its dictum unavoidably brings disaster. How important it is, then, that the National Soul should be aroused into activity, and that, when aroused, it should be heard, understood, and obeyed. And it is precisely in fulfilling these conditions that the responsible system of government is superior to all other systems which have as yet appeared in the world. Under that system the man best able to interpret the National Soul is the very man upon whom the task of interpretation falls.

And this brings us back again to that question we had under consideration when we turned aside to examine the doctrines of Machiavelli, namely, What are the qualities most required in a premier under the true form of government? But, to make intelligible the answer then given, that he should first of all be a poet, it will be of use to inquire what have been the most distinctive qualities heretofore exhibited by the premiers during the development of that system and down to the present time. And in this matter we cannot do better than to quote the words of that Englishman who, more than all other Englishmen, observed the development of the British constitution and penetrated deeply into the meaning thereof. In his essay on the life of Sir William Temple, Lord Macaulay says:

“Under the Tudors and the earlier Stuarts, it was generally by courtly arts, or by official skill and knowledge, that a politician raised himself to power. From the time of Charles the Second down to our own days a different species of talent, parliamentary talent, has

been the most valuable of all the qualifications of an English statesman. It has stood in the place of all other requirements. It has covered ignorance, weakness, rashness, the most fatal maladministration. A great negotiator is nothing when compared with a great debater; and a Minister who can make a successful speech need trouble himself little about an unsuccessful expedition. This is the talent which has made judges without law, and diplomatists without French, which has sent to the Admiralty men who did not know the stern of a ship from her bowsprit, and to the India Board men who did not know the difference between a rupee and a pagoda, which made a foreign secretary of Mr. Pitt, who, as George the Second said, had never opened Vattel, and which was very near making a Chancellor of the Exchequer of Mr. Sheridan, who could not work a sum in long division. This was the sort of talent which raised Clifford from obscurity to the head of affairs. To this talent Osborne, by birth a simple country gentleman, owed his white staff, his garter, and his dukedom."

Lord Macaulay's words, being interpreted, show that when the sovereign power of the nation was vested in the single person of the king, the qualities most required in a minister were those courtly graces and arts which are best suited to obtain control over a single individual; but that, when the sovereign power was transferred to the House of Commons, as was the case after the time of Charles the Second, the field of operations was widened and the premier then needed those qualities which best give control over a deliberative assembly. Therefore, the arts of the debater and of the parliamentary

tactician became most in demand. And, in this connection, we must observe that, in those days, the House of Commons was not controlled by the voters of the country as it is now. It was really not amenable to public opinion. This was due to several causes, among which may be noted as chief the two facts that the people seldom knew what was going on in Parliament, and that, if they did, they could influence Parliament but little, because members were not elected by popular vote. But it will be noted that, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the sovereign power has been gradually passing from the Parliament to the great body of the people, and this process, though not yet complete, has been still further widening the field of the premier's operations and has been making demands upon him for the display of a higher set of qualities. When the responsible system will have reached its true form and final perfection, this transition of the sovereign power will be complete, and the premier will then need to concern himself chiefly with the people of the whole nation. He will then be forced to discover, not what the Parliament, but what the nation wants, and the qualities most required of him will be those qualities which will best enable him to interpret the voice of the National Soul. Therefore, I say that he ought most of all to be a poet. For a poet is he who, when he applies his mind to a comprehension of his fellow-men, at times has flashes of the divine power of direct knowing; and a premier to interpret, always and infallibly, the voice of the National Soul needs precisely this power of

direct knowing. In so far as he possesses it he is a poet.

And we must carefully observe that this function of interpreting the National Soul has nothing in common with the arts or the qualities of the demagogue. The very first and most simple requirement for such interpretation is the ability to distinguish between popular clamor and the voice of the National Soul, between the sudden waves of public excitement or of public feeling and that true impulse of the public mind which indicates the course of the national life. The ability to make this distinction is at the very foundation of the power of the premier; and, as the responsible system approaches its true form and perfection, the importance of this distinction will increase. For, as soon as it be perceived that the sovereign power lies entirely with the whole body of the people, all interests desiring to affect the course of government will seek to take advantage of the weakness or of the corruptibility of the people. This will be done in the same spirit in which courtiers have taken advantage of the weakness of kings, and corporations or individuals have taken advantage of the corruptibility of legislatures; the methods of operation only will be different. And, in these days of sensational, cheap, and venal newspapers, it is not impossible to manufacture temporarily what appears to be an overwhelming public opinion in favor of a particular course, when that course is, in point of fact, directly opposite to the real course of the national life. Especially is this true in matters of detail in which the capacity of the public for intelli-

gent discrimination is limited. By the lavish use of money in the purchase of newspapers and in the holding of public meetings and in other and many well-known devices, a carefully planned and executed campaign for the manufacture of public opinion will often produce astonishing although temporary results. Indeed, this policy of fooling the people into demanding what is against their own interests is already extensively used by crafty men and powerful interests. A striking illustration is the course of the . . . Railroad Company, which virtually lays the whole State of . . . under contribution without the citizens of that State being able, apparently, to help themselves. For several years this company has completely fooled the people of the State of . . . in matters of public concern and has used its own unpopularity to further its own ends. When this corporation wishes any particular legislation, it first makes it appear that it is opposed to it, and then, by working up a popular clamor against itself, obtains the passage of the needed legislation. Or it prevents the passage of hostile legislation by the same means. And the people of the State of . . . have not yet discovered the crafty manner in which they have been repeatedly fooled. It often happens, however, and, indeed, I might say, more often happens, that a spurious public opinion is created simply through the emotionalism of the people, who are apt to betray a great interest in any new or sensational thing and to take sides for or against it. And this emotionalism is played upon and fed and heightened by certain

classes of newspapers of large circulation from the mere business policy of making their columns as sensational as possible. Thus, in many ways, a spurious public opinion is continually kept alive.

No matter whether this process of manufacturing public opinion result from the design of crafty men or from the mere accident of circumstances playing upon the emotionalism of the people, it can never have more than a partial and a temporary success. The wider the agitation is spread the greater is the tendency of the deep occult forces, which bind together the minds of the people, to assert their control and to bring the nation back to the true course of the national life. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to draw a distinction between real and spurious public opinion, and a mistake in this regard is often of the most serious consequences. A weak or a foolish man is generally carried away by the popular clamor, a strong or an intelligent man is often deceived, and is apt to oppose public clamor when it is in the right and to yield to it when it is in the wrong. To make the true distinction, always and infallibly, and, also, which is more important, to foresee and forecast true public opinion before it has as yet expressed itself articulately, requires qualities of the highest order; it requires occult qualities, it requires, to some extent, the power of direct knowing. Therefore, I say, that, first of all, the premier needs to be a poet, a true poet, not a scribbler of tales and rhymes, but a deep reader of the Universal Mind as expressed in humanity, a man such as Moses was, a man who walks with God.

Under the true form of government, the premier will always be precisely the man intended by the Great Design to occupy that exalted place. He will be the efflorescence, so to speak, of his time and nation. In every nation and at every time there is always one man who is the sum, as it were, of that nation. In him appears all that that nation, at that particular time, is. He is the expression of the national life—the nation personified, the conglomerate mass individualized, and this man, under the true form of government, will certainly be premier. The laws of natural selection and of the survival of the fittest (apt terms of expression for use in this connection) will inevitably force him to the top.

That such a man would be the one best able to interpret the National Soul and to carry into effect the ordinary development of the national life becomes at once apparent. He will seldom make mistakes of any kind, and never irrevocable ones: unless, indeed, it be under conditions similar to those surrounding Mr. Gladstone's mistake respecting Africa. For, in this instance, Mr. Gladstone did not fail to interpret the National Soul of the British in the British Isles, but he did misunderstand the British in South Africa. And, in regard to this matter, it may be said in passing that Mr. Rhodes (who was the real premier for the British in South Africa) did not misinterpret the national life of his people. Had he been invested with Mr. Gladstone's power over the situation no mistake would have been made. The cause of the error was the violation of the principle of home rule. But the chief excellence of the responsible system is

its unfailing tendency to correct any mistakes which the premier may make, for, when he parts from the decrees, as one might say, of the National Soul, he is shaping his course (blindly or otherwise) towards the overthrow of his rule. He cannot depart far from the prescribed course before his majority will melt into a minority, and he will be premier no longer. In this connection, of course, we must keep in mind the true proportions with respect to time. A premier under the true form of government might, by reason of his great strength or popularity or other qualities, sustain a line of action contrary to the spirit of the national life for one, two, or even, perhaps, several years. But the longer he continued his adverse course the greater would grow the pressure against it, and the harder it would be to sustain, until, at last, the accumulated opposition would completely overcome him. The result, in this respect, would be much like the action of electrical power, which, as is well understood by electricians, is dammed up, so to speak, by resistance to its current until presently the accumulated force compels the machinery to move. A few years more or less makes but a small showing in the life of a nation. If the balance be promptly restored and the national policy swings back again in harmony with the national life, very little damage is done by such a temporary departure from the straight and narrow path ; unless, meanwhile, some irrevocable step has been taken, like Mr. Gladstone's in "scuttling out of Africa." Even in such cases, the mischief may ultimately be remedied, although, perhaps, at a great

cost of blood and treasure. But the mistaken premier and his followers would be the longer out of power while the nation was recovering its equilibrium.

Thus, then, it will be seen that, under the true form of government, the premier is, as it were, the concentration into a single person of the life of the whole nation. And it does not in the least alter the truth of this statement to take into account the fact that premiers come and go, and that a man who is premier one year may not be so the next, but that an entirely different style of man may be in his place. For the new man who comes into office is the personification of the nation, notwithstanding the fact that he represents different views. The nation has changed and the change of premier is merely a result thereof. And this is in pursuance of a law of the universe which has a highly important bearing upon the science of government. We shall consider this topic in another chapter.



## CHAPTER III.

### THE LAW OF THE ALTERNATION OF POLITICAL FORCES.

**I**T is another illustration of the blindness of mankind, when the Great Design is not yet ready for mankind to see, that the institution of government by party, which is the highest and truest form of government that has yet appeared in the world, is the very institution which has been the most inveighed against by all the political writers of ancient and even, comparatively, of modern times. Party division, party intrigues, and party strife have been uniformly lamented over as being the fell and inextinguishable destroyer of nations. By some writers and some statesmen the growth of domestic faction has been more dreaded than the invasion of a foreign foe. The downfall of many a government has been ascribed to the weakening effect of internal partisan strife, when the truth was that the strife of parties was merely the last feeble flickering of a once exuberant vitality departing from a decaying state.

Many devices have been resorted to by the na-

tions to eliminate the influence of faction from the government of the state. The most ingenious, systematic, and persistent attempt of all was, of course, the effort of the Venetians, although other nations have made the same attempt to the best of their ability. Such expedients have always been in vain. As soon as the people of a nation begin to feel the promptings of that vitality, which is the invariable accompaniment of free institutions, they begin to form themselves into factions. They continue to form factions as long as any of that vitality remains. The only government which is ever free from faction is that of an absolute despotism ruling over an enslaved and debased people. The freer the institutions of a nation, the more marked the influence of faction; and this tendency ever gravitates (despite the efforts of seeming wise men to arrest it) towards the division of every people into two great opposing camps or parties. This, in turn, tends to the setting up of the form of government intended by the Great Design—which is government by party.

Government by party is the political expression of a universal law. The universe invariably presents a dual aspect. Everything has its opposite. Heat and cold, summer and winter, positive and negative, good and evil, waking and sleeping, activity and rest, life and death, these are a few of the phenomena which confront us daily. The old familiar jingle:

“What goes up must come down,  
Whether on head or on crown,”

is but a popularization of the action and reaction of

nature. We cannot escape from this all-pervading arrangement of forces. The laws of nature are distinguished from human law in this, that there is no provision for pardon. Nature has no favorites and admits of no exceptions. So the duality of the universe is, in fact, universal. It pervades all.

This duality dominates that other law of the universe—the law of growth. We grow, but not continuously. We go forward, but we also stand still. We are active, but we must also repose. We acquire, but we must also assimilate, digest, make that which we have gained part of ourselves. And the two aspects are about equal. They are halves. We rest as long as we work.

It is upon this law of duality that the institution of government by party is founded. The national life is not always a life of activity; it must have its equal periods of rest. The National Soul expresses itself doubly; now for change and now for assimilating and incorporating into the national character the progress which the nation has made. And as everything has its own separate method of expression, so has the National Soul. It does not cause the voice of all the people to be at one time all for progress and at another time all for repose. It causes a large number (but not the majority) to be always for progress, and another large number (but still not a majority) to be always against progress. There is still another large number (but not a majority, or at least seldom so) who range back and forth from one side to the other according to the national need of the hour. These sometimes go

with the progressive people, and sometimes with those who oppose progress, and thus each time a majority of all is on the one side or the other, and so to the national life is given its periods of activity and its periods of rest.

Along this ebb and flow of the national life political parties range themselves. It is because of this impulse leading from activity to rest and from rest back to activity in endless succession forever that there are never more than two main parties under any form of free government which is in its essential features a republic. For, no matter under what names they may masquerade, the political parties of a nation always stand for change on the one side, and for opposition to change on the other. No matter how many minor groups may be formed, it will be found that they all fight under one or the other of these two banners, though some may take an extremely advanced position, while others may lag far in the rear.

But it does not necessarily follow that one of the two great parties in a nation shall always stand for all kinds of growth or change, while the other shall always stand for opposition to all kinds of growth or change. One party may, and often does, represent change or growth internally, while, at the same time, diametrically opposed to change or growth externally, such as foreign conquest, for instance. The opposition party, however, may strongly favor growth externally, and be exceedingly active in that direction; but, at the same time, it may be stubbornly opposed to change internally. The Liberal

party of Great Britain, for example, and especially that section of it called the Radical wing, is constantly seeking, on the whole, to make changes and improvements in the internal affairs of the British Empire, and these improvements are generally democratic in their tendency, and consist, in the main, in taking privileges away from the few, and giving them to the many. The Conservative party, on the other hand, is constantly fighting to prevent these changes. Some one has wittily described the attitude of the two by saying that the Conservative party believes that everything is, which ought to be, while the Liberal party believes that nothing which ought to be, is. But, while constantly seeking to bring about internal changes, the Liberal party, and especially the Radical wing, is much opposed to what is known as a vigorous foreign policy; and especially is this true of anything smacking of foreign conquest, or of attempts to extend the British Empire over weaker countries. The Conservative party, on the contrary, is forever seeking to make British influence felt in every part of the world. As these two parties alternately come into power, the energies of the British nation are alternately directed towards internal and external growth. And the two parties alternately come into power as the British nation alternately feels the need of rest and assimilation in one direction, and of activity and growth in another. Thus the British Empire may go on increasing in power and in enlightenment, in vigor and in stability, almost, I was about to say, forever. However, we know that nothing terrestrial is

everlasting, and that the present civilization ultimately must go the way of all the rest (although we cannot now see how) and the British Empire will go with it. But a careful study of the course of the Great Design in the past brings one clearly to the conclusion that it will be very many centuries indeed before such a cataclysm can occur. Each great civilization which has arisen in the world has been signalized by the completion of some distinct advance in the progress of humanity, and, until the purpose of a civilization is accomplished, the civilization itself cannot have exhausted its vitality and cannot disappear. Such is now the case with this. It began in materiality, by the contest with matter it lives, and, until matter has been conquered, it cannot die. It had its origin in the Italy of Machiavelli, and in the England of Bacon and of Shakespeare. Indeed, the whole work of the coming civilization was foreshadowed in the minds of these three men. To Machiavelli fell the task of showing to the world that government was a practical art, and that it was not a matter of ethics nor of religion nor yet of heaven, but that it was essentially of the earth, earthy, and dealt with man as man is actually found now to be, and not as he may ultimately become when the dross of earth has fallen from him. To Bacon it was allotted to turn the thoughts of men from speculation upon the soul and the primal cause, and to direct them to a practical examination of the earth upon which we live, and to its material resources; and to Shakespeare it was given to hold, as it were, the mirror up to nature and to show man what man, at this time, actually

is, while he is still man and before he has taken on the attributes of God. And as these three spoke so have men acted ever since. The whole intellectual energy of the world has been directed towards a comprehension of the life of man as it is limited and affected by matter. It is to enable man to become master of matter that this civilization is designed, and, while matter retains any secrets hidden from the scrutiny of man, the civilization will continue. But this is a digression.

The fact that party divisions in the United States are not along such permanent and clearly defined lines as they are in Great Britain is due, of course, in a large measure, to the form of our government. The childish system of division of responsibility prevailing here is but another of the futile attempts of the world to obtain a check upon those in power without recourse to the strife of faction. While it does not prevent the formation of parties, it introduces endless confusion into their organization, so that the very same party, which in one generation is for change and for progress, in another generation may be opposed to change or to progress of any sort. But the lack of permanency in the attitude of American political parties has been due also to the fact that the energies of the American people have been directed (except during the struggle of the Civil War) chiefly towards the subjugation of the wilderness and the physical development of the vast and virgin territory they occupy. Apart from the question of slavery, the only great question which the American people have had to decide has been

a question of jurisdiction, and it has been upon that question that the uncertain divisions have ranged. The relative power of the Nation and of the States has been the issue over which the parties have divided, and, since these questions have been mainly argued by lawyers and decided by the courts, the antagonism between the parties would have grown very languid indeed had not the ugly matter of slavery injected vitality into the controversy. But slavery is dead, the question of State rights is pretty well decided, the wilderness is conquered, our territory is developed, and the energies of the American people will soon begin to find expression either in foreign conquest or in internal change. Nay, already the great mass of seventy millions is heaving and straining to plunge into the coming struggle. It is floundering mightily about, seeking for issues and for leaders, and, by and by, the vast host will be ranged in opposite camps under the old banners and fighting the old fight.

It is idle to hope that future progress in the United States may be made without mighty struggles between party and party, and it is as silly as it is idle. Warfare is the common heritage of mankind. Who that takes into account the red record of history, and contemplates the endless succession of desperate and bloody wars there set down, can affect to believe that all those wars were wholly accidental or, more outrageous still, were brought upon mankind merely as a punishment? Who can reflect upon those sanguinary struggles without perceiving that they are all part of a great and beneficent de-

sign, beautiful in its perfection, and having as its object the proper development of man? War is as useful to the world as is religion ; it occupies as important a place in the scheme of things and accomplishes as great a work. The province of religion is to develop the moral perceptions, but the province of war is to develop the will. While man may progress to some extent, at least, without morals, without the powers of the will he cannot progress at all, and the will can be developed by fighting alone. The strong oak battles stubbornly with the storm, and stands erect ; it is the unresisting grass that the whole world tramples under foot.

War develops the active volition of the will because it arouses the fighting spirit. It develops stability of the will because it furnishes a high motive for patient endurance under suffering and misfortune. War, and nothing but war, will do these things for mankind when mankind is in a certain stage of development. Those dreamers who would banish war from the world would, could they succeed, undoubtedly banish progress with it. After all, God is wiser than man. But, nevertheless, since everything which is is right—even the impulse to change what is—it is certain that the dreamers have some foundation for their dreams. And, indeed, such is really the case. For, while it is true that war is necessary to man in a certain stage of development, there comes a time when he has passed that stage. The highly developed man no longer needs war except as a means of preservation and, were the world ever to be peopled at any one

time entirely with none but highly developed men, war would not exist. But, it would appear, such a state of affairs never has come about and never may. Therefore, until it does, we shall have war.

But there are two kinds of war : war with a foreign foe, and civil war between the factions of a state. The former may, and, indeed, often actually does, invigorate both the nation which conquers and the nation which is conquered ; but civil war is never anything but a calamity to the nation in which it occurs. It is sometimes a calamity which prevents a still greater one ; but it is, nevertheless, always a calamity because it is always unnecessary, and the evil can be cured in a more enlightened way. It is the peculiar glory and privilege of the present civilization that it has developed a system of government which permits the internal struggles of a nation to go on uninterruptedly with all the ardor and all the power of which the nation is capable, while, at the same time, eliminating from those struggles the necessity for shedding human blood. Under the responsible system of government, ballots are more effective than bullets, arguments are more powerful than cannon, and the pen is mightier than the sword ; therefore bullets, cannon, and the sword are never resorted to. There is a mighty struggle of opposing factions, but factions armed with ideas and not with guns.

Under the true form of government every general election is, in point of fact, a grand field campaign in an unending civil war, and one in which all the reserves are called out, all the officers are at the front, and the whole of the people are fighting on

the one side or the other under the generalship of the two greatest leaders in the nation. Such a struggle is all that a civilized people require in the way of warfare for their orderly development, and the contestants never think of resorting to gunpowder and steel. Had we possessed the responsible system of government in the United States, the Civil War would not have been fought. Responsible government has advanced so far towards the true form in Great Britain that Ireland will never again undertake an armed rebellion. And this is because of several peculiarities in the system, the first of which is that the result of a contest is rendered vastly more certain by the ballot than by the sword. There is no chance that the rank and file will not obtain that for which they fight. It is true that in Great Britain the House of Lords still remains as an obstruction to the will of the people, and we have seen that House in recent years, upon the home-rule question, deliberately override the will of the majority as expressed in the House of Commons; but the Lords would not have acted as they did had they not been certain that popular opinion was rapidly veering round, and that it would soon furnish a majority in support of their position. Subsequent events showed that they were right. Had the tendency been the other way the House of Lords either would have yielded or have gone out of existence.

But, under the true form of government, where there is but a single chamber, the citizen knows that the government must follow the course dictated by the majority of the nation. He feels that he cannot

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system?*

be tricked out of the fruits of his victory and that, if he loses, he will have a chance to fight again. Therefore he enters into the struggle with confidence, takes victory with complacency, and accepts defeat with the resignation of one who knows that the fight has been fair, and that the best side has won. Thus, the antagonism of faction which, under any other form of government, is a menace to the nation, under the true form of government is given a natural expression and redounds to the stability and the vigor of the state.

A striking illustration of this is the sudden and extraordinary vitality of modern Greece. Here the antagonism of faction has been cultivated, as it were, under a forced draught, and here it has produced the most beneficent results. Diminutive modern Greece has the proud distinction of possessing the form of the most enlightened constitution in the world. Here the responsible system of government (in outward form, at least, although, indeed, not in the practical working) has been carried farther towards the true form than in any other country. Greece still has a king; but she has also a single legislative chamber. Responsibility, therefore, is not divided, for the king inevitably must become, in time, a mere figure-head; and this is true no matter what powers he may be granted by the constitution or how anxious he may be to retain them. The real possessor of power is the premier, and he is responsible to the single legislative chamber only, with no troublesome upper house to deal with. Furthermore, this single legislative chamber (called the Boule) is elected by

universal manhood suffrage, so that, therefore, every man in the nation has a direct voice in the government. It will be seen, then, that all the conditions prevail which are necessary to the healthy development of government by party. But the growth of faction has been further stimulated in Greece by a system, which is usually a bad thing for a nation, but which, under the circumstances, has probably been a good thing for Greece. This nation has possessed her present constitution since 1863 only, and is therefore new to responsible government; her people have not had time fully to develop the spirit of individual self-reliance necessary to its proper management. In Greece the "spoils" system still prevails. Civil-service reform is as yet in abeyance, and the offices are at the disposal of the party in power. The scramble for spoils has materially stimulated party spirit and stirred up party strife; thus the antagonism of faction has, as it were, been subjected to a forced draught. This peculiar state of affairs has aroused the fighting spirit of the Greeks to the very highest pitch; so the astonishing spectacle is presented of the little Greek nation defying the whole of Europe and throwing down the gauntlet to the heavily armed Turk. But it is instructive to observe the almost complete unanimity with which the political writers of the world ascribe the new and surprising vigor of modern Greece to the things which really diminish it, and express surprise that Greece advances notwithstanding the handicap of the very things which most promote her progress. One and all lament the growth of faction and express the

hope that King George will be able to hold the factions in check. The thing which has produced the vigor of modern Greece has been the growth of faction ; the thing which has retarded her progress has been the interference of her kings. But Greece will continue to progress notwithstanding that interference. It is too much, however, to expect that a people which has been living under despotic governments for two thousand years, can, within the lifetime of a single generation, develop all the attributes of a true self-governing people.

But it is not merely, nor, indeed, chiefly, in its adaptability to the spirit of faction that the system of government by party has its peculiar and distinctive superiority over all the other systems which have heretofore appeared in the world. It is possible that a healthy spirit of faction might be developed under some other system, even though not given a free and natural expression ; but it is not possible under any other system to provide what may be called the Perfect Check. To provide a perfect check upon those in power has been the unrealized dream of all the sages. Many have been the expedients adopted, and many times originators have believed that they had at last devised the perfect thing ; but, like the water of Tantalus, the refreshment which comes from the security of a perfect check on those in power has been ever at the lips of nations, but it has ever sunk away before they could drink. Here in the United States, as has been pointed out in the introduction to this inquiry, we supposed we had solved the riddle when we adopted

the plan of three equal and co-ordinate branches of the government, but time has shown this device to be as worthless as the rest. The simple truth is that a check upon those in power, to be of any utility, must possess certain features to be found only in the responsible system of government. The men whose business it is to watch the government, should, on the whole, be about as able as the men in power. They should be as familiar with the practical business of administration. They should have had an equal training in practical statesmanship. They should have no share whatever in the administration of government, and, therefore, be responsible for none of it, but, at the same time, should be recognized officials of the state, having a recognized authority to perform their functions. They should be able, at all times, to call the men in power to account, and to question them as to the administration of their trust. They should have the most powerful motives for continual vigilance in the performance of their duty. The relations between the men in power and those whose business it is to watch them should be in the nature of active and continual warfare, or, more properly speaking, combat, in which each side is continually seeking to defeat the other. This combat should be of such a public and of such an interesting nature that the whole nation would watch its course and take sides with one party or the other, and upon the result of the combat should hang the control of the government.

All these features are combined in the responsible system of government and in none other. And it

will be seen that there is a unique feature about this system, and one in which it differs radically from all others. The leaders of the opposition have no share in the administration of the government, and, really, in point of fact, have no voice in legislation ; in short, they have as little actual concrete power in the state as any set of private citizens. Yet they perform functions second in importance only to those performed by the men in power, indeed, I was about to say, equal in importance. For the very essence and the whole excellence of the system lies in this matter of perpetual combat between two approximately equal forces which are forever succeeding each other in the control of the state. The leaders of the opposition are, in truth, the other half of the government. And it has been seen that this combat is in harmony with and truly represents the eternal struggle of the universe between its own pairs of opposites. It is, therefore, the perfect check of nature. For it provides a perfect check upon itself just as the pairs of opposites of the universe provide a perfect check upon themselves. Darkness is a perfect check upon light, winter upon summer, cold upon heat, negative upon positive, and death upon life. These are alternately in "power" and in "opposition." To provide a perfect check, the forces must be equal by being alternately superior. And so it is with the responsible system of government.

Be it observed, that this perfect check is not only a check upon intentional evil, such as tyranny or corruption, but is a check upon error as well. But,

to appreciate this fully, we must again recall, at the risk of the tedium of repetition, what has been said about the national life, the National Soul, and the great law of the double aspect of the people. And I am the freer to refer to these things again (hoping thus to impress them indelibly upon the mind of the reader) for the reason that they are the very foundation of the philosophy of government, and the explanation of the perfection of the responsible system. For, if it be granted that the Great Design is carrying out its purposes in the movements of the nations (and who, having observation, can doubt it) it follows, as a matter of course, that each nation has a national life which it must lead if it is to prosper, and from which it cannot depart without disaster. The problem, therefore, which rulers have to solve is to perceive what is that national life. This is plainly a matter beyond the reach of human wisdom. No finite mind can penetrate into the purposes of the infinite. God Himself only can give expression to what God has designed. And He speaks through the voice of the National Soul. If left free so to do, and if not confused by details of administration, the great mass of the common people, moved by some mysterious impulse, will infallibly direct the general course which the nation should follow. And it is the province of the premier to interpret this voice of the National Soul and to carry out the details of its general decree. But (and note this well) should the premier misinterpret the National Soul, or attempt to act contrary to its decree, or go too fast or too slow, or permit himself to lag behind, the perfect responsiveness of

the responsible system will soon build up a majority against him and he will be swept from office and from power. Therefore, it is a perfect check upon error.

But this system has not appeared in the world before the world was ready for it. It is essentially in all respects a modern form of government, and requires all the forces of modern civilization for its successful operation. It would be altogether impossible to preserve its pure form of a single legislative chamber without king, president, or other extraneous executive, were it not for the railroad, the telegraph, the shorthand reporter, and, above all, the modern daily newspaper. For the very breath of its life is the constant communication between the parliament (or congress) and the people, and the sensitive response of one to the other. The parliament in this respect must be, as it were, the heart of the nation in which the life impulse of the people is concentrated each day, and each day sent out again to all its extremities. To produce such an effect immediate communication is necessary. Each voter in the nation must, each morning, have spread before him in his daily newspaper a full account of all that has passed in parliament the night before, so that the thought of the parliament may be reflected immediately upon the people, and the thought of the people may be reflected (though more slowly) upon the parliament, and each hold each to the true course forever. And herein will lie the whole, but, indeed, the perfect, security of the state. There can be no danger under such a system that any person will

seek to usurp powers to which he is not entitled. There can be no danger that a defeated premier, for instance, will not promptly surrender his office to the leader of the opposition. The immediate communication between the parliament and the farthest confines of the country which the telegraph and the printing-press have established—a communication as full and complete as it is immediate—puts the people in possession of a power that no man born of woman would for a single instant think of braving.

But it is of the essence of this security that there should be no chance for the people to become confused. There must be no room for doubt as to whether power has been usurped or not. The form of the government, therefore, should be perfect in its simplicity. And it is in this respect that the true form is superior to all others. To bring that simplicity freshly before the mind let us here again lay down the fundamental features of that system. All power is confided to a single legislative chamber. The whole power of the chamber is wielded by a single member called the premier, who (for convenience only) associates other members of the chamber in the government with him. The sole limitation upon the tenure of the premier is that he must at all times have a majority of the members of the chamber to support him, and the moment he loses his majority by an adverse vote he must turn his office and power over to the leader of the opposition. It will be seen at once that this is simplicity itself, and that no confusion whatever can arise. There can be no doubt about the powers which the

chamber possesses, because it possesses all power. There can be none about the powers which the premier wields, because he wields every power. There can be no question as to when the premier should resign office, because the determination of an adverse vote is a mere matter of addition and subtraction, which is within the range of the simplest intelligence. Therefore, the moment a premier should attempt the single act of usurpation it is possible for him to attempt, that is, should he refuse to turn over his office upon the announcement of an adverse vote, the whole country would know the fact the very next morning,—nay, within an hour or two,—and the nation would rise as one man to preserve the fundamental bulwark of its liberties. No premier would entertain the thought of such an act for a single moment ; indeed, the act itself would be altogether impossible.

And here arises a question to be answered, which is this: If the responsible system is the perfect system, why has not its recent introduction into certain modern governments been productive of the best results? The reply is, that the true form has not been introduced, but only a distortion thereof. What has been done is worse than if nothing had been done at all. One of the most acute of the observations which Machiavelli made upon the conduct of the average statesman was his famous statement that few men were ever wholly good or wholly bad, but that they usually adopted some middle course, which was always the wrong course. The absolute truth of this remark is shown by even a cursory examination of

history. All the great leaders of the world have been men who went straight to their object. They never adopted a middle course. If a thing were to be done they did it completely ; if it were not to be done they let it alone. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the career of Moses, to which we have already called attention. Men like Moses never fail. But the vast majority of mankind are incapable of action in this simple and forceful manner. They either have not the clear intelligence to perceive the full necessity of the situation, or they have not the lofty moral courage to carry their conception into effect. And as it is with men, so it is with nations. They are perpetually adopting a middle course. Particularly is this true in matters relating to the form of government. Nations are perpetually exhibiting a weakness for a mixed form, and in so doing they are perpetually committing an error—an error, it is true, it was designed they should commit, for mankind discovers truth only by first running the whole gamut of error, but, nevertheless, an error which has been the fertile source of the many evils which have afflicted the governments of nations.

There are but two forms of government which are based upon natural law and, therefore, correct. One is that of an absolute, hereditary monarchy, which is designed for people not capable of self-government ; the other is the pure form of the responsible system, which is designed for people who are capable of self-government. The governments of the world, for the most part, have graduated from the first of these

forms and have not yet attained to the second. They are all mixed governments. They are all pursuing a middle course and, therefore, are all wrong. The nearer a government approaches to one or the other of these pure forms, the stronger and the more efficient it is; the farther it is removed, the weaker and the less efficient it is. Those governments that are exactly in the middle are the weakest and least efficient of all. I am speaking now of governments, and not of peoples. The two most efficient governments in the world are those of Great Britain and of Russia, and this is true because they approach the nearest to the pure forms at either extreme. And, in this respect, I place the government of Great Britain in advance of the government of Greece because, considered from a practical standpoint, it is nearer the true form. The House of Lords and the English monarchy have very little practical power, and the English people have grown to hold the House of Commons responsible for everything. The government of Greece, on the other hand, is still so new that it has not become properly assimilated to its people, who do not as yet thoroughly understand its full meaning and still attach too much importance to their king. It is only a question of time, however, when this condition will change.

This tendency of mankind towards a middle course is the explanation of the apparent lack of success attending the partial introduction of the responsible system into countries other than Great Britain—as, for instance, France, where they have a government that is nearly as bad as it could well be without

completely breaking down. The tendency to adopt a middle course has here had full sway. It is in very truth a mixed government, and I use the word "mixed" advisedly, for confusion reigns both in the form of the government and in its acts—the one being the cause of the other. The government is composed of a president, who is elected for a fixed term and who is given very real power indeed and who exercises it too, and a legislature composed of two houses, a senate and a chamber of deputies, each of which is equal to the other and both necessary to the validity of any act. So far, the government is much like our own; and, had nothing more been done, might have been no worse than ours, which is bad enough in all conscience; but upon this foundation they have attempted to rear the institution of a responsible ministry. The president has a cabinet, the members of which have seats in the legislature, and at the head of this cabinet is a minister by courtesy called the premier. But the chief difficulty with this "responsible" ministry is to discover to whom it is responsible. Now, no man can serve two masters; but the French ministry is required to serve three, and is called to account for what little power it does actually wield, by the president, by the senate, and by the chamber of deputies alike. Furthermore, both chambers of the parliament are divided into a number of standing committees which exercise a very considerable control over the details of all legislation. As though enough "checks" had not been placed upon the ministry, and they were not to be trusted with anything of real importance in any case, the function

of deciding upon and of preparing measures relating to taxation and finance (one of the most important functions of government) is taken away from the ministry altogether and confided to a big double committee, composed of an equal number of members (outside the ministry) from each house of the legislature. It is hardly necessary to point out that this is not responsible government.

One of the causes of the failure of modern nations to adopt the responsible system in its pure form, and, also, of the retention of the monarchy in Great Britain, is, undoubtedly, the widely prevalent idea that it is necessary to have a fixed head of the state to make the government continuous, and to receive, as it were, the power of the premier from him when he goes out of office and to transfer it over to his successor.

This idea is merely one of those peculiar beliefs or superstitions which take complete possession of the minds of men during certain periods, and which, although well serving a good purpose at the times when they are needed, continue to dominate the thought of the world long after their usefulness has passed away. They then become a drag upon the progress of mankind. Such a superstition, for instance, was the belief in the divine right of kings. The idea of a fixed executive was an absolute necessity to the development of the responsible system in its earlier stages. Indeed, without it the responsible system never could have developed at all. But the time has now come when the science of government is to be relieved of the incubus of this error, and, in consequence, it will make a noteworthy advance. It is

not necessary in this place to make any additional attempt to dispel this superstition. The whole of this treatise, from the introduction to the appendix, is designed to accomplish that result.

As to the introduction of the responsible system into the United States, it can only be said that it will make its appearance first in the government of the cities. And this is merely because the movement will follow the line of least resistance. In the first place, the American people have become convinced that a radical change is necessary in the government of our cities; and, in the second, the responsible system can be introduced in them without any material change in our organic laws; but, before it can be introduced into the state and national governments, the people must discard from their minds the fetish of written constitutions. It would appear at first view impossible, or, at least, not advisable, for the American nation to discard its written national Constitution altogether. A written instrument covering certain points would seem to be rendered necessary, or, at least, desirable, by a certain difficulty inherent in the federal system itself. And by the federal system I mean now the scientific division of the territory to be governed, as prevailing in the United States, and not the nondescript form of our political government. The federal system divides the territory to be governed into nation, state, county, and township. Coming into this arrangement somewhere as being more than a township and less than a state, is the division of the city. But following this division of territory is a division of the powers of govern-

ment. It would seem, therefore, as though it would be of importance that the jurisdiction of each should be clearly defined. And in this necessity would lie the excuse for a written national constitution, which, it might be urged, should consist of a statement of the matters over which the national government shall have supreme control.

But I am convinced that this idea is wholly erroneous. It takes no account of the very simple and self-evident fact that it is a physical impossibility to place supreme power in an inanimate thing. Force necessarily predicates life; power is the attribute of a living man, not of a dead parchment. There is no power in a statute; the power lies in him who enforces it. If a constitutional provision be not enforced, it is useless; the power to enforce it must be entrusted to men, and he who has the prerogative of enforcing the provisions of the constitution is, in point of fact, invested with the supreme power of the land. It is, in the highest degree, dangerous to the liberties of the people to place this power in the hands of the irresponsible judiciary. The people of the United States should retain forever, in their own hands, the power to limit or to enlarge the jurisdiction of the national government, and this can be done only by concentrating all the powers of government in a national congress to consist of a single chamber which shall be responsible to the people alone. It must never be forgotten that the supreme powers of government must be reposed in some human hands, and the only safe repository is in a body directly responsible to the people. There is no dan-

ger that such a body will ever unduly encroach upon the rights of the several States, for the people will have in their own hands the direct and immediate means of correcting any such attempt. Therefore, I hold that it is not necessary to have any written constitutions whatever, either national or state, except, indeed, it might be convenient, by way of a starting-point, to adopt a single brief paragraph, such as, for example, the following:

All the powers of this nation shall be vested in a Congress which shall consist of a single chamber composed of not less than three hundred and sixty-five members, who shall be apportioned among the States according to population, and who shall be elected bi-annually by people thereof. All the executive powers shall be the wielded by a Premier, who shall be elected by, and hold his office at the pleasure of, Congress. All the laws in force at the adoption of this constitution shall remain in force until changed by Congress.

And as to state constitutions, again, it might be convenient to have what may be contained in a single brief paragraph, as, for example, the following:

All the powers of this State shall be vested in a legislature which shall consist of a single chamber composed of not less than one hundred and twenty-five members, who shall be elected bi-annually by the body of the people. The executive powers shall be wielded by a Governor, who shall be elected by, and hold his office at the pleasure of, the legislature. All the laws in force at the adoption of this constitution shall remain in force until changed by the legislature.

I can well appreciate the gasp of surprise that would come from most Americans at the proposal to substitute the simple paragraphs above set forth for their elaborate written constitutions. It is a superstition with most Americans that their written constitutions are the very bulwarks of their liberties, and that they have been the only things which have saved them from becoming the abject prey of rascals or the slaves of the corporation and the boss. "Where," they would exclaim, "are the safeguards? Where, the bills of rights? Where are the limitations upon the power of the legislature? What is to prevent that body from trampling upon every human right?" To which it is replied, that their safeguard is in themselves, where it has been from the beginning, and where it will remain until the end. A written constitution can afford no additional protection. After all, it is merely a bit of paper. The constitution which protects is that which is inherent in the character of the people. The only really useful purpose which bills of rights, or written constitutions in the nature of bills of rights, have served is in the way of a declaration of hostilities; that is to say, a sort of ready prepared ultimatum stating what the people demand and what they will fight to maintain. But their usefulness in this respect has long since passed away, and, in America, has not existed since we have been a nation. If it be advanced that written constitutions serve as a basis for the courts to protect the rights of the people, it can be replied that the law serves the same purpose better and with greater


certainty and carries with it none of the evils of the other.

For, in the train of written constitutions come evils of an aggravated character. In the first place, they are an unwarrantable assumption by one generation of the right to legislate for those who come after. This is, of course, an indefensible usurpation. Each generation has its own need and its own development, and it should be left free to provide for the one and to follow the other; but the very essence of written constitutions is the fact that they cannot be changed without great difficulty. In this respect, they act as drags upon progress. A second evil is that they are efficient instruments for the oppression of the people. A provision in a written constitution giving undue advantage to vested interests cannot readily be changed, and such provisions are easily adopted by constitutional conventions, and usually escape the scrutiny of the people, who often vote upon a constitution without reading it, and always without understanding its full meaning and what will result therefrom. A third evil is that they give to the judiciary the power of legislation and of veto, under the guise of passing upon the constitutionality of a law. A fourth evil is that they stand in the way of sincere men who attempt to institute needed reforms. And a fifth evil is that they prevent the people from holding any man or set of men responsible for what is wrong in the state, and, therefore, they prevent the free ebb and flow of the life of the people in obedience to the eternal law of growth.

And this is indeed the greatest evil of the five,

that written constitutions hinder the free expression of the American national life, stifle the voice of the National Soul, and turn aside the development of the American people from the course it ought to take to the course it ought not, and thus hold back the civilization of the world. For it is certain that America has an inspiring destiny to fulfil. The finger of the Great Design has written this much at least plainly upon the rivers and plains and mountains of our mighty continent. So splendid a land, reserved until modern civilization began before being given over to the use of civilized man, must indeed have been intended to support a civilization which could vie with the land in splendor. And therefore, evidently, some inspiring destiny is to be worked out here by this nation. And, also, the knowledge of what it is, is lying latent in the souls of the common people, and they are restless and uneasy under the sting and the spur of that which they know not; this, in truth, is the voice of the National Soul struggling to utter forth the momentous secret.





## CHAPTER IV.

### THE LAW OF POLITICAL SUBORDINATION.

**U**NITY is the law of the universe. This more than anything else proves that God is One. All things which exist are but the particularizations of a single thought which renews itself perpetually. A man is the microcosm of the macrocosmic world, and contains within himself the germ of all. The infinite diversity of the universe is but the completion of an all-pervading unity. Each part is expressed in the whole, and the whole is expressed in each part. God is one, therefore all things are one. All is each, and each is all. But, coming down out of the cloudlands of occultism and of philosophical speculation and looking at the world from the lower elevation of empirical observation and noting merely that which we can perceive with our ordinary every-day faculties, we find that the law of unity pervades and dominates every concern of man. In art it is laid down that beauty is the harmony produced by perfect unity, just as it is said that picturesqueness is the harmony produced by complete diversity, or, in other words, dissimilarity carried to the point of union. In science no theory

is accepted as a law until it has been proved to be in harmony with every other known law ; that is to say, to conform to the unity of the world. In war the whole of strategy and of tactics consists in concentrating upon a given point a greater force than the enemy, or, as it were, in attaining to a more nearly perfect unity than that to which he attains. And the same conditions exist in every department of thought. The law of unity is the first law of all.

And thus it is in the science of government. Unity is its most essential law. The entire object of government is to direct the total force of a nation in a given direction. When this is accomplished perfectly, and when the direction taken is the direction of the national life intended for it by the Great Design, the nation is advancing at the highest rate of progress of which it is capable. When the exact reverse prevails, that is to say, when each individual in the nation is a law unto himself, the nation is in a condition of pure anarchy—a total annihilation of civilization. So far as history discloses, no nation has ever been absolutely in either condition ; but the whole of history is simply a narration of the blind groping of mankind away from the latter and towards the former ; sometimes the movement was retrogression, sometimes advance, but the goal was always the same. The problem of government, therefore, is twofold : first, to discover the course of the national life ; and, second, to combine and concentrate all the power of the nation upon it. Therefore, all the machinery of government should be subordinated to the accomplishment of these two objects.

It follows, then, that the perfect government is the one possessing perfect unity. Thus an absolute monarchy is a perfect form of government for people who are in that stage of development (or lack of development) in which it is necessary for some one else to do all their thinking for them. Such a government was that of the Incas of Peru, which was, apparently, at once the most despotic and the most beneficent the world has yet known. This government was so peculiar and so wholly out of harmony with all European standards of thought that it appeared to have been transplanted from another world, or, as is probably nearer the truth, to have been left over from a civilization which existed prior to the dawn of history. A knowledge of its institutions is of superlative value to the student of political science, for it is an almost perfect example of the national unity which may be reached by a people of inferior development under an absolute monarchy. The Inca arbitrarily regulated every important detail in the lives of his subjects. He fixed the character of their employment, limited their property, allotted their lands, regulated their hours of labor, prescribed their religion, decided upon their places of residence, and chose their husbands and wives. A subject of the Incas had but little greater freedom of action than a slave, indeed, in some respects, not so much, for a slave is often permitted to select his own wife and his own religion, while a subject of the Incas had no occasion whatever to think for himself from his birth to his death. On the other hand, so long as he submitted peacefully to this control, he

was entirely relieved from all care and all responsibility. He never had to provide for the morrow and he never knew the meaning of want or the fear of it, he labored no harder and no longer than was good for his physical and moral health, he was never wronged or oppressed, he was carefully trained in his childhood and he was comfortably provided for in his old age. Under no government known to history was there less crime or more perfect order than existed under the government of the Incas of Peru, and under no other were any people so joyous and contented.

It will be observed that in an absolute monarchy the double function of deciding upon the course of the national life and of carrying out the details of that decision are concentrated in the hands of a single man. So people who are, as it were, merely children are happy under that form of government; but the moment the people betray the slightest inclination to think for themselves they become unsuited to live under an absolute monarchy. There arises at once an antagonism between ruler and subject and the unity of the nation is destroyed. The nation has then started upon that long and terrible struggle the ultimate outcome of which is a form of government that permits the people to decide upon the course of the national life while concentrating into the hands of a single man the work of carrying out the details of that decision. Every government now in the world is engaged in this struggle; some are just beginning it, while others are nearing the end. This fact, that no government now existing

possesses the essential element of unity, is the cause of all the political turmoil and confusion in the world. But in proportion as the form of a government is nearly allied to the simple form from which they all started, or to the simple form towards which they are all tending, does it approach the condition of unity. Thus, as stated in a former chapter, the two most efficient governments in the world are those of Russia and of Great Britain.

It becomes apparent from a consideration of these premises that anything which tends to disrupt or to prevent the unity of a nation is a direct and a distinct evil. And we have seen that the perfect unity of a modern nation is obtained only when the people decide upon the course of the national life and the decision is carried out in detail by the premier or the head of the nation. It follows from this, logically, that any plan or detail of government which tends to confuse or to prevent the decision of the people or to divide or to impede the power of the premier (or governor or mayor) is necessarily an obstruction to the welfare of the nation. Such an obstruction is our system of division of responsibility against which we have spoken in a former chapter, and such obstructions are our state systems of the judiciary and the civil service.

Of the judiciary and the civil service it can with truth be said that it is of greater utility to show what they ought not to be, than to define what they are. For in the United States of America both the judiciary and the civil service have been elevated to a rank wholly out of keeping with their

real importance. Functions in the body politic have been assigned to them with which they ought never to have been invested. This error has been the cause of much of the confusion and corruption in American politics. But, however, in order the clearer to perceive what the judiciary and the civil service ought not to be, it might perhaps be well to point out briefly what they actually are. To do this we must return to first principles.

The proper function of the judiciary is to apply the law to disputes between private parties and to the trials of persons accused of crimes—these two things and these only. That in the United States the judiciary exercises functions far outside these limits is due to two facts. The first of these is the confusion which is the logical result of the vicious system of division of responsibility, and the second, our system of written constitutions. But both these evils have been treated in former chapters and it seems unnecessary to discuss them again. Another feature, however, of our judicial system, which is almost equally pernicious, has not been discussed and may profitably be considered in this place. This is the system of electing the judges by popular vote—a system which prevails almost universally under our state constitutions. It would seem that the bad features of this system ought to be apparent to the least observing. The function of the judiciary is one requiring a special and a technical knowledge; it is impossible for the multitude to know whether a candidate possesses it or not. Furthermore, in the application of that knowledge the judge on the

bench should be influenced by no motive save the professional pride which prompts him to great care in interpreting the law so that his rulings may be considered sound and that his decisions may stand. He should not be subject to the pressure of popular opinion. If it be objected that there is danger that judges appointed for life or during good behavior will build up rules of law oppressive of popular rights, it is replied that it is the business of the legislature to make the law, and if judicial decisions become obnoxious or oppressive, it is a very simple matter to change the rule of law by statute. Bringing the judicial office into the arena of partisan strife for the purpose of securing decisions in a line with popular opinion is like the expedient described by Charles Lamb of burning down a house to secure roast pig.

But the chief evil which flows from an elective judiciary is one which also is inseparable from an elective civil service. And in this respect the system of electing the judiciary is less harmful than the system of electing the officials of the civil service only because the judiciary consists of a smaller number. I have before me as I write, one of the ballots voted at the election of November, 1896, held in the city of San Francisco. This ballot is framed according to the Australian system and, therefore, the names of all the candidates are placed on the same ballot. It contains, however, the municipal ticket only, the state and national tickets being separate. Yet it is thirty inches long by eighteen inches wide, and contains two hundred and

forty-eight names. The feeling of despair which passed over me when I first opened this monster ballot is still vividly remembered. I was confronted by the absolute impossibility of reaching any reasonable conclusion as to the fitness for office of even a twentieth part of the candidates presented for my choice. And I was, perhaps, as well informed about municipal affairs as a majority of the voters at that election. When I reflect upon such methods, I am filled with wonder how a city thus governed can get along at all. And, indeed, it could not, were it not for the fact that the body of the American people is essentially a self-reliant and self-governing body and forever stands for honesty in public affairs and is forever striving to maintain an honest public service. This fundamental fact saves the republic from hopeless public corruption.

This system of electing the judiciary and the civil service is an arrant breeder of corruption. The confusion into which it throws political matters not only divides responsibility, but, often, it does away with responsibility altogether. In municipal affairs especially, where the questions of national policy which are the foundation of the national parties have little weight, the idea of party responsibility is wholly lost sight of; it is simply impossible for the people to prevent or even to lessen corruption by their mandate at the ballot-box. This is fully appreciated by the "push," the "gang," and the "boss," and these parasites of city politics control all the machinery thereof. To vote one set of rascals out is merely to vote another set of rascals in.

The dirt blows in through the open windows of the Augean stables as fast as it is thrown out of the door. It is the recognition of the utter uselessness of effort in this direction which keeps the better class of American citizens out of municipal politics, and, of course, in consequence, more or less out of state and national politics as well. The intelligent Anglo-Saxon is the best fighter in the world ; but he never fights for the mere sake of fighting. He must, at least, have some remote chance to win, and he is too intelligent not to perceive that his efforts for pure politics are wholly thrown away. Occasionally, in desperation, he gathers himself together, makes a herculean effort, and prevents the public service from becoming wholly rotten ; but these tremendous efforts are exhausting and the meagreness of the results is out of all proportion to the effort, and he cannot be induced to make it every year. Therefore, the old state of affairs quickly returns again. The marvel of American city politics is not that they are so corrupt, but that they are not more corrupt than they are. Again, I repeat, this escape from utter and permanent demoralization is due solely to the high moral standard of the body of the American people.

But to understand the radical error and the great mischief of this system it is necessary to go back to first principles and to take into consideration the function of the people in the machinery of government. It is the business of the people to dictate the general course which the life of the nation shall take, and it is the business of the man placed at the head

of the government to carry out the details of that general decree. If the decree of the people be clear, unconfused, and positive and if the man at the head of affairs be able, the nearest approach to perfection in government is the result. For, in that case, the national life which is intended for that nation is lived in the greatest possible fulness and with the least possible friction. And it must be remembered in this connection that the national life intended by the Great Design is the only life possible for any nation, and that the nation which misses its destiny is inevitably destroyed. It follows, therefore, that any system which confuses the popular mind, which diverts the decision of the people, and which splits it up among a lot of inconsequential details that bear no relation to the broad issues of general policy, is essentially pernicious in this, that it confuses and impedes the expression of the National Soul—if it does not prevent its expression altogether. There is always great danger, therefore, and, indeed, it is generally certain, that a nation loaded down with such a system will miss its destiny and lead the wrong national life, and so, in time, decay and disappear.

✓ It may be laid down as a fundamental principle of political science that no public official other than a member of the legislative body should be elected to office by the vote of the people. Nay, it may be laid down as *the* fundamental principle. For the moment this principle is violated, division of responsibility is introduced, and in the wake of divided responsibility comes official corruption, confusion of

the public mind, distortion of the National Soul, and a perversion of the national life. The great law of the double aspect of the people cannot be avoided nor overcome, and, if it be disregarded, the nation ultimately must be destroyed. Man as an individual, and especially a common man, is but a weak and despicable creature; but man as a nation, and especially the common man, has some of the attributes of the omnipotent God. Only, for this result, you must indeed make a nation of him, and this can be done only by making his many hearts beat as one, his many breasts feel as one, and this, again, is only possible when his many minds are directed as one upon a single general issue that universally can be easily understood. Such an issue is the question whether the party of progress or the party of conservatism shall at that time have control. But no other sorts of questions should be submitted to his decision; for, if they be submitted, they will be submitted, not to a god; but to an incoherent, wretched, foolish, emotion-blinded mob.

And like considerations, applied inversely, control the administration of the civil service. So much has been written and said about the improvement wrought and to be wrought in the efficiency of the civil service by the application of the competitive and merit systems as a condition precedent to admission and promotion therein, that nothing is left to be said here. The question of civil-service reform has long since been decided in favor of the reform, and revolutions never go backward. Hence, it is idle further to discuss the matter. But, indeed, there is more to this

question of civil-service reform than the mere matter of improvement in the efficiency of the civil service. That it increases that efficiency is beyond all question; but this is the least important part of the matter.

There are periods in the history of every nation when the "spoils" system in the civil service is a direct good. When there are no great issues upon which political parties readily divide, or when the people of a nation are still so new to the business of self-government that they have not yet learned how to manage it, the additional stimulus to the formation of faction which the fight for the "spoils" furnishes, is almost essential to the vigor and stability of the state. Certainly, it is a prime factor in maintaining that vigilance which is the price of liberty. And, undoubtedly, it develops the fighting spirit of a nation. A condition like the first prevailed in the United States during all the early period of our history. That is to say, there were no great issues for parties to divide upon, and the "spoils" system was then a blessing to this country. A condition like the second now prevails in modern Greece, that is to say, the people are new to self-government, and the "spoils" system is good for the Greeks. But as a nation having a free government grows older, not only do the people thereof become accustomed to the work of self-government; but, also, great national issues inevitably arise, and then the "spoils" system in the civil service becomes an unmixed evil. And this is true for two reasons. The first and most important evil is that it diverts the attention of the na-

tion from the great issues which affect its destiny and its national life, and directs it toward the base and vulgar scramble for the spoils of office; thus the National Soul is confused and distorted. This is, of course, the prime and fundamental evil of the system, because it affects the very life and destiny of the nation. But a second evil, only less in importance to the first, is that, when the "spoils" system remains after great issues have made their appearance in the life of a nation, it is used to corrupt the people and to influence their thought and their votes, and thus, again, to confuse and distort the National Soul. And I place this evil second to the other simply because the extent to which the "spoils" system can be used to corrupt the voters is limited; it is not nearly so great, for instance, nor so demoralizing, as the wholesale use of money under an imperfect ballot system which permits the widespread buying of votes. So, that, therefore, it may be laid down as a general rule that, while the "spoils" system in the civil service sometimes may be a good thing for a young nation or for a nation which has only recently obtained the blessing of a free government, it is always a bad thing for a nation of mature age, the people of which have had sufficient experience in the business of governing themselves.

But there is exhibited a distinct tendency in the drift of the thought, or, perhaps, I should say, sentiment, of a considerable section of the American people towards taking up with certain ideas respecting the science of politics, which threatens the introduction of a new element of confusion and of mal-adminis-

tration into American political life. The tendency in question is all towards increasing the power and opportunity of the people to meddle with the details of the administration of government. It is not my intention to discuss all the theories advanced having this tendency, but two of them appear to receive the support of so many intelligent people that I am constrained to point out their inconsistency with the law of political subordination. The two theories alluded to are popularly known as the "Imperative Mandate" and the Swiss system of the "Initiative and the Referendum."

What is known as the "Imperative Mandate" is simply a power reposed in the body of the people to recall a representative whenever desired. In the measures looking towards the practical application of this theory it is usually provided that a certain proportion of the voters (generally 25 per cent.) may, by petition, cause a special election to be held at any time to decide whether the representative (to city council, legislature, or congress) shall remain in office. If the vote be adverse the representative is *ipse facto* out of office, and a new representative is elected—generally at the same time. The advocates of this theory argue in its support that if the people have the right to select their public servants they should have the power to discharge them at will, precisely as is done in the business world; and that it is as idle to expect public servants to be honest when their terms of office are fixed as it would be to expect private employees to be honest if they knew they could not be discharged until the end of a

definite period, no matter what they might do or how much they might be guilty of neglect.

A reply to this argument might be made simply by pointing out the essential difference between a legislator and a private employee, but let us treat the question altogether from another standpoint and consider this theory of the "Imperative Mandate" in its relation to the doctrine of political subordination. In this respect we find that it is altogether at variance with that doctrine, for its first effect is to destroy the unity of partisan organization and its final effect is to destroy the unity of the nation. In a former chapter we have shown that that perfect check upon those in power for which the world has been vainly searching for ages has been ever present, from the beginning, in the thought of the Great Design, and that it was destined to be unfolded to the perception of humanity when humanity was ready to perceive it. At last it was obtained in the Responsible system of government, and its essential feature was the opposition of two political forces which, like all the dual forces of nature, were rendered equal by being alternately superior and thus were a perfect check each upon the other. In that chapter we also endeavored to make clear the essential unity of each of the contending forces, but it is well to discuss this feature more particularly in this place and in this connection. A political party, like an army, is essentially a fighting machine; to be of the best utility it must possess unity of organization. There are corps commanders, generals of division and of brigade, colonels of regiments, captains

of companies, and corporals of squads; but there must be but one commander-in-chief, whose will is supreme. To get the best results, the whole army must feel its essential unity, must feel that the will of its leader reaches down through and permeates and dominates the entire mass. When this effect is felt the result is a perfect *esprit de corps*—a perfect loyalty to the organization and to the cause. This loyalty is a controlling influence in keeping men honest and true.

Political parties which possess the essential quality of unity compel honesty and faithfulness in public officials through two powerful motives—self-interest and personal honor. When each man in the partisan organization feels that his own interests are bound up with the interests of his party and that they cannot be separated therefrom, he is certain to exercise the utmost vigilance and the utmost circumspection. Consider the thing in detail. First, there is the premier, the commander-in-chief of his party, who has fought his way up step by step through many a hard-contested campaign until he occupies the proud position of head of the nation. He knows that his term of power depends upon the supremacy of his party, and that his party is kept in power by the will of the people. He feels that he is held responsible for the party from top to bottom. There is no division of the wrath of the people. If they reject his party they reject him, and if they reject him they reject his party. There is no possibility of discrimination. Thus the premier has the most powerful incentives for watchfulness over his followers. Below

the premier are the members of his cabinet, each one of whom undoubtedly has won his position by hard fighting and probably aspires to the premier's place. Each one knows that his personal future depends upon the future of his party and each is thus stimulated to great watchfulness. Beneath the chiefs are the subordinate officers, that is to say, the members of the legislative body, each one of whom may have earned his place by hard combats and each certainly ambitious to climb higher. Each knows that his future depends upon the future of his party and each is thus stimulated to incessant watchfulness. Opposed to this organization is another one, composed of able commanders and tried veterans, which is eager to drive the forces of the administration out of the government citadel. Able, lynx-eyed, and hungry, its leaders watch every move of the administration and are quick to detect fault and error. Each one of the opposition knows that his future depends upon the future of his own party and upon the mistakes of the administration, and each is stimulated to incessant vigilance. Thus, when the unity of the partisan organization is preserved, self-interest in its most powerful form operates to keep men honest and to keep them vigilant. Each man knows that he is incessantly watched, and each incessantly watches others.

And, in addition to this, the sentiment of personal honor acts in the same manner and to the same end. Each one of the party leaders feels that not only his own future but also that of his fellow-partisans depends upon his good behavior. It therefore becomes

an act of treachery to his fellows for him to be guilty of malfeasance in office. A feeling of *esprit de corps* springs up, a certain party loyalty which holds men to the true course precisely as in battle. How seldom it is that soldiers prove traitors in war.

Furthermore, as long as the unity of the party is preserved, the leaders of the party, that is to say, the members of the legislative body (whether city council, legislature, congress, or parliament) are individually kept true to their trust, by a recognition of the uselessness of any individual attempt to be otherwise. The party controls and the party is responsible. To pass or to defeat any measure requires the co-operation of the entire party. It is useless, therefore, for individual legislators to be dishonest.

And back of these two partisan organizations are the people—the sovereign people, who are the final arbiters and who must not be confused nor distracted between individuals, but who should pass judgment upon the whole. It is the business of the partisan organizations to watch individuals, and it is the business of the people to watch the partisan organizations: this is a division of labor which never fails to produce honesty in the government when it is strictly carried out and when (as is almost always the case) the great body of the people prefer honesty to rascality, honest men to rogues. The greater unity of the partisan organizations is the reason that the federal administration is purer than the administrations of the various States, and the total lack of unity in the partisan organizations is the reason that the

administrations of American cities are the most corrupt of all. It is because of the unity of the partisan organizations that the administration of the British Government has become the purest in the world.

But the very first effect of the Imperative Mandate is to destroy the unity of the party organization. It transfers the attention of the people from the party as a whole to the individuals composing it, from principles to men, from general issues to local demands. It now becomes no longer great and simple questions of general policy which control the vote of the people, but the narrow ambitions of a district, the mistaken notions of the populace upon a detail of administration or the personal popularity of the representative. On the other hand, that representative now no longer looks to the party leaders, the party policy, and the party organization to keep him in office, but to his own individual control over the voters in his own district. So long as he keeps those voters satisfied he can bid defiance to the leaders of his party and can follow what course he will. The feeling in the party organization of interdependence and inter-responsibility is thus destroyed. The result is not to place checks upon those in power, but to remove them; not to compel honesty, but to increase corruption.

And this comes about simply because the Imperative Mandate gives the people power and opportunity to meddle with the details of administration. When voters at a general election pass upon partisan organizations as a whole, matters purely of local interest and of detail and the personal popularity of

individual candidates receive but slight consideration and have very little weight in determining the vote. The people are uplifted to the height of deciding upon great issues of general policy and their minds cannot be turned to petty and inconsequential matters. But for this exaltation of the people to be genuine and not false it must concern itself solely with broad issues of general policy which decide the course of the national life and it must include the whole of the people affected, that is to say, a city issue must be decided by all the people of that city, a state issue by the state, and a national issue by the nation. And it requires an enormous effort to lift the people up to that state of exaltation—an effort not alone of partisan leaders but also of the people themselves. This effort cannot be made too often. The sluggish people will not rouse themselves too frequently, and they cannot be aroused. But they may easily be stirred up to a false excitement, or, rather, sections and groups of them may. By cunning manipulation, by playing upon their emotions, and by personal solicitation, sections of the people can be swayed this way and that, for or against any detail of administration. And, of course, correspondingly, they can be stirred up to demand the recall of any particular member of the legislative body. The result is a hopeless and inextricable confusion between questions affecting the party and questions affecting the individual. The burden of responsibility is shifted from the party to the individual, and each legislator looks out for himself. Under such conditions corrupt men thrive and honest

men fail. A knave, uncontrolled, can feather his nest before he is discovered; but a patriot cannot effect reforms without the sustained co-operation of his fellow-legislators.

Furthermore, all these evils would be rendered still more acute by the additional opportunity the Imperative Mandate would afford to the pernicious activity of a certain class of American newspapers. The modern newspaper is the greatest bulwark of democracy. Without it the responsible system of government would, with certainty, be seriously handicapped and might be impossible. But the very instrument which, when properly directed, is the most effective to preserve the liberties of a republic, is capable of being turned into the most powerful engine for the destruction of those very liberties. And this is because of the inherent weaknesses of the people; their subserviency to emotionalism and their incapacity for particularization. The downfalls of republics invariably have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the follies of the people: directly, when the republic has been changed into a despotism; indirectly, when the fear of that folly has changed the democracy into an oligarchy. All forces in the body politic, then, which operate to increase these weaknesses—which serve to heighten the emotionalism of the people and to stimulate them to meddle with the details of administration, are forces of the greatest potency for evil. Such a force is the modern sensational newspaper.

Sensational newspapers rest their existence upon

the emotionalism of the people. It is with them a business matter and nothing more. It is perceived that what the people crave above all else is sensation—excitement, a stimulation of their emotions. The sensational newspaper is deliberately devoted to the task of supplying this craving, and its entire make-up and contents are arranged with this end in view. The matter and form of its head-lines, the character of its news, the manner in which it is written and presented, the selections for cuts and illustrations, the topics of the editorial and the style in which they are written are all designed for the production of sensation. The most expensive talent is often employed and made to pander to these ends: the brightest writers, the cleverest artists, the most enterprising news-gatherers. Finding that the production of sensation pays—that it is followed by an increase in circulation and a rise in the value of advertising space, such newspapers are often stimulated to extraordinary exertions to produce it. The ordinary news of the day no longer is sufficient. Special projects must be concocted and special enterprises undertaken. Neither expense nor energy is spared; the world is ransacked for “stories,” and the best talent is employed to dress them up.

Such newspapers find an almost inexhaustible mine in political fields. The course of public affairs and the conduct of public officials not only furnish abundant materials for the manufacture of sensation, but, also, it is the safest source of supply, for in political discussions newspapers are, in a great measure, relieved from the fear of libel suits and

they can usually assume an air of great virtue. While constantly posing as the champions of good government, their unvarying method is to stir up the passions and the prejudices of the people, their chief weapon is indiscriminate abuse, and their pernicious activity is incessant. The most monstrous demagogue the world has yet known is the modern sensational newspaper. It thrives upon the very evils it creates. Its power over the people is immense and it heightens that power and augments its wealth by its demagogic methods. The common people are the larger portion of every community and the price of a newspaper is within the reach of all. By stimulating and supplying the most common appetites and desires of the greatest number of people, the sensational newspaper increases its circulation, and increase of circulation not only widens the circle of its influence, but also causes the raising of advertising rates. It is, therefore, constantly stimulated to increase rather than to diminish its pernicious efforts.

When the perfect unity of the partisan organizations is preserved, the sensational newspaper is, in political matters, comparatively powerless for harm. The sentiment of party fealty, like the sentiments of patriotism and of religion, exercises a dominating influence over the minds of men. When the voter is deprived of the power of discrimination between individuals (whether of men or of measures) and is compelled to cast his ballot for or against his party as a whole and the general principles that party represents, it requires an overpowering motive indeed

to swerve him from his loyalty. Furthermore, at times of general elections held to determine which party is to control the government, the entire mental activity of the nation is aroused and brought into play, two vast political armies contend for the supremacy or suppression of a principle, the minds of the people are exalted, the National Soul is called into activity; then the barkings of the sensational newspaper would be of as little effect as a chorus of dogs against a passing army. But the introduction of the Imperative Mandate would make the sensational newspaper the greatest power in the land. The same common people who would refuse to be disloyal to their party would exult in any attack upon an individual. It would be an easy task for the newspaper, with its ample and powerful facilities, to arouse the enmity of the people against any public man who incurred its displeasure. On the other hand, public men, finding that the newspaper and not the party was the real source of power, would throw off all allegiance to party, bow down before the newspaper, and work its demagogic will. The unity of the partisan organizations would be wholly destroyed, all semblance of responsible government would cease to exist, and political chaos would follow.

The institution known as the "Initiative" is a power reposed in the body of the people to initiate or propose any law or measure they please and which the legislative body is then bound to discuss: the "Referendum" is a power or right reposed in the people to have any proposed measure referred back

to them for final decision thereon. These two institutions are merely the halves of a single idea in the administration of government, and, although in their practical operation they have sometimes been divided, they are essentially one for all the purposes of this discussion, and we shall treat them as such. Divested of all externals and described in plain terms, this institution (the Initiative and the Referendum considered together) transfers the real power of legislation from the "legislature" to the body of the people, and reduces the "legislature" (or congress) to the level of a mere committee whose business it is to discuss all measures submitted to it and to report upon the same to the real legislative power. The institution as at present prevailing in Switzerland is not by any means in its pure form. It is greatly limited in many essential respects, but these limitations have neither foundation nor resting-place (for, once the principle is admitted, there is no logical halt short of its complete adoption); our concern, however, is not with the expedients adopted in Switzerland, but with the fundamental principles of the system itself. It will be seen at once that this system is diametrically opposed to the whole philosophy of government as set forth in this treatise, since its very essence is to give the people power and opportunity to decide upon details of administration—a thing which, by the logic of this work, the people are incompetent to do. It, therefore, would be necessary merely to define the institution and then to refer to the pages of this work for a refutation of the theory upon which it is based and so dispose of

the whole matter, were it not for certain peculiarities in the institution itself and certain facts in its history which bid us pause before disposing of it in so summary a manner.

The most significant facts respecting the existence of the Initiative and Referendum in Switzerland are the antiquity and the vitality of the institution. The rudiments of it are known to have existed in that country, with greater or less distinctness, for more than four hundred years, and they have maintained their existence in spite of the most strenuous efforts to stamp them out, on the part both of the nobles and privileged classes at home and of powerful governments abroad. It is difficult if not impossible to ascertain the exact time of the origin of the institution; but it bears all the marks of having been one of those spontaneous growths out of the inner consciousness of the people which plainly show the modelling finger of the Great Design. One of the earliest recorded instances of its adoption was in the year 1471 in the mountainous district of Rhetia, or, as it is now known, the Canton of Grisons. The shepherd people inhabiting this district had arisen against the oppression of their feudal lords and had succeeded in destroying that tyranny. They formed three communities known as the Greys' League, the God's House League, and the League of the Ten Jurisdictions. Subsequently, these three leagues met in convention in the little village of Vazerol, in the middle of the country, and formed a union which was to be represented and presided over by a general Diet. In the organization

of this Diet and in the limitations placed upon its powers, appeared the institution of the Initiative and Referendum. From all the accounts obtainable of that convention it would appear as though the Rhetians had been already familiar with the idea ; but, whether this be true or not, certain it is that from the year of that gathering until the present time the institution or its rudiments have been kept alive in Switzerland. Throughout the whole of this period the Swiss people have exhibited an amazing vitality which, while it is of a low order and qualified merely to preserve the national independence and national characteristics without developing any particular intellectual vigor, yet is of such a tough and vigorous sort and has so well withstood such tremendous and repeated shocks both of foreign and of civil war, that it is plain the nation and its institutions were meant to endure.

It is difficult to read the history of Switzerland without coming to the conclusion that the Great Design has some deep purpose in the development of the Initiative and Referendum in that peculiar, mountain-locked land. Indeed, the conclusion is irresistible. We are constrained, therefore, notwithstanding the certain and irrefutable conclusion that the Responsible system is the only proper form of government for mankind in its present stage of development, also to conclude that the development of the Initiative and Referendum in Switzerland has some important bearing upon the future government of man which must be understood before the science of government can be said to be complete. But at

this point we come to a dead stop. The Great Design has drawn about its plans the veil of impenetrable mystery. Man can see truth only as far and as soon as he is prepared to act upon it, and he is certainly not prepared to extract finalities from the present development of the Initiative and Referendum. It is useless, therefore, to attempt to forecast the result of that interesting experiment so plainly going on before our eyes in Switzerland. There arises in the mind, however, two lines of diverging speculation which, though mere speculation, might be worth while recording here, if only for the purpose of furnishing a starting-point for future investigation.

One of these is the thought that the Great Design may intend the Initiative and Referendum simply as another object-lesson to humanity as to what ought not to be. It is a cardinal philosophical principle that man learns nothing except by experience. There are no short cuts to wisdom. There is no divining rod for the discovery of truth. Everything really known is known because it has been actually lived. It is intended that man, when he reaches the truth, shall know that it is the truth and shall not be tempted to run after error because it is new and strange. This doctrine applies to nations as well as to individuals, that is to say, mankind is unable to detect error in theories of government save as it is demonstrated by the disastrous experiences of nations. This is the meaning of all the wrecks of governments that have strewn the shores of time. This is the justification for the otherwise apparent heart-

lessness of God in permitting such countless evils to come upon mankind from the results of bad government, while having, as it were, the true and perfect government formed in His mind. Certainly, there are few branches of thought in which mankind has made so many experiments with such few satisfactory results as in the science of government. The history of these experiments is really a record of uninterrupted failures. But an examination of these failures discloses the fact, that most, if not all of them, in the main, illustrate merely the evils which flow from excluding the people from the function of deciding upon the course of the national life. And this error of government has been pretty thoroughly explored and pretty well exhausted. Man is dull indeed if he cannot now interpret the lessons of history in this regard. But none of these failures, on the other hand, appears to illustrate, with fulness and particularity enough to make the lesson plain and unmistakable, the evils which flow from permitting the people directly to dictate the details of administration. The world, heretofore, has not made the experiment of allowing the people the exercise of this function to an extent sufficient to disclose all its consequences. It may be that such an experiment is now under way in Switzerland.

There are many considerations which support this view. One of these is the fact, that the institution has appeared in such a land and among such a people. Had the Initiative and Referendum been incorporated into the government of a country like the United States, for instance, with its vast extent

of territory, great and varied population, immense wealth, complicated questions of foreign and domestic policy, and weighted with the necessity for facing many difficulties and solving many problems new and strange to the body of the people, there would have been quickly revealed the fundamental error of the system and its utter inadaptability to the government of mankind as mankind is at present constituted. The people would have shown themselves the dupes of powerful interests or the slaves of their own emotions, and the political turmoil, confusion, and corruption prevailing in our cities would have been greatly increased and would have been extended to the governments of the States and of the Nation. But in a country without a sea-coast, shut in by lofty ranges of mountains, apart from all commercial routes of travel, and settled for the most part by sturdy but simple-minded shepherds and farmers, the institution has been able to take root and grow. No great aggregations of wealthy interests have arisen to corrupt or delude the people, and there has been little or nothing for the "boss" or the demagogue to feed upon. Practically all of the pressure upon the state has been from without (for the civil wars have mostly hung upon the issues of religion, and not upon matters of civil government), and this has served merely to cement the state more strongly together. Under such conditions and in such an environment, the institution has lived and developed until, now, when the Responsible system of government in its true and simple form is about to be generally adopted by the world, the institution of

the Initiative and Referendum is ready to be subjected to the test of existence under the pressure of the forces of modern civilization. Thus the way is prepared for presenting to mankind, at the very time when mankind needs it most, a perfect object-lesson of the error and mischief of giving to the body of the people, even under the most favorable conditions, power and opportunity to meddle with the details of administration.


The other hypothesis is of so fanciful a nature and so utterly incapable of direct demonstration as to cause it to be excluded altogether from the realm of science and to be placed among those unsubstantial visions of the human mind of which Plato's *Republic* was one. Nevertheless, although the speculation be idle, it is of so pleasant a nature that I cannot forbear from expressing it. We have seen that the meaning of life is growth, that mankind, by countless experiences, gains knowledge and wisdom. We have seen that, while this growth is not so apparent in the lives of individuals, it is unmistakable when we consider humanity as a whole. We have concluded that this law of development applies to the types of government as to all else, and that the finger of Providence is plainly seen guiding the nations towards the true form. We have observed that a government to be correct must possess the essential quality of unity; that it must preserve the essential unity of the nation. We have noted in this connection that in times antedating the dawn of history the unity of a nation unmistakably was obtained by vesting both the decision upon the course

of the national life and the details of carrying out that decision in the hands of a single man. An instance of this was left over, as it were, in the government of the Incas of Peru. Within historical times, however, mankind has been occupied in evolving a method by which the people could decide upon the course of the national life while leaving in the hands of a single man the task of carrying out the details of that decision—which riddle of the Sphinx mankind is now on the eve of solving forever. May it not be, then, that when this age of the world is over and this civilization has passed mankind shall advance another step? May not the world, or a portion thereof, be peopled by a race, each individual of which is so far advanced and so highly developed that its government, to preserve the national unity, must be of a form which will permit the body of the people not merely to decide upon the national life but to carry out the details of that decision also. But without waiting so long, ages in advance of the time when it shall come to full fruition, may not the Great Design, in this isolated mountain-locked land, and among this vigorous but simple-minded people, be now making the first experiments with such a government, of which the precursors are the Initiative and the Referendum? \*

\* NOTE: I have refrained from discussing any of the details of the practical operation of the Initiative and Referendum, and have confined myself to observations of a general nature, for the reason that, since, in the first place, my information is necessarily second-hand, and, in the second place, other writers, with better opportunities, have treated the subject more fully and with greater exactness than

is possible to me with the facilities at my command, I could not set forth anything of additional permanent value. A clear and impartial treatise on the subject and one which quotes all necessary authorities is contained in the second volume of A. Lawrence Lowell's work on *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, to which I refer the curious reader. I might, however, be justified in saying that from the best and fullest information I can gather it seems to me that the rudiments of all the worst evils of unrestrained democracy are already showing in Switzerland. All published accounts agree in depicting the indifference of the people to the act of voting upon a measure submitted to the Referendum when they ought to be interested, their excited use of the ballot when they ought to be calm, the ease with which their fears or prejudices can be aroused, the difficulty with which they can be induced to inform themselves genuinely as to the merits of any pending measure, their invariable tendency to reject any proposed law they do not understand, the difficulty of making them understand anything new or complicated, their unyielding opposition to paying the highest public officials more than the smallest salaries, the dead-levelling tendency of the whole system, and (above all, and by far the most deadly of all, though by many short-sighted observers accounted a merit) the annihilation of party loyalty and the destruction of partisan organization. To my mind, these things all point, with irresistible certainty, to the time when accumulations of wealth, whether in the hands of private citizens or of the state, or, even, the accumulation of wealth in neighboring states, will spread wholesale corruption among the people, and when the follies born of the inherent emotionalism of the multitude will surely destroy the state.





## CHAPTER V.

### THE GOVERNMENT OF CITIES.

**T**HUS, then, we have taken a general view of the philosophy of government in its broad aspect and we are ready now to consider the particular and immediate application of what has been laid down. And here, in the United States, that, of course, must mean that we shall set forth and examine the form of a charter for a city. In the appendix to this work will be found the form of a charter for the city of San Francisco. I selected that city simply because it was more convenient to prepare a charter for it than for any other.

But before taking up the examination of this instrument, it would be well first to discuss certain general principles relating to the government of cities. And, in this connection, it would be extremely entertaining, although, perhaps, not really necessary, to inquire into the history of cities, both in their ancient and sovereign form and in their more modern and subordinate position. It might not be amiss to point out that, in ancient times, the cities were the ruling power in the world. It was not merely that they had greater influence, but that,

in point of fact, they exercised all the powers of the state, and the smaller towns and rural districts were in the position of subject provinces, and either had very limited political rights or none at all. This state of affairs prevailed in all the countries round about the Mediterranean from the earliest times down to the Italian Renaissance of the sixteenth century, and, in the city of Venice, survived until overthrown by Napoleon nearly one hundred years ago. But north of the Alps a different system came into being. There the sovereign power rested in an individual, and not in a place, and the seat of that power followed the person of the king. It resulted, therefore, that cities became of no more consequence in the body politic than were the rural districts. After a while, it became apparent that the government of cities required more elaborate machinery than the government of rural districts; and, for this and other reasons, the king granted charters to the cities, or, in other words, set up a form of government which, in his absence or lack of leisure, should exercise some of his sovereign powers for certain specified purposes. The powers thus granted were strictly limited. In the United States the same theory prevails, but under another aspect. Here the theory is, that the sovereign is the people, who have delegated their powers to the legislature, which, in turn, to assist it in its otherwise too multifarious labors, brings into being a form of local government called a municipal corporation, to which it gives certain limited powers for the purpose of accomplishing certain specified results.

It will be seen from this short sketch that we imported into the United States a policy, with respect to the government of our cities, which rightly belongs to mediæval and feudal Europe, and is wholly at variance with that system of the division of the territory to be governed which it is our peculiar glory to have developed, and which is known as the Federal system. But the mischief did not stop with the importation. For, while in England, since the separation, there has been a steady advance in the direction of granting greater powers of home rule to cities, here the tendency has been in the opposite direction, until, now, our cities are shorn of much of the autonomy and independence they formerly possessed. And this result has been brought about by the introduction of the vicious system of division of responsibility into city government, where questions of national policy, upon which the political parties of the country divide, have no place and exert no influence. In consequence thereof, the voters in cities have never been able to hold any permanent power or force (such as a political party) responsible for the conduct of civic government, nor could they hold individuals either, for the system of division of responsibility so distributed the powers of local government that it was impossible to fix the blame upon any one in particular for the maladministration of the city. The natural result of such a state of affairs is the lamentable corruption in our city governments. To offset and to prevent this corruption two expedients were adopted. The first was to take away from local control many of the powers that

rightfully belong there, and to confide them to the control of the State. In most of our cities a large proportion of the powers are vested in independent commissions appointed by the governor. The other expedient was to resort to the courts.

In England the salutary doctrine had been early laid down that the courts could not interfere with the discretion of the legislative power. No other doctrine could arise in that country, because there the legislative power was not limited by written constitutions, and, therefore, its supreme nature was manifest. But the doctrine was so plainly sound and the reasons for its existence were so strong that the courts in the United States early adopted it and placed it upon a firm basis by numerous decisions. This doctrine thus became thoroughly incorporated into American law while our country was still young. When the growth of our cities aroused forces which rapidly developed the corruption of city government and application was made to the courts to prevent that corruption, this doctrine stood in the way. If a City Council was anything it was a legislative body, and if a legislative body the courts could not interfere with it. The courts, however, very cunningly got over the difficulty by calling a city government not a government but a municipal corporation, and, in the great case of *Davis et al. vs. the Mayor etc.*, of New York (which is reported in full in 1 Duer, N. Y., p. 451 *et seq.*), a municipal corporation was placed squarely upon the same basis (neither more nor less) as a private corporation formed for private business, and the City Council was accorded no

greater dignity and no greater rights under the law than the board of directors of a private corporation, and was held to be subject to the same interference by the courts. The opinion in this case (which has been extensively followed by the courts of the various States) was handed down by Judge Duer, and is a marvel of sophistry. The excellence of its style covers the falseness of its reasoning. Had **American** cities then possessed a proper form of government it would have aroused a storm of indignation; but, instead, it was hailed as a protection against municipal rascality, and has become firmly imbedded in our law. It stripped from the government of American cities the last vestige of dignity, of efficiency, and of independent discretion.

That this conception of a city government is totally at variance with the spirit of the Federal system is plainly apparent; that it has been a calamity to the nation and has held back and prevented reform is only too true. The urban population, instead of seeking the cause of municipal corruption and maladministration in the form of the city governments, ascribed it to the total depravity of mankind, and looked to the State authorities and to the courts for relief. The result is that the corruption in city governments has grown worse year by year, until, at last, it has become so bad that the American people are forced to consider the question of a radical reform. The problems of city government have, of late, been extensively discussed, and there has been a sharp and radical change in public opinion upon the question of home rule in cities. Public attention

is, at last, turned in the right direction and the time is now ripe for a true reform.

A city is a community with needs peculiar to itself, and the laws which are good for the rural parts of the State or for the small towns are not always good for a city. Furthermore, the problems of city life are such that city men must solve them. Legislators from country districts are not competent to pass upon city matters. Especially is this true when the city has grown to large proportions and the urban problems become more extensive and more complicated. All these things are now becoming generally recognized and it is reasonable to expect that from this time forth the tendency will be to extend to cities the full measure of the cardinal principle of the great Federal system (which is distinctively the American system)—the principle of home rule.

It seems to me probable that not only will all cities be given a liberal measure of home rule; but that very large cities, such as Greater New York, for instance, will be given all the powers of a separate State. And, in such an event, large cities of that class will extend the principle of home rule still further, and divide themselves into districts, each with its separate district council having full control over all local affairs, and with a central city council having control over all general affairs. Such a system is already partly in operation in the city of London and appears to work well.

The scheme of city government contained in the form for a city charter in the appendix to this work is simply one in which all the powers of the city are

vested in a council consisting of a single chamber composed of one hundred members, and with the administration of affairs in the hands of the mayor and eight of the members who are entitled supervisors and who form the executive committee (cabinet), with the mayor (premier) at their head. In the main and on the whole, the charter explains itself; but there are certain features therein which, because new to American customs, might well be discussed in a brief manner.

In the first place, it will be seen that provision is made for paying certain members of the city council very large salaries, while other members receive no salary at all. This is done to induce the very best citizens to serve in the city council. A superior citizen will serve in a public capacity if it be understood that he serves solely for the honor of the place; but if he be paid at all, he must be paid a salary so large that the official position is thus marked out as one of great consequence and dignity. Therefore, to obtain the best class of citizens they either must be paid high salaries or be paid wholly in honor. To pay low salaries is merely to degrade the office to the level of a bookkeeper or a clerk, and the inevitable result will be that the superior citizen will not lower his dignity by accepting it. On the other hand, the undesirable citizen will be eager to obtain the salary which, to him, is ample, and he will make a vigorous effort to secure the place. The tendency will then be to force all the good citizens out and all the bad ones in. To attempt to pay partly in money and partly in honor

would be one of those foolish middle courses against which Machiavelli so vehemently protests, for the small salary would lower the honor to the level of the pay, and neither would have any virtue to tempt the best citizens to accept the post. For these reasons it is wise to pay the ordinary members of the council nothing at all, for the duties are such as not to prevent them from attending to their private affairs and they can afford to fill the office for the honor of it. The supervisors and the mayor, on the other hand, are supposed to give their entire time to the work of administration and they are therefore paid accordingly.

Another feature requiring some discussion is the provision for the nomination of candidates. This provision is designed to render both the administration and the opposition wholly independent of the "push," the "gang," and the "boss," and, of course, independent of the employers of these forces. The favorite tactics of those corporations which control city governments (such as street railway, water, gas, and other monopolies) is to control the primaries and, of course, the nominations of both or of all political parties in the field. By carefully putting their own men on every ticket they leave to the voter no loophole of escape. They do not trouble themselves about the result of elections. It is impossible to corrupt or to control the great body of the voters; but it is comparatively easy to control the conventions of the various parties. Especially is it easy to control municipal conventions, because party questions do not enter here, and the leaders

of the great political parties do not concern themselves with them. Municipal politics are the great field for the "boss." He is in politics for "what there is in it," and, therefore, he sells his services to the highest bidders ; these are, of course, those corporations whose profits depend upon the control of the city government. This state of affairs has long been rather generally recognized and a great number of bills have been framed (and some of them enacted into law) having as their object the purification of the primaries. They have all been failures.

Were the custom of nominating candidates to remain the same as heretofore, the mayor, under the responsible system, would be forced to organize a "machine" as powerful as that of the usual "boss." He would be forced to become, in fact, a superior sort of "boss," and would be compelled to use the services of the "push" and the "gang." And the leader of the opposition would be compelled to do likewise. But, even then, the mayor would have a difficult and serious task to retain control of his own party. The powerful corporations (or other interested parties) would organize an opposition to fight the mayor in his own primaries, and he would certainly be compelled to compromise and to treat with the forces for corruption. The real struggle would be transferred from the open arena of the council chamber to the dark and devious places where the primaries are held. Under such conditions the corrupting influences in city politics would always have a good fighting chance.

It is, therefore, much simpler, much wiser, and

much more to the point to make the responsible government responsible from the beginning to the end. By placing the power of nominating candidates into the hands of the mayor and of the leader of the opposition, the two parties are made absolutely responsible for the whole of their organization as well as for their conduct, and the voters are able on the day of election to settle the entire score by casting a single ballot. This is the method which is in vogue (practically, although not theoretically) now in England, and it works well. To those who fear that such a system might result in keeping the citizens from putting up a ticket of their own, should occasion arise, it is pointed out that the usual method of nominating candidates by petition would still remain in force. To those who fear that the system would give too much power to the mayor, it is replied that it is impossible to give too much power to the mayor. The greater the power the more direct the responsibility. That is, in fact, the object for which the responsible system is designed. The power is taken away from the irresponsible corporations who maintain it by means of their hired men, the "push," the "gang," and the "boss," and is given to the responsible mayor who maintains it by faithfully serving the people and building up the city. And the same thing is true of the leader of the opposition, who, of course, in his turn, in time, becomes mayor. To those who object that the mayor might use his power to keep many worthy and ambitious citizens out of the council, it is replied that it is wholly immaterial to the great body

of the citizens or to the welfare of the city whether the ambitions of John Jones or of Richard Smith be gratified; what is wanted, solely, is a good government.

A third feature new to American customs is the provision that members of the city council need not be residents of the particular district they represent, either before or after election. The motive of this provision is apparent. The more cultivated class of citizens usually live in one quarter of the town, and the less cultivated class in another quarter. Some quarters are peopled largely by criminal classes or bordering on the criminal. Manifestly, it would be impossible to find suitable candidates resident in every quarter of the city. Furthermore, if a member can be elected only from the particular district in which he lives, the services of a valuable leader of his party would often be lost to the city by the mere ebb and flow of popular opinion. Nay, the leader of the party, himself, might be left out of the council. On the other hand, it is plainly necessary to divide the city up into voting districts and to elect one member from one district. Otherwise, if the entire membership of the council were to be voted for throughout the city, at large, it might often happen that the whole opposition party would be voted out of office, foot, horse, and dragoons, and the city government be left without an opposition. This would, of course, be a public calamity.

Although, under the responsible system, there might be some difficulty in suitably designating the head of the national government, there could be

none in designating the head of the city government, nor that of the State. Of the two last, the one would as naturally be called a mayor as the other would be called a governor, and the designation would not be at all confusing. Furthermore, the titles mentioned, besides being in accordance with the present usage in the United States, would serve to distinguish the holders thereof from the official at the head of the national government, which would be a great convenience. The Mayor, then, is the title used in the charter in the appendix, and, by the provisions of that instrument, the functionary thus described is entrusted with the wielding of all the powers of the city government. On the other hand, he holds his office at the pleasure of the full council, and may be deposed at any moment; while the council, again, is elected by the people, in whom, in the last resort, the real sovereignty rests.

But the mayor is the visible and responsible representative of that sovereignty, and no restraints are placed upon the exercise of his power. Thus, then, while the entire civil service of the city is placed under civil-service rules, yet the heads of the various administrative departments are appointed and removed at the pleasure of the mayor. This enables him to maintain a perfect discipline over all the departments of the city without subjecting him to that pressure by office-seekers which might compel him, or which would, at least, have a tendency to compel him, to use the civil service as a political machine. For, in possessing the absolute power of appointment and removal over all the heads of departments,

he is able to compel the adoption and enforcement of his policy by every one of them. On the other hand, the civil service itself is kept on a basis which will permit it to be operated with the greatest efficiency coupled with the greatest economy.

Furthermore, the terms of the charter leave the way open for the settlement, by practical experiment, as to whether or not it would be best to appoint those heads of departments (in addition to the supervisors) from among the members of the dominant party in the council. This would seem to be the more logical and better course, and one which would render the party in power more truly responsible for the conduct of affairs than would the policy of appointing the heads of departments from the body of the people outside the council. Should they be appointed from within the council, those members who were also heads of departments would be in the "ministry," but would not be in the "cabinet," which would be composed of the supervisors only. The advantage of this system (apart from its true responsibility) would be that the younger members of the party would be trained in the work of administration before taking their seats in the Supervisorial Committee or "cabinet."

And this supervisorial committee, or "cabinet," would be the only committee of the council. From it would originate all legislation, and to it would, in reality, be addressed all the petitions and complaints of the citizens. Its sessions would be secret, and its members would stand or fall together. This feature of the responsible system, which prohibits the forma-

tion of any standing committees in the body of the legislature, and which concentrates the entire control over the details of all legislation in a single standing committee called the "cabinet," is wholly foreign to present American legislative methods. It will probably be the most difficult feature to introduce, because it is contrary to the customs of the people. The Americans have become wedded to the committee habit, and they desire a committee for every subject of legislation. But the responsible system and the system of standing committees in the body of the legislature cannot work together. Either the cabinet will absorb all the powers of the committees, or the committees will usurp the prerogatives of the cabinet. Such committees are either mischievous or superfluous. If they exercise the least control over legislation they destroy the responsibility of the ministry; and if they do not destroy the responsibility of the ministry they exercise no control over legislation. A legislative body may have active standing committees or it may have a responsible ministry, but it cannot have both. The attempt to have both is a chief cause of the weakness, confusion, and comparative failure of the Italian and the French Governments. In those countries the popular branch of the legislature is divided by lot into sections (called *bureaux*), and these sections elect the standing committees, to which is given great control over all legislation. The result is a division of power and of responsibility, a weakening of party control, a breaking up of partisan organizations into numerous small independent groups, and a consequent instability and

paralysis of the government. In France, since the founding of the present republic, the ministry has changed, on the average, every eight and one half months. In Italy, the average has been a little over thirteen months.

Under the responsible system, Government by Party would proceed along substantially the same lines in a city as in a nation; that is to say, one party would stand for growth or change, and the other party would stand for conservation or rest, only that now, in a city, the distinction generally would be upon a financial basis. The progressive party would advocate the spending of money in the improvement of the city, and the conservative party would advocate economy and a reduction of taxation. And by the continued antagonism of these two forces the city would obtain the greatest improvement coupled with the strictest economy. For the party of progress, finding that it was always turned out of office by a spasm of economy among the voters, would seek to postpone the evil day as long as possible, and therefore, while continuing to improve the city, would seek to keep the expenditures down as low as it could, and be consistent with its policy of improvement. The conservative party, on the other hand, finding that it was always turned out of office by a craze for improvement breaking out among the voters, would seek to postpone its evil day as long as possible, and, therefore, while cutting off expense at every possible point, would not fail to preserve, in good shape, all the improvements made by the other party, and even, if

possible, to add a little more. And thus one party would temper its progress with economy, and the other party would temper its economy with progress, and the city would reap the benefits of both progress and economy and suffer from the excess of neither.







## APPENDIX.

### CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO.

#### ARTICLE I.

##### BOUNDARIES, RIGHTS, AND LIABILITIES.

(The usual provisions under this head are sufficient.)

#### ARTICLE II.

##### LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

#### CHAPTER I.

##### *The Council.*

SECTION 1. The powers of the City and County of San Francisco shall be vested in a body to be designated as the Council of the City and County of San Francisco.

SEC. 2. The Council shall have power to perform all acts not in their nature judicial or not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of this State, the general laws of this State, or the provisions of this Charter. The Board of Police Commissioners, the Board of Park Commissioners, the Board of Fire Commissioners, the City Hall Commissioners, the Board of Public Works, the Board of Education, the

Board of Health, and the State Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City and County of San Francisco are hereby abolished, and the powers heretofore held by them shall be held by the Council.

SEC. 3. The Council shall consist of one hundred members, who shall be elected severally from the wards of the City as hereinafter provided and shall hold office for two years. They shall serve without pay except the Mayor, the Supervisors, and the presiding officer, who shall receive the salaries hereinafter provided.

SEC. 4. Immediately upon the adoption of this Charter, or as soon thereafter as may be, the Commissioners of Election shall divide the City and County into one hundred separate districts ; which shall be known as wards and shall be numbered from one to one hundred consecutively. The said wards shall each contain as near as possible an equal number of voters as shown by the last previous general registration. The wards shall be reapportioned every four years to conform to the shifting of population. Each of said wards shall be composed wholly of contiguous territory. Each ward shall be represented in the Council by one member, who shall be voted for within the limits of one ward only.

SEC. 5. Any person who has been continuously for four years a duly qualified voter of the City and County of San Francisco shall be eligible to the office of member of the Council. Councilmen must be residents of the City and County, but need not be residents of the wards they represent, either before or after their election.

SEC. 6. The Council shall organize by electing a presiding officer, who shall be one of themselves. His official title shall be President of the Council. He shall be paid a salary of five hundred dollars per month. The presiding officer shall appoint a sergeant-at-arms and a

clerk, and as many assistants and at such salaries as the Council shall authorize.

SEC. 7. At least sixty days prior to any election held after the first organization of the Council under this Charter, at which members of the Council are to be voted for, the Mayor shall nominate one person for each ward as candidate for member of the Council. The names of all the persons so nominated shall be arranged according to the number of the wards, and the Mayor shall certify by his signature to the correctness of the list. The list, so certified, shall be transmitted by the Mayor to the Registrar of Elections, who shall cause the names upon the list to be placed upon the official ballot; and in addition to the usual party designation, the word "administration" shall be placed after each name. In all elections to fill vacancies in the Council the same proceedings shall be had.

SEC. 8. Any fifteen members of the Council, acting together, may, at least sixty days prior to any election held after the first organization of the Council under this Charter, at which members of the Council are to be voted for, nominate one person for each ward as candidate for member of the Council. The names of all the persons so nominated shall be arranged according to the number of the wards, and the list, so arranged, shall be certified to by the signatures of not less than fifteen members of the Council. The list, so certified, shall be transmitted by one of the Councilmen signing it to the Registrar of Elections, who shall cause the names upon the list to be placed upon the official ballot, and in addition to the usual party designation, the word "opposition" shall be placed after each name. In all elections to fill vacancies in the Council the same proceedings may be had. Nothing in this nor in the preceding section shall prevent the

names of any candidates who have complied with the ordinary provisions of law from being placed upon the official ballot.

## CHAPTER 2.

### *The Mayor.*

SECTION 1. Immediately upon organization, or as soon thereafter as may be, the Council shall elect a Mayor of the City and County of San Francisco, who shall be one of their own number and who shall retain his office as member of the Council and with voice and vote therein. The Mayor shall have no fixed term of office, but shall hold the same at the pleasure of the Council.

SEC. 2. The Mayor shall be the official head of the Government of the City and County of San Francisco. He shall appoint the heads of all the departments, and shall appoint the Supervisors. He may appoint a secretary and such clerks and assistants and at such salaries as the Council may prescribe. He shall be paid a salary of two thousand dollars per month.

## CHAPTER 3.

### *The Supervisors.*

SECTION 1. As soon as may be after his election, the Mayor shall appoint, from among the members of the Council, eight Supervisors who shall be the executive heads of the departments of the City and County government. The said Supervisors shall be designated as follows :

1. Supervisor of the Law Departments.
2. Supervisor of Finance.
3. Supervisor of Education.

4. Supervisor of Public Works, Streets, and Parks.
5. Supervisor of Police.
6. Supervisor of the Fire Department.
7. Supervisor of the Health Department.
8. Supervisor of the Harbor.

SEC. 2. The Supervisors shall hold their office at the pleasure of the Mayor. They shall each be paid a salary of one thousand dollars per month. They shall, in addition to their duties as members of the Council, perform the duties hereinafter described. They may each appoint a secretary, and such clerks and assistants and at such salaries as the Council may prescribe.

SEC. 3. The Supervisor of the Law Departments shall have general supervision and control, not inconsistent with the general laws of this State, over the departments of

The Superior Courts.

“ Police Courts.

“ Justice Courts.

“ City and County Attorney.

“ District Attorney.

“ Sheriff.

“ County Clerk.

“ Public Administrator.

“ Recorder.

“ Coroner.

The books, papers, and records of the said departments shall at all times be open to his inspection, and it shall be his duty to keep thoroughly informed as to the general conduct of the said departments, and to report the results of his investigations to the Mayor.

SEC. 4. The Supervisor of Finance shall have general supervision and control, not inconsistent with the general laws of this State, over the departments of

The Auditor.

“ Treasurer.

“ Tax Collector.

“ Assessor.

The books, papers, and records of the said departments shall at all times be open to his inspection, and it shall be his duty to keep thoroughly informed as to the general conduct of the said departments, and to report the results of his investigations to the Mayor.

SEC. 5. The Supervisor of Education shall have general supervision and control, not inconsistent with the general laws of this State, over the departments of

The Superintendent of Public Schools.

“ Chief Librarian.

“ Custodian of Public Schools and Libraries.

The books, papers, and records of the said departments shall at all times be open to his inspection, and it shall be his duty to keep thoroughly informed as to the general conduct of the said departments, and to report the results of his investigations to the Mayor.

SEC. 6. The Supervisor of Public Works, Streets, and Parks shall have general supervision and control, not inconsistent with the general laws of this State, over the departments of

The Superintendent of Public Works.

“ Superintendent of Streets.

“ Superintendent of Parks.

“ Custodian of Public Buildings.

The books, papers, and records of the said departments shall at all times be open to his inspection, and it shall be his duty to keep thoroughly informed as to the general conduct of the said departments, and to report the results of his investigations to the Mayor.

SEC. 7. The Supervisor of Police shall have general supervision and control, not inconsistent with the general laws of this State, over the department of

The Chief of Police.

The books, papers, and records of the said department shall at all times be open to his inspection, and it shall be his duty to keep thoroughly informed as to the general conduct of the said department, and to report the results of his investigations to the Mayor.

SEC. 8. The Supervisor of the Fire Department shall have general supervision and control, not inconsistent with the general laws of this State, over the department of

The Chief of the Fire Department.

The books, papers, and records of the said department shall at all times be open to his inspection, and it shall be his duty to keep thoroughly informed as to the general conduct of the said department, and to report the results of his investigations to the Mayor.

SEC. 9. The Supervisor of the Health Department shall have general supervision and control, not inconsistent with the general laws of this State, over the department of

The Superintendent of Public Health.

The books, papers, and records of the said department shall at all times be open to his inspection, and it shall be his duty to keep thoroughly informed as to the general conduct of the said department, and to report the results of his investigations to the Mayor.

SEC. 10. The Supervisor of the Harbor shall have general supervision and control, not inconsistent with the general laws of this State, over the department of

The Port Admiral.

The books, papers, and records of the said department shall at all times be open to his inspection, and it shall be his duty to keep thoroughly informed as to the general conduct of the said department, and to report the results of his investigations to the Mayor.

#### CHAPTER 4.

##### *The Administrative Departments.*

SECTION 1. The Mayor shall appoint a City Attorney, a Prosecuting Attorney, a Sheriff, a County Clerk, a Public Administrator, a Recorder, a Coroner, an Auditor, a Treasurer, a Tax Collector, an Assessor, a Superintendent of Public Works, a Superintendent of Streets, a Superintendent of Parks, a Custodian of Public Buildings, a Superintendent of Schools, a Chief Librarian, a Custodian of Schools and Libraries, a Chief of Police, a Chief of the Fire Department, a Chief of the Department of Public Health, and a Port Admiral, all of whom shall have no fixed tenure of office but shall hold the same at the pleasure of the Mayor.

SEC. 2. The officials provided for in Section 1 may appoint, subject to the civil-service provisions of this Charter, such deputies, assistants, or other employees as the Council may prescribe.

SEC. 3. All of the officers and employees provided for by this chapter shall be known by such titles, give such bonds, be subject to such penalties, perform such services, and be paid such salaries as the Council may prescribe.

#### ARTICLE III.

##### THE JUDICIARY.

(Under this head are treated the departments of  
The Superior Courts.

## The Police Courts.

## “ Justice Courts.

(The department of the courts is not here treated in detail for the reason that the various State constitutions prevent the application of the principles set forth in the preceding pages. Judges should be appointed for life, with adequate provisions for retirement and removal in the event of impaired efficiency, incompetency, or misconduct. Before such a system can be adopted the constitutions of the States must be amended to permit it.)

## ARTICLE IV.

## THE ELECTION COMMISSION.

(The usual provisions of city charters relative to Election Commissions are, in the main, sufficient. This department should be made as independent of the Council as possible, and therefore, their rights, duties, and privileges should be set forth particularly in detail. Their salaries should be stated, and their tenure of office fixed.)

## ARTICLE V.

## THE CIVIL SERVICE.

(The usual provisions covering the principle of civil-service reform are, in the main, sufficient. This commission, as the preceding one, should be independent of the influence or control of the Council so far as the provisions of the Charter can make it.)

## ARTICLE VI.

## AMENDMENTS.

(Provisions for amending the Charter.)



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
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